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DEFINITIONS AND EXPLANATIONS OF TERMS USED IN THIS THESIS

For the purposes of the questionnaire and in the text of this thesis, I have defined the terms used as follows:

Ethical issue: any aspect of professional life which has an ethical dimension.  It was not possible to offer a definition of the word ‘ethical’ on the questionnaire, because the purpose of questionnaire question one was to elicit the respondents’ own mental concept of ‘ethical’ in terms of professional practice.  Respondents necessarily completed the questionnaire from this personal viewpoint and the resulting responses are categorised and discussed in the body of the thesis.  

Ethical dilemma:  as above but where there is an ethical conflict between one or more courses of action.  In the body of the thesis, I use the term ethical dilemma to describe a situation where the EP ethically ought to do action A and also ought to do action B, where the two actions are, or appear to be, mutually exclusive, in other words, where it behoves the EP both to perform a certain action and at the same time to perform an incompatible action.

Ethical problem-solving: any strategy, reasoning or heuristic principle used to help resolve such dilemmas.

Ethics and virtue: The etymology of our word ‘ethics’ lies in the Greek ethos, relating to personal disposition or character (Ayto, 1990).  Following Aristotle, ethical behaviour is that which results from the development of a virtuous character, where the end pursuit of virtue (arête) is eudemonia (often translated as happiness, well-being or human flourishing), which is the highest aspiration or purpose (telos), for an individual human being or community.  In circular fashion, the development of a virtuous character involves establishing habits of virtuous behaviour, which in turn contribute to the individual’s accumulation of virtue.  So ethos is both a way of being for the subject as well as a way of acting which is visible to others.  It proposes an answer to Aristotle’s timeless question, ‘How should I live?’ with a conception of human flourishing which has virtue at its centre.  A good act is one done by a virtuous person at the right time in the right way for the right reasons.  A virtue is the mean between two related vices, where we either fall short or exceed the mean.  So, for example, to choose to be brave (at the right time for the right reasons) would be virtuous but bravura or cowardice would be regarded as vices.

Ethics as a discipline: As a branch of philosophy, sometimes called moral philosophy, ethics attempts to understand the nature of morality, what is right and what is wrong conduct and the nature of ‘the good’ in human flourishing.  There are numerous divisions of ethics, each with their own proponents and champions, for example, Aristotelian, Utilitarian and Kantian, Christian, Liberal and Marxist etc.  There is no neutral place from which to validate a whole ethical scheme – no place that is not some place (Vardy, 1994, p.18).  It is a vast subject, and one that is not fixed in time.  The discourses of any particular époque are underpinned by the particular regime of truth, the paradigm which holds at the time.  This is as true of value systems as it is of, for example, science.  

Ethical codes and codes of conduct: In the context of the professions, (for example, medicine, law and the social sciences) ethical codes are employed both in order to regulate those professional decisions and actions, which have potential to do harm (to the client or to the profession), which break new ground, or which require dispute resolution, and to set aspirational standards or ideals.  The professional actions we choose from amongst a multitude of other actions, which could, in their turn, have been chosen, require judgement and evaluation.  For example, what is it to be a ‘good’ psychologist?  We then begin to look at criteria of evaluation, and evaluation of right behaviour, the discussion of which is always embedded in the particular Zeitgeist in which it occurs, and consequently never completely universally resolved.

The divisions of ethics pertinent to this purpose are normative and applied ethics.  Normative ethics involves the formulation of theories of conduct, which examine what is right and what is wrong conduct, and which propose moral codes or rules. It also encompasses theories of value, which discuss the intrinsic and relative values of concepts of ‘good’ and ‘bad’.  Applied ethics involves the application of normative ethical theories to specific instances.  This enterprise can inevitably conflict with what has often become established practice through custom and tradition, and so another branch of applied ethics is casuistry or argument by cases, i.e. case law.  Here, responses to ethical dilemmas are determined by analysis of previous cases and by judiciously drawing parallels between them.  The role of ethics in professional life is formalised in each profession’s code(s) and through its ethical and disciplinary committees.

Morality: ‘Morality’ has its roots in the Latin mos meaning ‘custom’.  Its derived adjective, moralis was used in Latin to translate the Greek adjective ethikos to denote ‘the typical or proper behaviour of human beings in society’ (Ayto, op.cit.).  In this sense, morality refers to right or wrong actions rather than the character of the person who performs those actions.  It seeks an answer to the question, ‘How should I act?’ through concepts of obligations and rules.  

In current common usage, however, the adjectives ‘ethical’ and ‘moral’ in relation to behaviour have come to be treated as similar in meaning.

Moral philosophical terms used in this thesis: Ethical theories are grounded in certain basic assumptions or positions.  These are not necessarily always mutually exclusive and aspects of each can overlap but they focus on a particular premise.

Deontic (deontological):  Where codes of ethics and conduct are concerned with the moral imperative to do certain things and not to do others, they can be described as deontic, after the Greek word for duty.  The deontic tradition in philosophical ethics is a particular feature of Kant’s universalistic approach to ethics, in the late eighteenth century, which has remained extremely influential to the present day.  Basically, Kant argued that moral worth, i.e. doing what is right, consisted of obeying the moral law because it was universal and because it was the moral law, i.e. a categorical imperative, which is right of itself. 

Consequentialist:  The consequentialist position is that actions are right or wrong according to the result of their consequences.  It typically encompasses a Utilitarian consideration of the requirement to achieve the greatest good for the greatest number but can also go beyond that to include what contributes to the well-being of an individual life, or to the fair distribution of resources or to the generalization of moral goods such as equality or human rights.  From the notion of maximization of good to optimum good, what is right could be determined as what is optimum.  A broader generalisation of what is right, however, might be what is ‘satisfactory’ or ‘good enough’.

These two philosophical frameworks are sometimes referred to as an ethic of justice, that is, they involve the formulation of rules which, if applied rationally, objectively and universally, are deemed to result in actions which are morally justified.  From the Kantian perspective, the primary consideration is (very broadly) the protection of the individual rights of people as free rational agents, as in the Categorical Imperative, and from the utilitarian perspective, the primary consideration is (again very broadly) the general welfare of the greatest number because all people are worthy of respect and concern, as in the principle of utility.

Aretaic (virtue theoretical): There is a third dimension of ethical thinking where references are made to human attributes of excellence.  It is called aretaic, after the Greek word arête (virtue).  This involves an assumption that adherents should also seek to develop certain personal qualities such as, for example, honesty, integrity, industry, sound judgement and good will.  Whereas in the deontic and consequentialist traditions, practitioners are called upon to act and make decisions in one way rather than another, in this dimension of moral reasoning, practitioners are required to have or to seek to develop certain qualities of being, that is, to hold certain desirable dispositions of character, which can be called virtues.  Bond (1996) notes that, prior to the Enlightenment and Kant’s influential writings, philosophical ethics dealt with morality almost exclusively in aretaic terms.  There has been a post-war revival of interest in Virtue Ethics.  The aretaic turn is a movement in contemporary moral philosophy, which advocates a revisiting and contemporary revival of virtue ethics to emphasise character and human excellence or virtue as opposed to moral rules or consequences.

A final strand of philosophical thinking, which will be referred to in the course of this work, is the most modern, having emerged out of the feminist literature of the1960s and 1970s, (for example, Gilligan, 1982, and Noddings, 1984).  This is an ethic of care, whose defining feature is the paramount importance of responsibilities within relationships.  Unlike an ethic of justice, claims of objectivity, rationality and universality are considered less important than the dynamic of specific relationships where reasoning is not claimed to be objective or impartial because the agent is an active participant in a relationship.  Since we are in relationships with individual people with unique features, ethical conduct is that which entails moral particularism, that is, the merit of an action is ultimately determined by having regard to the best outcome within a specific context or situation.  There are different views regarding the extent to which care ethics should be regarded as a sub-set of virtue ethics.  For the purposes of this research and discussion, although the separate focus of care ethics is acknowledged in the Discussion: Part two, the two will essentially be considered as combined. 

Principle: The term is used to describe a value which is deemed to be fundamental and which may in some cases take on the aspect of a rule to be followed.
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For, however much educational psychology services and their members are forced into immediate administrative and legislative concerns by developments within central and local government, there remains a need for a theoretical underpinning to our work (Miller, 1995, p.5).

William James and Wilhelm Wundt, considered to be among the founding fathers of the academic discipline of psychology, were philosophers.  The ensuing success of psychology has arguably been because it moved from the discourse of philosophy to embrace a scientific, empirical investigatory discourse within a modernist paradigm.  However, in a secular and culturally relativist society such as the present Western society, discussion of the framework of values within which we act, of the moral indicators of our behaviour and of the dispositions of character that drive our actions seems to lag behind the quest for pragmatic solutions to ways of problem-solving and target-setting.  

This thesis argues that, in addition to the theoretical underpinning called for by Miller, and alongside pragmatic considerations, there is equally a need for an explicit ethical underpinning to our work as educational psychologists (EPs).

In the same year as the American Psychological Association (APA) adopted its latest revised Ethics Code, the British Psychological Society (BPS) journal, Educational and Child Psychology, published a special edition entitled ‘Ethics in Practice’ (Webster & Lloyd Bennett (eds.), 2002).  The editors noted (p.4) that, although ethical issues are foregrounded in other professional domains, such as medicine, it could well be argued that the status of ethics in psychology is out of step with the discipline’s rapid growth as a central science for society.  The stated aim of ‘Ethics in Practice’ was to realign the status of ethics in psychology to be congruent with its expansion as an applied discipline in society.  Webster and Lunt (ibid., p. 97) described ethics as having a two-fold function, firstly in guiding people towards optimal conduct and secondly, in defining standards which clients can expect and countering malpractice.  They also described (p.100) a compelling need for ‘ethical literacy’: a deeper understanding of the ethical principles which enable educational psychologists to engage in ethical dialogue, to share a common language for ethical analysis and to apply this to professional dilemmas and conflicts of interest.  This development in the professional practitioner of ethical literacy, also called ethical awareness or mindfulness by Webster and Bond (ibid., p.17) is a consistent theme amongst writers on the subject.  Franey (ibid., p. 48) defined ethical mindfulness as being alert to the ethical dimensions of professional behaviour in all areas of activity, all of the time.

Three years later, in 2005, the BPS Revised Code of Ethics and Conduct was published, becoming effective in 2006.  It is the latest in a series beginning in 1985, when the first code was adopted.  Members of the BPS work in diverse areas of psychology, not all health or education related.  For this reason, the published code focuses on describing and fostering universal obligations and values from which ethical decision-making might be expected to ensue, rather than on specifying particular approaches and methods. The BPS Division of Educational and Child Psychology (DECP) also publishes a set of guidelines of good practice (2002) more specifically directed to the practice of its members.  The Association of Educational Psychologists (AEP) publishes its own Code of Professional Practice in its members’ handbook (2003).

Six years on from the publication of this special edition, ‘Ethics in Practice’, three years after the revised BPS Code of Ethics and Conduct, with the existing 2002 DECP guidelines, and in the face of on-going changes in health and education services, what is the current status of ethics in educational psychology? 

The discussion is apposite since the reorganisation of children’s services, for example, ‘Every Child Matters’ (DfES, 2003), and the Children Act 2004, bring together educational, social care and health professionals, who may have different value systems, priorities, working guidelines and codes of practice together with EPs, who themselves may have conflicting views of their role and differing ethical perspectives, 
Management of change in educational contexts involves a complex set of social processes within which those at LEA, school and classroom levels develop their own interpretation of what a particular set of proposals means
(DfEE, 1999, Research Brief 91). 

The ethical concerns of a profession are reflected in its publications.  In Chapter 2, there is a review of the literature pertaining to ethics in the psychology professions.  There exists a large body of North American and European literature, especially in the fields of counselling, clinical psychology and psychotherapy, and a relatively smaller body of work specifically on ethical issues in educational psychology, or school psychology as it is called in North America.  A number of these authors address ethical analysis and problem-solving in the psychology professions, either from positions which support the principles approach to morality, or from a pragmatic perspective.  Some advocate a virtue ethical (aretaic) turn in the profession.  In Britain, disciplines such as social care, clinical and counselling psychology and psychotherapy address ethical issues in their literature, but empirical research on the subject is scarce, and there is a paucity of material on issues specifically faced by educational psychologists.  

Out of the study of the literature, four research questions are subsequently identified, and Chapter 3 describes and justifies the methodology chosen to investigate these questions.  The research undertaken is a partial response to Webster and Lunt’s statement that, A test of ethical awareness in psychologists is to solicit ethical problems, dilemmas and concerns from them.  Taken together, the ethical concerns of a professional group also give some insight into the prevailing culture and mindset (Webster & Lunt, op. cit., p.101).  

Through a questionnaire survey of the profession, the research aims to place a brick in the foundations of a search to ascertain the mindset of ethics in educational psychology in the first decade of the 21st century.  It seeks to identify EPs’ understandings of what it means to be an ethically literate practitioner, to describe the predominant ethical concerns that permeate current EPs’ working practices, to record their prevalence, to describe strategies EPs use to move towards resolution of their perceived ethical issues, and the worldview that underpins their value system.  This information will be useful in identifying prevalent issues of concern, in providing authentic examples for ethics awareness during EP training, in describing institutional pressures on the maintenance of a professional ethic, and in giving direction to future research on ethical issues in educational psychology.

Chapter 4 sets out the results of the questionnaire analysis, beginning with the sample data and followed by the results of each research question in turn. 

Chapter 5 is in two parts, the first being a discussion of the research findings as set out in Chapter 4.  In part two,  the discussion of the research results is broadened out to argue that contemporary Virtue Theory, for example as expounded by Alasdair MacIntyre (1985, 1988, 1992, 1998), may contribute a moral philosophical framework within which people from a variety of psychological disciplines, including EPs, might be able to construct a common language of ethics. 

Arguably, the psychology professions want for a post-enlightenment ethic.  Other professions (medical, clinical, occupational and business, noted in the following chapter) are already incorporating virtue ethical thinking into their professional discourse and investigating its potential to enhance research, training, practice and policy-making.  Therefore, I explore how a move towards a virtue ethical (aretaic) approach might play a more systematic part in the development of educational psychology and speculate upon what this might involve.









The discussion of ethics in psychological practice in general, and with particular reference to psychotherapy, clinical and counselling psychology, is well represented in the literature of professional ethics. A related body of literature refers to the teaching of ethics, ethical problem-solving and ethical induction to professional life. 

However, there is a relatively smaller body of empirical research specifically into ethical dilemmas and problem-solving amongst the psychological professions.  A large proportion of it is North American, with few instances of published research having been undertaken in the UK.  

The use of codes of ethics, or codes of conduct and ethics, often features prominently in the related literature.  The three codes generally adhered to by practitioners in this country are those of the BPS, AEP and DECP.  As ‘institutional texts’, codes are arguably necessary and have numerous advantages.  They are not without their limitations, however, and a body of critical literature, discussed in this chapter, notes these limitations and the manner in which codes can be used to support a particular hegemony.

Both practical rule of thumb and moral theoretical approaches to ethical problem solving are represented in the literature of psychology and in the literature of other disciplines.  A number of authors have proposed specific problem-solving heuristics, some based on codified principles, and some based on a more pragmatic view.

Others have linked a specifically virtue-ethical (aretaic) approach with the resolution of ethical issues in the professions, including that of psychology, or argued that the possibility of moral thought and judgement does not rest necessarily on the assumption of a number of pre-stated principles to which practitioners should subscribe.

The topics introduced above are expanded upon and referenced below.  Out of these, a number of research questions and discussion points pertinent to ethical issues in the current practice of educational psychology emerge.  

Ethics in psychological practice

The BPS journal, Educational and Child Psychology, published the previously mentioned special edition entitled, ‘Ethics in Practice’, in which Francis (2002, p.8) outlined the rationale for a professional ethic for educational psychology.  He referred to the relationship between law and morality, stating that it is the function of professional codes of ethics to promote aspirational value standards and the function of statutes to set and police behavioural standards.






Reports into ethical aspects of specifically educational psychological practice have been published in North America (e.g. Chevalier & Lyon, 1993, and Jacob-Timm, 1999).  Results of the North American study by Chevalier and Lyon indicated inconsistency amongst school psychologists both in actions taken in the resolution of ethical dilemmas and in rational decision-making about those dilemmas.  Jacob-Timm reported that 82% of the dilemmas reported in her survey represented ‘difficult situations’ or ‘ethical tugs’ experienced by the practitioners, rather than reports of specific violations of an ethical code.  She noted that these ‘tugs’ were created by competing ethical principles, by conflicts between ethics and law, by conflicting clients’ interests and by witnessing poor educational practices with the potential to harm pupils.  A Finnish study (Tirri, 1999) investigated teachers’ perceptions of moral dilemmas at school and is also of interest, given that, until 2006, there has been a requirement for EPs also to have undergone teacher training and to have practised as a teacher for two years.  She claimed that teachers reported that they were ill-prepared to deal with those ethical dilemmas they identified in their work, which usually involved competing views of the best interests of the child.  

However, there have been few published research reports which have specifically investigated the ethical experiences of EPs in the UK.  Lindsay (1996) analysed the EP responses to his survey of members of the BPS, Lindsay and Colley (1995).  He identified ten categories of ethical dilemmas experienced by EPs, of which the major one he called "professional gagging" of EPs by the LEA.  This reflects the perennial tension of the EP as an employee of the LEA but also wishing to act in the best interests of the child.  Little more than a decade later, this research will show that many of these issues remain current.  Mercieca (2007) examined how the uncertainty and anxiety provoked by EPs' experiences of ethical dilemmas can, far from being a negative experience, play a positive role.  In developing the ability to practise with uncertainty (p.170),  she argues that the practitioner is better placed to judge cases individually and to focus thereby on the best interests of the child.  Webster et al. (2000) published a survey report on the transition experiences of new entrants to educational psychology in their first year of practice, in which they reported that 18 respondents (11%) made reference to ethical dilemmas experienced in practice.  However, these dilemmas were not the focus of the research and were not described in detail.  Carrington et al. (2002) described ethical analyses of four cases from their practice as EPs in a local authority, in two cases using Bond’s (2000) six stage model of analysis and in two cases using what they described as a more fluid approach.  They recognised advantages in using staged problem-solving models but noted that their use required time for reflection which was not always available to a busy EP.  They noted also that ethics was not just a personal issue for EPs but that there were implications for psychology services in terms of ethical training and supervision.  The education authority also had a role to play in avoiding ethically compromising situations, a view echoed by Bracher and Hingley who state that,
        ethical decision-making ….is the end product of a dynamic equation which involves at least three key elements; the personal ethical stance of the individual; the wider societal and cultural values in which the practitioner operates; and the specific organisational purpose, organisational beliefs and values which justify and guide agency behaviour (Bracher & Hingley, 2002, p.82).

A survey was conducted by Lindsay and Colley (1995), of the general membership of the BPS, and another by Lindsay and Clarkson (1999) of psychotherapist members of the UKCP.  The first of these followed Lindsay’s Presidential Address to the BPS Annual Conference in1995.  In this, he referred to a number of North American empirical studies and to the debate on-going in the UK at that time about societal values, to make the point that psychology does not operate in a social and value free vacuum and can be driven in one direction or another by political and cultural agendas.  There nevertheless remained, he asserted, an element of choice for a profession in how to respond to those agendas, and a choice in defining the values which should guide practitioners’ responses and underpin their professional identity.  

Lindsay and Colley undertook their first empirical study to ascertain if BPS psychologists from a variety of the psychological professions faced real dilemmas for which the existing BPS code provided insufficient guidance.  The study replicated the US survey of Pope and Vetter (1992), and highlighted differences and similarities in the types and prevalence of the ethical dilemmas reported by American and British psychologists. It is referred to again later in this thesis.  Psychologists in other countries conducted similar studies, in an investigation of commonalities and differences in their experiences of ethics (for example, Pettifor, 2004, Fischer, 2004).  Lindsay and Colley reported two broad categories of ethical dilemmas, the first category comprising those dilemmas traditionally experienced at the client-practitioner interface e.g. confidentiality, and the second category comprising those dilemmas experienced at the practitioner-employer interface i.e., organisational constraints upon preferred practice. Aspects of the dilemmas in the second category, and practitioners’ strategies to resist administrative pressures to act unethically, have been researched in the United States by Helton et al. (2000) and Helton and Ray (2005).  They surveyed both school psychologists and special education teachers to investigate their experiences of, and strategies used to resist, administrative pressure to act in a manner they perceived to be unethical.

An unpublished Masters Degree thesis (Mancini, 1997) also investigated ethical issues, conducting a study of 10 EPs from four different local education authorities to ascertain the nature of dilemmas found to be ‘ethically troubling’ in the practice of educational psychology.  His research categorised 17 particular types of dilemma volunteered by EPs, of which two corresponded to Lindsay and Colley’s client-practitioner interface and the remainder corresponded to the practitioner-employer interface.

Lindsay and Clarkson subsequently, and by way of comparison, surveyed the reported ethical dilemmas of UKCP psychotherapists, finding that, in contrast to the psychologists, most psychotherapists reported dilemmas of the client-practitioner type.  The researchers noted, interestingly, that in all three studies (i.e. including the US study) a significant minority of respondents reported that they had no ethical dilemmas.  In explanation, and with reference to the UK studies, Franey (2002, p.48) noted that some psychologists might fail to recognise ethical issues, As a nascent area of study, it would not be unreasonable to speculate that an inherent conservative tendency would underplay the relationship between ethics and psychology.  This result will be compared later with the findings of the current survey.

The above mentioned studies are situated within the broader context of a voluminous body of research and academic publications on the subject of ethics in the psychological professions in general, and in particular, clinical and counselling psychology and psychotherapy, which began to emerge in the post-war years, (the APA developed its first written code of ethics in 1953).  This literature became especially prolific during the 1970s and1980s, possibly stimulated in part as a result of interest generated by the publication in 1969 of Kohlberg’s Stages in the Development of Moral Thought and Action and in 1984 of Psychology of Moral Development.  At the same time, interest in the subject was emerging in the UK (the BPS published its first code of ethics in 1985) and amongst psychological associations in Europe and world wide.  This large body of academic literature and research studies has centred on:

(i) the ethical beliefs, ethical dilemmas, ethical decision-making processes and behaviour of psychological, psychotherapeutic and counselling practitioners and researchers in general, for example, Welfel and Lipsitz (1984), Bernard and Jara (1986), Haas et al. (1986), Pope et al. (1987),  Pope and Bajt (1988), Jordan and Meara (1990), Wilkins et al. (1990), Rae and Worschel (1991), Kimmel (1991), Pope and Vetter (1992), Prilleltensky (1994), Bersoff (1995), Pomerantz et al. (1998), Prilleltensky et al. (1999), Tubbs and Pomerantz (2001) Mannheim et al. (2002), Gottlieb (2006), Knapp et al. (2007) and Seider et al. (2007).  These did not specifically involve educational or school psychology.

(ii) the role of psychologists’ personal and professional characteristics (including gender), competence and emotional awareness as factors in their ethical decision-making, e.g. Keith-Spiegel (1977), Hall (1987), Haas et al. (1988), Skorupa and Agresti, (1993), Betan and Stanton (1999), Lunt (2000), Brodsky and McKinley (2002), Johnson and Campbell (2002).

(iii) ethics teaching, training, supervision and induction within the psychological professions, e.g. Abeles (1980), Baldick (1980), Newmark and Hutchins (1981), Welfel and Lipsitz (1983), Ridley (1985), Tymchuk (1986), Eberlein (1987), Hillerbrand (1988), Rosnow (1990), Tabachnick et al (1991), Kitchener (1992), Vasquez (1992), Welfel (1992), Welfel and Kitchener (1992), Schön (1996), Bersoff and Ogloff (1997), Francis (1999), Kitchener (2000), Arnstine (2000), Blizek (2000), Scaife (2001), Pettifor et al. (2002), Handelsman et al. (2005).

(iv) provision of ethical guidelines and decision making support for practitioners, for example, Pope and Vasquez (1991), Smith et al (1991), Keith-Spiegel and Koocher (1995), Francis (1999), Jacob-Timm (1999), Bond (2000), Swain (2000) and Gottlieb(2006).  Cottone and Claus (2000) provide a comprehensive review of the literature on ethical decision-making models up to 1998.

(v) the ethics of specific aspects of psychological testing, for example, computerized assessment, and psychological report writing, for example, Rupert et al. (1999), Smith et al. (1991), Hansen et al. (1999), Groth-Marnat and Horvath (2005), Michaels (2005).





        A profession such as psychology requires an ethics code because society sustains a different relationship with professions than with a commercial enterprise or ventures…As professions developed, however, people began to expect professionals to be trustworthy and competent and to cause no harm.  Professions must then instigate mechanisms that balance their self-interests against the interests of the people with whom they work (Keith-Spiegel & Koocher, 1995, p.1-2).

It is only since the post-war Nuremberg Code of 1946 that emerged in response to the atrocities of the Nazi regime, in which scientists and doctors alike colluded, that these quasi-legal documents have proliferated to encompass virtually every profession, including those in the social sciences.  Because of their relevance in this study, they will be discussed in some detail.  Lindsay (1996) also provides a broad overview with specific reference to European and North American codes.  Pettifor (2005) and Strong (2005) demonstrate the socially constructed nature of the principles expressed in codes.

The biomedical model, where ethical performance is monitored by internal review boards or committees made up of experts and lay people is the oldest and the one to which other professions generally aspire. Its code is both the point of reference for practitioners and the basis for the accumulation of ‘case-law’.  Casuistry (i.e. argument by cases) is an attempt to determine the correct response to a moral dilemma by drawing parallels with previously agreed cases.  For heterogeneous groupings of people, whose only common bond might be the profession they practise, this has the advantage that it does not require agreement on any specific metatheory of ethics in order for policy to be determined.  In other words, it can provide a pragmatic solution on which those coming from different philosophical or even religious backgrounds can agree.  Codes can also act as a protection against litigation by clients, when the practitioner can demonstrate evidence of conformity with a relevant professional code.
New entrants to a profession who need induction, as well as experienced practitioners faced with changing cultural or media mores and scientific or technical innovations, require what Webster and Lunt (2002, p.97) describe as a compass helping practitioners to decide a course of action in conditions of ‘poor visibility’, that is, a framework for decision-making which is neither prescriptive nor binding but provides guiding principles for decision-making.  Webster and Bond refer to codes as a form of service warranty. They argue that codes of ethics have a wider function than to regulate the space between client and practitioner,
Ethics is …about professional discourse and dialogue, a consensual validation of the most recent views of the majority of practitioners about how best to make a difference.  A professional ethic for psychologists is thus fundamentally a social and iterative process, concerned with the development and maintenance of a professional culture (Webster & Bond, 2002, p.16).
That is, one of the functions of a code is to develop a professional culture, by setting out normative values, standards and practices, encouraging evidence-based interventions and exhorting practitioners to take ownership of the principles under which they practise.  Keith-Spiegel and Koocher (op. cit., p.2) quote Levy (1974, p.207) in support of the above, occupational groups are most often moved by a genuine need for guides to action in situations of agonising conflict and by sincere aspirations to deal justly with clients, colleagues and society.

So, codes of ethics and codes of conduct illuminate the desirable relationship to be had between practitioners and clients, specifying the rights of, and responsibilities to the client.  They usually involve protection of client welfare and privacy, and minimum standards of competence, integrity and responsibility on the part of the practitioner.  Codes of ethics may describe a framework of overarching moral values or ethical principles to which the practitioner is expected to subscribe, while codes of conduct may prescribe rules of conduct and good practice.

Codes also usually clarify the rights and responsibilities of professionals in their relationships with each other.  They force greater awareness of ethical issues on practitioners, when taught on professional training courses and debated within professions.  In academic research, codes can act as a protection against the subordination of the interests of people researched to the interests of the researchers.  Ethical codes can also act as a guide and a protection to the practitioner faced with resolving both individual and institutional ethical dilemmas.  They enable a discipline to achieve status as a professional group capable of self regulation. 

Psychological associations and employers issue guidelines to psychology practitioners and employees. Codes of ethics have been developed by the professional psychological associations of Europe, North America and worldwide.  The plurality of different codes throws up questions of pluralist values and professional requirements across borders.  There is a need for psychological organisations to monitor the training of their members and to require minimal standards of both training and professional behaviour and, although the existing codes had numerous features in common, there were also significant local differences which militated against the creation of a single code suitable for all psychologists practising in all of the different member countries of the European Federation.   The alternative model was to create a cross-national Metacode.  Member psychology associations had to have regard to the provisions of this Metacode when drawing up their own national ethical codes.  It was produced in 1995 by the European Federation of Professional Psychological Associations (Pettifor, 2004) and was revised in 2005 with minor amendments.  The present BPS code was subsequently revised and reissued in accordance with its requirements.  The history and rationale behind this Metacode are described by Lindsay et al. (2008).

The BPS revised Code of Ethics and Conduct came into effect in March 2006, the latest in a series beginning in 1985, and is now "fit for purpose" in that it is compliant with the provisions of the European Metacode, including having provision for complaints procedures.  Although the HPC has set out its own generic Code of Conduct written for the workforce anticipated to work under its remit, the BPS aspires to provide guidance more specifically tailored to the needs of psychologists than the generic standards set out in the Health Professions Council’s Code of Conduct, (BPS, 2005, p.2), and to build upon previous codes by giving more emphasis and support to the process of ethical decision-making. The raison d’être of the code is to support the ethical decision making process, through the provision of four Ethical Principles, (Respect, Competence, Responsibility, and Integrity), each being defined through a Statement of Values and made explicit through the setting out of Standards of Behaviour to which reference should be made in practice.  This code should be seen as setting out ethical principles as aspirational norms for professional practice, and as a text for consultation, rather than a set of fixed rules pertaining to minimal standards, and criteria for disciplinary action.

From 2009, it is envisaged that psychologists will be regulated by the Health Professions Council and become subject to its "Standards of Conduct, performance and ethics" (HPC, 2008).  This sets out fourteen statements of practice as enforceable behavioural obligations, each prefaced by the directive, "You must…", for example (p.3), You must act in the best interest of service users.  It does not specify how the standards must be met, but acknowledges the role of other professional bodies, (p5), In particular, we recognise the valuable role professional bodies play in representing and promoting the interests of their members.  This often includes providing guidance and advice about good practice, which can help you meet the standards in this document.  The HPC states that judgements made in practice must be informed, reasonable and professional and that awareness of other guidance available is crucial in obtaining enough information upon which to base decisions.  In practice, if an educational psychologist can demonstrate that they have acted in accordance with their own professional code, it is unlikely that they would fail to meet the minimal behavioural standards of the HPC, which have a primarily regulatory  function.  

The BPS code, and others like it, relies on modern, ethnocentric and deeply buried assumptions.  It describes its philosophical approach as the ‘British Eclectic Tradition’ (although a Web of Knowledge database search dated 01.04.06 for this term produced no result).  It embodies post-Enlightenment concepts such as human rights, individual autonomy, equality, and social inclusion, which can be traced to utilitarian philosophies, which emerged in the latter half of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and whose prominent advocates in the English-speaking world were John Stuart Mill, Jeremy Bentham and Mary Wollstonecraft.  It also acknowledges more explicit Kantian influence, in a formulation of the Categorical Imperative Treat humanity in your own person and in others always as an end and never only as a means, which it states forms the basis of the code (BPS, 2006, p.6).









As professional codes are usually and necessarily brief and general rather than specific in nature, (since they cannot foresee every ethical problem that might arise) their application in specific situations is often difficult and many ethical dilemmas are left for the individual practitioner to resolve.  Codes do not, of themselves, protect clients in professional psychological practice, because individuals are motivated to act, for better or worse, by more than systems imposed by exterior bodies.   

The necessarily general nature and abstract wording of codes of ethics can lead to different interpretations of the codes, depending on the particular world views of the individual practitioner, members of the review board or of the disciplinary committee. In this sense, there is little difference between the quasi-legal status of the codes and the law in that both rely on interpretation by ‘experts’ and casuistry in order to provide judgements.  A legalistic or institutional approach, with its tendency to increase external monitoring, shifts the emphasis of ethics away from applied practice by the practitioner to the practice of rule making and rule observing, rather than being integral to the practitioner’s mindset and professional judgement.  However, an important difference is that, while all citizens are subject to the law, not all professional practitioners in educational psychology are subject to the rulings of the BPS because membership is not currently compulsory, unlike registration with the Health Professions Council, which is projected to become compulsory for all EPs in 2009.  
  
Shaw (2003), writing from a social care perspective, points out that ethical codes, practice guidelines, disciplinary and regulatory committees are useful and necessary for the regulation of professions but cannot alone ensure the integrity of the profession or the welfare of the client.  Their existence should not obviate the need for vigilance with regard to the regulation of the shifting balance of power within discourse and the potential for abuse of rights that exists in all relationships but especially in the relationships between the client and practitioner.  In this relationship, power can find its justification in the privilege of expertise.  

It is a modernist view that presumes progress of knowledge, by definition, to be good, or at least harmless.  Meskell and Pels (2005), writing from an anthropological perspective, compare the pursuit of professional expertise to the colonial settler doctrine of terra nullius, that is to say, just as the first colonists to cultivate the fields of a land could claim ownership of it, dispossessing the original inhabitants, so the first to access information and intellectual property can claim ownership, dispossessing the original participants of their joint ownership in that particular epistemology.  Meskell and Pels emphasise the need to maintain the flexibility for open-ended negotiation and practical ethical engagement between expert practitioners, their clients, research participants, and diverse audiences.  They argue that moral values imposed from the top down can disembed guidelines from practice and ultimately distort practice or, worse, impose alien standards.  In the context of educational psychology, Billington (2000) illustrates how hegemonic power relations can militate against EPs’ search for ethical scientific practices and reflection on first principles by dominating the professional discourse in terms of technologies of assessment and deficit modelling. The practitioner’s adherence to a code of practice cannot, per se, protect the client from coercive practices.

Pomerantz et al. (1998), researching the differences between ethical beliefs of psychotherapists and undergraduate students, note that psychotherapists may hold ethical beliefs at odds with those of their clients.  Where ethical decisions are negotiated between parties, a redefinition of the locus of expertise, hence power, is implied.  In assuming the power to decide themselves what is and is not ethical, without evidence of negotiation with other involved parties, professional committees and individuals can also perpetuate power differentials.  In psychology, this lack of negotiation can maintain the therapeutic relationship between practitioner and client in dyadic terms, maintaining a presupposed distinction between the expert and layperson, where the ability of the former to produce propositions about humanity, which are more valid than those of the latter are assumed, and the relationship of power is maintained.  

Homan (1991) recognises one of the dangers of professional codification of ethics as being the loss of the dynamic process of debate, and the potential fossilization of an ethical code as a quasi-legal instrument.  Ethical authority can be thereby usurped by institutional powers.  
In practice, ethics has come to be no longer the philosophical study of values such as the ethic of autonomy, the ethics of non-malfeasance, that of utility and that of good consequences… for better or worse, the literature is now at the stage of not moving forward procedures to safeguard these ethics, but of recognising consensual standards and judging examples of social research accordingly (Homan, 1991, p.2). 
 
He acknowledges the three-way tension that can exist between the personal moral standards with which people enter a profession, professional ethical norms and generally accepted public levels of morality and raises the question of whose morals should be followed. This question becomes acute when professional bodies with different traditions are merged and guidelines blur.  For example, the requirement to preserve confidentiality may become blurred, as different institutions are compelled by law to share information, especially where there are child protection concerns.  If the moral high ground of ethical practice is hijacked by any one service, then in order for one opinion to prevail over all of the others, one must necessarily enter into a power relationship in which the strongest will overcomes.

A legalistic and institutional approach shifts the emphasis of ethics away from applied practice by the professional to the practice of rule making and rule observing.  In other words, the completion and approval of checklists or ‘tick-boxes’ with regard to ethical approaches to problem-solving becomes an externally imposed bureaucratic hurdle to be jumped, rather than integral to the researcher or practitioner’s mindset and behaviour. It can also promote defensive practice and risk-averse management of psychological services.  

Codification can contribute to the creation of historical discontinuities by setting up marker buoys to indicate practices that will thereafter be either discontinued or entrenched.  There is a danger that codes can substitute the application of rules for the responsible agency of the moral self.  Rather, ethics need to be embedded in daily professional practice in such a way as to open up negotiation between practitioners and those from whom they distinguish themselves as experts, that is to say, their clients, as well as more diverse audiences in the public arena.  

Although codes can guide practice, they cannot necessarily provide the level of specificity required to meet all of the complex judgements that EPs are called upon to make (e.g. Bersoff, 1994).  Bond (2000) argues, in the context of the therapeutic counselling relationship, that there may be occasions when, in full cognisance of a code, the practitioner decides to act otherwise than in accordance with one or more of its principles if to do so would be to act in the best interests of the client.  To do so, however, requires a fine ethical judgement, which in turn has to be developed and refined.  Dancy (2004) also argues that the possibility of moral thought and judgement does not rest necessarily on the assumption of a number of pre-stated principles to which practitioners should subscribe, but advocates a particularism which is rationally based.  He disputes the assertion that to be a moral agent, one must adhere to rules or principles, and argues that to do so is to act in accordance only with prima facie duty, but not with duty proper.  A reason for action can make a difference in one case that it does not make in another, and that each case should be analysed in terms of its own unique complex of features.  This notion will be further discussed in chapter 5(b).

Raven (2000) articulated the concerns of some psychologists regarding the reification of the world view and the routinised application of codes of ethics against what he describes as the real severity of the ethical dilemmas faced by the profession.  He argues that it is wrong to take a narrow traditional view of ethics as limited to conventional proscriptions but that codes should prescribe standards that induce proactive behaviour to avoid ethical lapses of omission.  

With the progress of time, and changing mores, an appeal to internal traditions and previously adequate pragmatic solutions may not always be appropriate and fresh assessments of what are appropriate ethical responses for a profession need to be debated.  Drenth (1999) asks, with reference to the social and ethical limitations of behavioural science, who should control what and on what criteria?  

It is possible to argue that ethical codes and guidelines can be enjoined more for the defence and protection of institutions themselves than for the well being of those people for whom ethical behaviour has real consequences.  Defensive practice, which is defined here as acting through fear of litigation, primarily in self-interest or in the interest of the employing institution, does not necessarily deliver high quality service to the client, even though no law or code may have been breached.  For a comment on the limitations of rule-bound systems see Cullen (1998).

Canadian authors, Bryceland and Stam (2005), acknowledge the usefulness of codes which can serve both to protect the autonomy of the psychology profession and its self regulatory role.  However, where institutional requirements, such as for empirically supported interventions, begin to infiltrate ethical frameworks, they argue that some recognised psychological therapies become in danger of being considered unethical and marginalised.  Their point is that the language of ethics and the tool of ethical codes can be usurped by a particular hegemony for their own purposes, We argue that it is a misuse of codes of ethics to co-opt them into debates that are essentially professional and bureaucratic, but are not primarily about proper or ethical conduct in the field of therapy (Bryceland & Stam, 2005, p.133).  There arises then the potential for disciplinary action for breach of a code for any psychologist who practices a therapy which has not been empirically tested and approved.  The extent to which one and the same code is appropriate for both practitioners and academics is debated by Fischer (2003a) and Haverkamp (2005).  In the context of educational psychology research, Fox and Rendall (2002) argue for a clearly constructed ethical narrative.

Ethical decision-making and problem-solving

There is a semantic difference in the use of the term of ‘ethical dilemmas’ between authors.  Francis (2002, p.12), appears to define an ethical dilemma as a potential violation of an aspect of an ethical code, The first [issue to be addressed] is to identify that the problem is an ethical (and not some other sort) of dilemma.  If it is one would want to know exactly what part of the code had been breached.  Jacob-Timm (1999) includes difficult situations and ethical tugs and ethically troubling situations in addition to violations of a code.  The way in which ethical dilemmas are conceptualized by writers on the subject in large part defines their responses to their resolution.

Several authors have suggested pragmatic approaches towards the resolution of ethical dilemmas in psychology e.g. Tymchuk (1986), Pope and Vasquez (1991), Keith-Spiegel and Koocher (1995), Hansen and Goldberg. (1999), Bond (2000), Fischer (2003b), and Flanagan et al. (2005).  These usually take the form of a staged model which encourages definition of the issue, identification of relevant professional guidelines or principles, reflection, evaluation, and peer review.  They can be useful in structuring reflection on the ethico-legal aspects of a dilemma, consultations with colleagues, review of guidelines and as an evaluation of the rights, responsibilities and welfare of all affected parties.  They allow the practitioner to describe (and if necessary defend) how a decision has been reached.

Keith-Spiegel and Koocher (op. cit.) observe also that the ethical ideologies held by an individual determine their decisions with regard to particular professional decisions and actions.  Other determinants of professional conduct may be related to personality, and traits such as proneness to anxiety, depression or shyness. 

 Festinger’s (1957) theory of cognitive dissonance, which will be referred to later in the thesis in connexion with ethical dilemmas in professional practice, states that there are individual differences among people’s tolerance of dissonance which will affect their cognitions and actions.  Forsyth (1992) cites individual differences in idealism on the relative-absolute continuum as one dimension of ethical decision making.  Another thread of research compares an ethic of care with an ethic of justice, with some authors, e.g. Gilligan (1982) and Gilligan et al. (1988), claiming a feminist and empathy link to an ethic of care. 

Singer (1998) attempted to evaluate the role in ethical decision-making of an agent’s subjective concerns in combination with the intensity of the characteristics of the ethical instance being scrutinised.  Relevant considerations bearing on the ethical decision taken proved to be: the consequences of any action taken, perceived notions of fairness, feelings of closeness or relational involvement with people involved and the degree of social consensus felt.  He argued that this latter consideration features most prominently in the dialogue process by which ethical solutions are negotiated, and states that, In Kohlberg’s (1976) notion of conventional morality, the primary motivation for morality is a desire to conform, and the main moral consideration is socially agreed upon rules (Singer, 1998, p.664). 

Judgements of fairness also correlated highly with judgements of justice and ethicality.  Carr (1998) strongly criticises some official approaches to moral education in their conceptual confusion between personal and commonly held values.  The latter are directed to the common good of the organisation and to exerting influence on and determining the identity, role and power of individuals who work within it.  Personal values are more grounded in principle and sentiment.

What this shows is that models of ethical problem solving which do not have regard to the wider issues which relate both to the characteristics of the problem and to the nature and subjectivity of the problem solver may have limited scope.  It also makes the case for trans-disciplinary collaboration on the subject of ethics in order to disseminate research, open up debate and avoid professional parochialism.  For example, Ford et al. (2005) have written a review of the empirical literature on ethical decision making in business ethics.  Also writing from a business ethics position, Adam and Rachman-Moore (2004) discuss the different methods which can be used to implement an ethical code of conduct and how these can be made maximally effective.  Kyarimpa and Garcia-Zamor (2006) consider the issue of individual conscience and organisational constraints in the wider public service context.  Back (2006) debates the relationship between ethics and compliance and Morrell (2006) examines the relationship between governance and ethics in the context of the NHS.  Hutton and Massey (2006) develop the theme of the dual allegiance of the professional both to the employer and to the profession.  London (2005) specifically raises the issue of dual loyalties and ethical and human rights obligations in the context of occupational health professionals.  Gardiner (2003) specifically relates virtue ethics to the analysis of moral dilemmas in medicine, and Braunack-Meyer (2005) investigated doctors’ articulated notions of ‘the good’ in terms of the virtues necessarily practised in ‘good doctoring’. There is a wealth of informed comment and research in the business, health professions and scientific journals which is also relevant to psychological practice.

Francis consistently with his previously stated views, takes a quasi legalistic position, advocating collection of evidence, witness statements etc prior to informal mediation, which, he opines, obviates in most cases the need for formal disciplinary proceedings.  He advocates a sufficing principle of finding the best solution that we can manage in the circumstances, accepts apparently uncritically that political and commercial imperatives drive so many decisions and suggests the adoption of constant improvement whereby a solution that can be deemed satisfactory will leave the situation improved and act as a learning experience.  Francis asserts that the gradual improvement method will probably bring about better ethics than moral perfection but also acknowledges that this idea could be used as a means of not trying harder (Francis, 2002, p.12-13). 

There is a tension between ethical absolutism and the professional discretion required to make specific decisions in particular cases.  Pope and Vasquez (1991) ask, 
How can psychologists who believe that the authority of the legal and ethical codes are not absolute ensure that their actions are based upon sound professional judgement, rather than on self interest, prejudice, rationalisation and the sense that one is above the law? (Pope & Vasquez, 1991, p.829).





Codes of practice, as aids to ethical problem-solving, are based on largely deontological and utilitarian or consequentialist approaches to ethics.  Morrell (op. cit.) provides an interesting examination of the links between forms of governance and the ethical frameworks considered in this thesis.  
The various approaches to ethics are not always necessarily mutually exclusive but rather emphasise different foci and orientation.  

The deontic approach sets out rules or imperatives about what should be done or not done.  It is not the outcome of an action that determines if it is a moral action but the rational application of the principles laid down by the Categorical Imperative.  The consequentialist approach finds the justification of an act in its outcome.  Utilitarianism is the best known form of this, where, generally speaking, the principle of utility would state that actions are right depending on how much human or sentient well-being they produce. These two frameworks, here sketched in broad brush strokes, have formed the basis of ethical thinking since the Enlightenment.  However, a number of modern philosophers, for example Anscombe (1958), Foot (1978), MacIntyre (1985), and Hursthouse (1999) have argued for a renaissance of a virtue-ethical (aretaic) approach.  MacIntyre is particularly a proponent for an aretaic turn in professional practice. 

Arguably, an aretaic approach would render mere lip service to ethical codes less likely, because being of good faith or good character as a person and asking the question, ‘What is the laudable (admirable, commendable) thing to do in this situation?’ would be integral to the process of ethical decision-making and result in a process that would then carry an ethical obligation, or as Hursthouse (op. cit) calls it, a virtue rule.  How the practitioner acquires the experience and wisdom to make these fine judgements then returns us to the literature of teaching ethics, professional induction and supervision.

Other disciplines are ahead of educational psychology in advocating a virtue-ethical approach.  Meara et al. (1996) and Meara and Day (2003), writing from a counselling psychology perspective, advocate a specifically aretaic approach to ethical problem-solving in psychology, not to supplement but to enrich existing principle-based practices. The synthesis of the two ethical approaches, principles and virtues, they argue, is more likely to protect clients and ultimately to promote and secure an ethically justifiable practice.  Virtue ethics can be helpful in guiding ethical conduct in multicultural settings and interactions (Katayama, 2003).  See also Beauchamp and Childress (2001) for a discussion of the relevance of virtue theory to the practice of medicine, and Morrell (op. cit.) to public sector management, amongst numerous others.  Bloch et al. (2006), writing from a psychiatry perspective, propose a similar approach, advocating that one based on principles should be complemented in a synergistic way by care ethics, a variant of virtue theory, which highlights character traits pertinent to caring for vulnerable patients.  

The argument for virtue ethics in qualitative research is typified by Brinkmann and Kvale (2005).  Sellman (2000) argues that nursing is a practice in MacIntyrean terms and Gardiner (2003) in her conclusion to a discussion of virtue ethics illustrated through case studies in medical practice states that, 
One of the attractions of virtue ethics is the flexibility to assess each situation individually, searching for action guidance in considering what a characteristically virtuous person would do.  This would be illuminated and informed by the relevant facts and individual ethical sensitivities of that circumstance.  This allows and encourages creative solutions to very hard problems, which might be more difficult to find when applying rules and principles (Gardiner, 2003, p.300).

Academic disciplines are what Foucault (1988) called Technologies of the Self and they construct their subjectivity partly by examination of their beliefs about what it is good to be, which then become grounded in ethical codes about what it is right to do.  An example of a debate, which, over the last decades, has shifted the predominant ethical narrative, is that of the move from medical paternalism to the recognition of partnership with the expert patient, a move that has been paralleled to some extent in the social sciences.

Oakley and Cocking (2001) take the examples of legal and medical practice to illustrate how a virtue-ethical approach has the resources to provide a different understanding of what it is to be ethical in the professional role in general.  Their ideas will be discussed at greater length in the Discussion: Part two section of this thesis, with reference to their potential for informing educational psychology practice.  Following virtue-ethical approaches in other above-mentioned professions, what is being advocated in this thesis is an aretaic turn in educational psychology.

There are critics of virtue ethics, for example, Miller (1991), Bersoff (1996), Louden (1997), and Everitt (2007), who put forward a range of arguments against virtue, largely based upon the difficulties around the cultural construct of virtue, the identification and definition of specific virtues, their relative importance and universal application.  One objection is that even if there could be consensus about the character of the virtuous agent, application of the ‘virtue rules’ is too open to interpretation, and that two different courses of action can both be seen as right.  I argue later that this is actually an advantage.





From the above review of the literature, despite informed debate and research on ethics in the psychology professions in general, originating especially from North America, the paucity of empirical research into ethical issues specifically facing educational psychologists in this country is apparent. 

Lindsay (1995) queried the extent of congruence between ethical dilemmas faced by psychologists in their daily practice, their own attitudes towards such dilemmas, their behaviours when confronted with these issues, and the BPS Code of Conduct.  Arguably, there are also cases for research into the current state of ethics teaching in educational psychology training courses, into the ethical attitudes and beliefs of both trainee and experienced educational psychologists, into their awareness of ethical issues, decision making processes, and their resistance to institutional pressures, into the use made by EPs of the BPS and other codes…the field is potentially extensive.

Meara et al. (op. cit.) expressed the hope that their proposal for a synthesis of principle and virtue ethics would stimulate thought and reflection on professional ethics and begin to fill the large void in formal conversations regarding ethics.  They advocate that, 
part of the void in conversations about ethics can be filled with a consideration of virtue ethics as a complementary phenomenon to principle ethics….Such an integrative view of principle and virtue ethics can improve research and instruction of professional ethics and result in a code and practices that are more cognisant of cultural pluralism (Meara et al., 1996, p.5). 





1.	Do educational psychologists have a common understanding of the term ‘ethical’ in the context of their working practices?

1.	To what extent do educational psychologists believe that they regularly encounter ethical dilemmas in their practice?

1.	What is the nature of dilemmas perceived to be ethical by educational psychologists?












In order to provide answers to the research questions, which are as robust as possible, a number of different sources of data, both qualitative and quantitative, have been employed.  A questionnaire survey was used in order to generate knowledge about the range of views held on the subject under scrutiny.  Some questionnaire questions asked for quantitative data while others requested qualitative data in order to provide the survey results with the richness and depth which open ended questions can provide.  The task was to develop a methodology that was ‘fit for purpose’.  The quantitative data has provided information for a number of questions with associated numerical and statistical properties.  However, research into people’s perspectives is necessarily multi-factorial.  That is, factors interact in ways that make the use of traditional experimental methodologies with their dependant and independent variables inappropriate.  Qualitative data, (which forms the larger part of this survey), is more useful in revealing other aspects of the research questions and has been used here in order to provide more detailed insights into key concepts held by the respondents.  

The research described below has sought to investigate as wide a spectrum as possible of EPs’ ethical beliefs and how these beliefs may affect their professional decision-making.  It has also sought to describe the kinds of dilemmas most commonly encountered by EPs, which they believe have an ethical dimension.  Theory provides a framework for understanding and organising constructions of knowledge.  At the outset of a research study, it is not possible to predict with certitude either the route through the morass of data collection or the destination to which the route leads.  The aim of this research is to generate theory, but building theory is not the only goal of doing research.  High-level description and what we call conceptual ordering also are important to the generation of knowledge and can make a valuable contribution to a discipline (Strauss and Corbin, 1998, Preface).  It is anticipated that the results will reveal individual responses as well as grounded themes so as to convey respectively both detail and breadth of perspectives.

The research questions are restated here for ease of reference.  They are:

1.	Do EPs have a common understanding of the term ‘ethical’ in the context of their working practices?
1.	To what extent do EPs believe that they regularly encounter ethical dilemmas in their practice?
1.	What is the nature of the dilemmas perceived to be ethical by EPs?








A number of research strategies were considered in order to provide responses to the research questions above.

Consideration was first given to a case study approach or a comparative case study approach where one or more EPs would be invited to keep diaries over time and/or be interviewed in relation to their experiences of ethical dilemmas and of making ethical choices in the workplace.  This was the methodology of choice in an Australian study of social workers by McAuliffe (2007) and a Finnish study of teachers by Tirri (1999).  The advantage of this strategy would have been to obtain similarly ‘thick’ data i.e. rich and detailed descriptions of the research topic.  After much consideration, this methodology was discounted because, for an initial exploratory study in a field previously unexplored amongst EPs in the UK, the researcher wished to obtain data from a larger number of participants than is possible in a case study or small group study, in order to gain an initial broad oversight into the general constructs of ethics in the profession, into the prevalence of ethical dilemmas in the profession, and into how members of the profession approached the resolution of dilemmas.  

A second strategy considered was an empirical study using the methodology of Lindsay and Colley (op. cit.).  They modelled their study of ethical dilemmas of members of the BPS on the study by Pope and Vetter (op. cit.) on the ethical dilemmas encountered by members of the APA.  This took the form of a questionnaire survey, where the individual responses obtained were grouped by the researchers into one of 23 pre-existing categories created by Vetter and Pope.  The advantages of duplicating this study would have been that a direct comparison with their results would have been possible.  However, their sample base represented a number of different occupations within psychology, of which educational psychology was only one.  It was considered that the 23 pre-existing categories originally devised some fifteen years earlier in America for a wide range of psychological occupations were not appropriate to represent the current situation of educational psychologists in England and Wales.

A third strategy considered was to emulate a quantitative survey such as that by Haas et al. (1986), who also used a questionnaire survey.  This survey presented 10 vignettes, each describing a professional ethical dilemma chosen to represent five general categories that Haas et al. considered representative of the broad range of dilemmas at that time.  Respondents had to select from a forced choice of ways to respond to the dilemma in order to provide specificity by finding out what choices psychologists would actually make in a number of concrete problematic situations (Haas et al., 1986, p.319).  Percentages of respondents choosing various alternatives, frequencies of encounter and degrees of perceived severity were calculated.  Bowers and Pipes (2000) described a similar piece of research.  This methodology was rejected at the current time because responses had to ‘fit’ within a pre-existing schema devised by the researchers.  In the absence of empirical data about the nature and prevalence of ethical dilemmas amongst educational psychologists in this country, the vignettes provided and the forced choice method of response would have been open to the criticism of being possibly unrepresentative of the actual experiences of EPs.

The fourth strategy considered, a specifically devised questionnaire survey, became the methodology of choice.  EPs work in complex social settings where there are multiple actors, multiple and conflicting perspectives and multiple power relationships in any given situation.  The subject matter under investigation is likewise an intensely subjective issue around which emotive opinions are likely to be generated.  A methodology was required that would generate (i) a degree of high level description and conceptual ordering of ethical attitudes and dilemmas grounded in the data provided by practitioners themselves (ii) prevalence data (iii) theory of EPs’ experiences of ethical dilemmas which was based on data, although subsequent research studies may cause it to be modified or reformulated.  In order to gain the quantitative data needed to establish meaningful prevalence and other statistical data, a questionnaire survey was chosen.  This had the advantage of accessing a broad sweep of EP opinion (albeit a self selecting one) in a wide variety of EP services throughout the country, in order to make some claims regarding empirical representation of the research outcomes.  This was considered to be an essential first step in mapping the area to be investigated.  It also reduced the possibility of the researcher’s personal views influencing the responses received, for example, through an interviewee making assumptions about the ethical stance of the interviewer, and adjusting their responses to be congruent. 

In order to begin to capture the qualitative data required, open questions were included in the questionnaire.  Serious consideration was given to the possibility of obtaining this data through semi-structured interviews.  However, a decision was taken that, at this stage of data sampling in a previously unexplored field, the research questions were more effectively addressed by obtaining a wider range of views, experiences, and processes than was possible by conducting individual interviews countrywide.  Rich and detailed accounts of EPs’ personal experiences of ethics, ethical dilemmas and ethical decision-making can be obtained through interviews.  However, an initial overview of the subject area, out of which further research into the complexities of the issues explored can, in future, be sustained, is arguably a 
prerequisite.

A self-administered ‘stand alone’ questionnaire to be distributed primarily by email (some hard copies were distributed by hand) and which could be completed by respondents outside the presence of the researcher was devised.  The advantages of this approach were that a consistent stimulus was presented to all respondents equally.  Also, the possibility of obtaining a representative sample of views was increased, from a broader geographic coverage and a large potential sample.  As some of the topics might be considered sensitive, a further advantage was that a questionnaire could be returned anonymously, and respondents had more time to respond at leisure.  They could take time to think about more reflective answers than if ‘put on the spot’ by the presence of the researcher.  One disadvantage was that the researcher had no control over who might respond. Another was that the likely response rate was dependent on the goodwill of the PEP or Senior EP in local authority services to whom the email was directed with the request that it should be distributed to the EP team.  The subject under investigation was complex and required the inclusion in the questionnaire of several open-ended questions which only motivated respondents might have been willing to take time to answer.  Motivated respondents might be those who have an existing interest in the subject under investigation and therefore not representative of the EP population as a whole.  Even the fullest written responses would be likely to provide less comprehensive data than, for example, an interview.  Bourque and Fielder (1995) state explicitly that open-ended questions do not work well in self-administered mail questionnaires.  However, this was not a questionnaire administered to the general population but to a highly literate and educated specific group of professional people.  A risk was taken to proceed with the inclusion of several open questions, analysis of which could form the basis of subsequent research, beyond the initial survey, in an ever refining process.

Analysing the data 

Data analysis using a grounded theory approach was used to analyse the responses to the open questions in the questionnaire.  Grounded theory is a methodology, i.e. a way of thinking and studying social reality that is well suited to generating theory in complex social settings whilst retaining rigour and being open to critical inspection (Miller, 1995, p.6).  It was developed by American sociologists, Glaser and Strauss (1967), as a method of discovering, through a process of inductive reasoning, concepts and hypotheses by which to generate theory (as opposed to what they considered at the time to be excessive emphasis on the verification of existing theories or of abstract theories deduced from a priori assumptions, i.e. deductive reasoning).  Concepts are the ‘building blocks’ of theory which, in order to discover, the researcher must obtain directly from the text, analysing the thoughts, ideas and meanings.

The process of carrying out a grounded theory approach moves through a number of levels, each level reducing the data to fewer and fewer abstract categories.  In the first stage, qualitative data from the questionnaires was open coded.  That is to say, the researcher asked, ‘What is this about?’ and ‘What is being referenced here?’ and gave each discrete conceptual category a name and defined properties and boundaries.  The coding was sourced from the researcher’s own conceptual framework, or from the literature, or from respondents’ own words.  Inevitably, the choices made during these analyses were interpretative and the codes chosen reflected to some degree the mind-set of the researcher.  Glaser and Strauss (ibid., p.37) note that, although categories from existing theory can be used, there is a danger for the researcher in doing this that round data is forced into square categories.  Far better, they argue, is the focus on the emergence of new categories, which solves the problems of fit, relevance, forcing and richness.  In order to minimise the effect of too idiosyncratic an analysis, the breakdown of the data was discussed in some cases with other EP colleagues, and codes that were largely consensual were developed.  As the analysis of the questionnaire responses proceeded, information was related either to existing codes, or new codes were created.  This is called level one coding.  An example from the study is where a respondent wrote …Remaining within the best interest of the child, which was coded as ‘Promoting Well Being (Child)’.  

Through a process of constant comparison and comparative analysis, Level 2 categories were generated from condensing level 1 codes and from memoing, in order to group together certain properties of level one codes that were deemed to have an affinity with one another.  Memoing is reflexive note taking of the thought processes which contributed to the researcher’s creation of the codes.  The properties of the level 2 categories were then explored.  An example of a memo from this study is the following, RA=Right Action (code used when respondents have indicated by ‘ethical’ that they understand it to pertain to actions which are prompted by a personal sense of right or wrong.  It contrasts with code RB=Right Way of Being-where respondents emphasise the personal qualities required in order to be an ethical practitioner.

Through reading, reflection, immersion in the data and memoing, the researcher then developed awareness to the subtleties of the data which Glaser and Strauss called theoretical sensitivity, defined by them as the attribute of having insight, the ability to give meaning to the data, the capacity to understand and the capability to separate the pertinent from that which it is not.

The categories and their properties were then, in some cases, condensed together into a third level of more abstract conceptual categories, out of which emerged the researcher’s hypotheses regarding ‘best fit’ explanatory insights into the construct under scrutiny.  In other cases, the categories and their properties were left as high level descriptors of the phenomena under investigation, since it could not be predicted at the outset of the research what the overarching abstract conceptual category or categories would be.  In grounded theory analysis, the comprehensive pattern between codes is the substantive grounded theory, the theoretical constructs having been grounded in categorical codes rather than being the product of abstract theorising.  A theory is a set of well developed categories…that are systematically interrelated through statements of relationship to form a theoretical framework that explains some relevant social, psychological, educational, nursing or other phenomena  (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p.22).  The process of analysis is not strictly linear as may appear from this sequential account but the stages can occur in parallel and recursively.

Having briefly described above the grounded theory methods advocated by Glaser and Strauss, it should also be noted that both Glaser and Strauss (1967) and later Strauss (1987) state that grounded theory should not be considered as a specific method or technique to be applied rigidly but rather as a process or style of thinking which is characterised by a number of distinct features.  Charmaz (2006) in her practical guide through grounded theory methods notes that it should be regarded as a set of principles and practices, not as prescriptions or packages.   What the different interpretations of grounded theory have in common, is that the theory develops inductively from the study and is grounded in the data.  This research has drawn on the principles of grounded theory in its analysis of the qualitative data, but the study is also hybrid in the sense that it discovers and calculates quantitative data.  The methodology has been that of the survey as opposed to Glaser and Strauss’ interview methods, for reasons explained above.

The processes of selection and grouping of codes and their synthesis into larger groups of data in this study posed a methodological problem.  It is not the case that instances must belong to one category and one category only.  Categories are not mutually exclusive; they overlap and have ‘fuzzy’ boundaries.  They should be regarded as categories of overlapping concepts rather than categories of mutually exclusive or distinct concepts.  This is because, unlike the taxonomies made possible by, for example, natural science, where categories of birds and mammals may have clearly defined properties, or where chemical elements are contained in a periodic table, concepts are mental constructs, that is, abstract ideas that exist along multiple axes.  This is the conclusion that emerges from the evolving cognitive psychology literature on concept and schema theories, for example Komatsu (1992).  Classification here is a contextual act that serves not to be an end in itself but merely to be a useful method of distinguishing certain foci of thought along a continuum of distinctiveness and/or degree.  Instances have been classed according to perceived typical features, but within each constructed category, some exemplars have more features, which are typical and distinctive to the category than others.

In this study, some responses clearly belonged to one category only.  For example, Research Question 1, level two: category 3 has been labelled, ‘Seeking well-being/doing no harm’.  Respondent 2 provided the following definition of ‘ethical’, Practice which takes into account and strives to ensure the well-being of others. and this response was deemed to be a typical instance. 

However, the definition of Respondent 65 appeared to have a less ‘good fit’.  The right and wrong thing to do, the right being the one that helps people.  There was an argument that inclusion into category 5 ‘Doing the right thing’, was more appropriate here.  However, as the ‘right thing’ was specified as that which ‘helps people’, a decision was made to place this response into category 3.  It may be that other researchers would code some of the responses differently.  Inevitably, this interpretative aspect of the research draws upon the subjectivity of the researcher.  This should be borne in mind when reading the cited percentages for the level two conceptual categories in the following section.

Partly to address the issue of preconceptions in the interpretation of data, Glaser and Strauss advocate that it is an effective strategy, initially, to ignore the literature on the area under study, in order to assure that the emergence of categories will not be contaminated by concepts more suited to different areas.  They argue that similarities and convergences with the literature can be established after the analytic core of categories has emerged. However the researcher found that some preliminary background knowledge of the topic was a necessary prerequisite to inform the research design.  The literature review, which forms Chapter One, has been instrumental in initiating this study.  The process of coding and categorising has not, however, been based on any pre-existent schemas.

Frequency analysis of the quantitative data provided by the questionnaire responses was carried out using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS14).  Histograms of the results were drawn up on Microsoft Excel.

Can the results of this study be considered valid? reliable? credible? generalisable?

The significance of the above terms in the data analysis of this research is discussed below.

Mason (2002, p.38) succinctly states the dilemma posed in justifying the value of qualitative research, …some of the philosophical approaches informing qualitative research are explicitly anti-positivist, anti-realist or anti-modernist and yet it is from these methodological traditions that criteria for evaluating research and evidence have been conventionally derived.

The discussion of concepts of validity, reliability and generalisability in the positivist modern research paradigm is relevant to this study. Traditionally, validity has been about whether research findings have measured what they purport to have measured, i.e. do they have construct validity?  Have the researchers ‘really’ found out ‘the truth’ using a ‘hard scientific’, ‘objective’ experimental methodology?  The term validity in this positivist modern paradigm has a number of defining features, such as construct validity (as above), internal validity (where a causal relationship between variables can be established), ecological or external validity (where the findings within one environment, e.g. the laboratory can be generalised to another environment, e.g. the outside world) or cue validity which, in theories of object concepts, refers to how characteristically a feature is associated with a concept.  

Reliability has been about whether research findings are consistent, for example, over time (are the same results obtained by the same researcher on different occasions?) or when conducted by different researchers (has there been experimenter inconsistency, bias or error?) or with different subject groupings (has there been subject bias or error?).  If the findings were not reliable, they could not be valid.

In terms of generalisability, responses to questionnaire questions do not necessarily reflect how people actually behave in naturally occurring situations, as has been amply demonstrated by opinion pollsters (and experienced by chastened politicians!).  Researchers who generalize from a sample survey to a larger population ignore the possible disparity between the discourse of actors about some topical issue and the way they respond to questions in a formal context  (Fielding & Fielding, 1986, p.12).

Also, the questionnaire responses are subjected to an act of analysis by the researcher that is an interpretation and therefore a selective and inferential process.  The interpretation can be affected by conscious or unconscious bias on the part of the analyst, which can threaten the generalisability of the findings to whole populations.

The discussion of concepts of validity, reliability and generalisation in the interpretive post-modern paradigm is also relevant.  A variety of terms has been used to describe alternative research methodology to the traditional empirical approach, for example, new paradigm research, cooperative enquiry (Reason & Rowan, 1981) and post-positivism (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000).  Central to this is a view of reality as dialectal.  A number of writers on qualitative research methodology argue that the language of traditional quantitative methodology, for example, the terms valid, reliable and generalisable as described above, can be inappropriate to qualitative research in an interpretative post-modern paradigm.  For example Janesick (2000) states,
Most often, questions addressed to qualitative researchers are constructed from the psychometric paradigm and revolve around the trinity of validity, reliability and generalizability, as if there were no other linguistic representations for questions…. Validity in qualitative research has to do with description and explanation and whether or not the explanation fits the description.  In other words, is the explanation credible? (Janesick, 2000, p.393).


Credibility in the context of qualitative research 

It is difficult to define the notion of credibility in terms of qualitative research, but, as with positivist research, it necessarily involves aspects both of epistemology and of ontology, that is, what can be known and how can we know it.  In terms of process, one criterion is transparency in the methods and procedures used and their justification.  Another would be triangulation, a term deriving originally from navigation, where different bearings give the correct position of an object.  An example of triangulation would be where the researcher’s interpretations and the participant’s perceptions and understandings were negotiated to reach an agreed account.  In terms of findings, criteria would involve the revelation of the researcher’s positionality, that is to say, whether they are writing from a particular standpoint, for example, Marxist, Creationist, etc.  It would also involve the explanation of the warrant behind the conclusions drawn, which is to say, the step-by-step reasoning in the analysis of the data through a clear audit trail.  These criteria are cited by numerous researchers, for example, Janesick (ibid.), and Silverman (2001).  Words that seem to be inherent in any notion of credibility with reference to qualitative research are trustworthy, robust, rigorous, systematic, reflective, transparent and worthwhile.  

Some researchers nevertheless continue to use the terms validity and reliability (and their sub-sets, for example, inter-rater reliability, or respondent validation), in the context of qualitative research.  Silverman (2001) has argued that two forms of validation are appropriate to qualitative research.  One is comparing different kinds of data (for example quantitative and qualitative) and different methods (for example, observation and interviews) to see whether they corroborate one another.  Another is taking one’s findings back to the people being studied for verification.  This research has the potential for further development along these lines.  

Reliability refers to the issue of consistency within this interpretative categorisation, i.e. has the researcher consistently assigned instances of identified concepts to the same defined category and to what extent would a different researcher identify and assign concepts differently.

Silverman also introduces the terms ‘emic’ and ‘etic’, derived from cultural anthropology, to describe the two different perspectives or world views offered by differing approaches to data analysis, where an “emic’ analysis derives from using the conceptual schemas and categories that are meaningful to the participants in a study who may claim to be the sole arbiters of the validity of research knowledge produced about them.  An ‘etic’ analysis, on the other hand, derives from the conceptual schemas and categories that are meaningful to the academic community who are undertaking a study and is valid when it accords to their epistemological and ontological paradigms.  Which knowledge forms, if any, have priority or can claim to represent the ‘truth’ of any objective reality is, of course, hotly debated.

While the terminology used by researchers of different paradigms differs, reflecting their position on the positivist-post-modern research continuum, the principles of establishing the trustworthiness of qualitative inquiry are, nevertheless, shared.  Strauss and Corbin (1990) state that well performed grounded theory meets all the requirements of ‘good science’: significance, theory, observation compatibility, generalizability, reproducibility, rigor and verification (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p.27).

The approach taken in this study

The data collected here has been of two types: 
	that which is straightforwardly quantifiable, for example, gender, years of professional experience, employment status etc.  
	that which, being a narrative account of opinions or beliefs, has been subject to interpretative categorisation by the researcher, for example, respondents’ definitions of ‘ethical’, i.e. qualitative data.  

The level one codes have been founded as far as possible on respondents’ own answers, that is to say, an emic analysis as described above.  Thereafter, the researcher has attempted to conduct coding and analysis based on categories derived from the conceptual frameworks of the participants but as the interpretation of the concepts has proceeded, the emic analysis has subsumed into etic claims to knowledge, a process that is itself open to the challenge that etic claims to knowledge are not necessarily superior.

In a study which includes mixed data analysis such as this, issues of terminology can be problematic, in terms of whether to use the language of positivist ‘hard’ science or the language of ‘new paradigm’ post-modern social science.  The approach taken here is to use the words that I consider best describe an action that I have taken.  I define their meaning and rationale as precisely as I can in the context, so that the reader can make a judgement as to the overall trustworthiness of the outcome of the study.  Where an action has been taken that is derived from ‘traditional’ experimental methodology, then the language associated with that procedure will be used.  Where procedures have followed ‘new paradigm’ thinking, then the appropriate terminology will be used in context.  This includes the use of the first person in certain sections where transparency and reflection in the researcher’s thought processes are considered helpful in contributing to the credibility of the study.  

Chronology of action 

	Conceptualisation of the study, which arose out of a combination of personal interest in the topic, debates with colleagues, combined with professional experiences encountered both as an EP and as a researcher.  Background reading.
	Decision to conduct pilot study to establish feasibility of the proposed research.  Further reading and modification of the research questions and questionnaire.
	Methodology and methods for analysis of data identified.
	Questionnaire and explanatory letter issued electronically to all EP services in England and Wales through the PEP or acting PEP.
	Analysis of open responses as described.
	Entry of quantitative data and conceptual categories into SPSS14. Statistical Product and Service Solutions-version 14 is a software programme for managing and analysing social scientific data.  Prevalence data computed and recorded.
	Completion of literature review
	Results discussed.
	Wider implications of the results discussed.
	Conclusions drawn and reflection on the limitations and implications for further development of this study.

Description of the procedures and techniques used to gather data

The sources of data were practising educational psychologists whose opinions were sought by asking them to respond in writing to a variety of open and closed questionnaire questions which pertained to the research questions.  The quantitative element was relatively straightforward.  It consisted firstly of measuring major identifying features of respondents, namely, gender, years qualified and employment status and secondly, of counting frequencies of categories occurring in the questionnaires at the second level of analysis.  Silverman supports this use of quantitative measures by qualitative researchers as follows,




A pilot study (Bennett, 2007) was carried out in order to ascertain the feasibility of the project.  This was undertaken in three stages.  Firstly, a self-selecting focus group of EPs (N=5) from the same EP service as the researcher debated the topic, prompted by the initial questions:
	To what extent, if any, do you encounter ethical dilemmas in your professional practice?
	How do you set about resolving such dilemmas?

From the ensuing discussion key issues were identified which subsequently formed the four research questions to be investigated.  A questionnaire was devised to provide survey data, and this was distributed to a convenience sample of EPs known in a professional capacity to the researcher (N=10) representing seven different Children’s Services Authorities.  

Finally, semi-structured interviews (N=4) were undertaken with EPs from one service, who had not completed the questionnaire.  The questions asked were taken from the questionnaire with minimal modifications where multiple choice responses had been offered.  For example, How often do you encounter dilemmas in your practice, which you consider have an ethical dimension? replaced the six item choice of Daily, Frequently, Regularly, Quite Often, Rarely and Never.  The taped interviews were not fully transcribed but notes were taken of selected relevant excerpts.  

Using a content analysis approach, emergent themes were analysed and reported in Bennett (2007).  

The interview data enabled the researcher to ascertain the extent to which the results produced by the two different data collection methods were similar or substantially different.  In fact the grounded themes were similar, a finding which contributed to the later decision in the main study to seek breadth of data through questionnaires rather than depth of data through interviews.
The results of the preliminary study suggested that the project was feasible and that the data collection method chosen, i.e. a questionnaire survey was an appropriate research method which could provide insight that could address the research questions robustly.  

Main research study procedures

The pilot study revealed that the research was feasible.  However, the researcher decided to modify the final research project in two ways: firstly by replacing the content analysis of the qualitative data with a more structured grounded theory approach; secondly, by amending very slightly the wording and layout of the questionnaire in the light of feedback from participants and reflection by the researcher.  The questionnaire is reproduced in Appendix 1a.  The questionnaire included both closed and open questions.  It was constructed in such a way that completion could take as little as ten minutes or as long and detailed as the respondent wished.  The researcher provided the option for the respondents to remain anonymous or to provide contact details.  These contact details could have been useful if the researcher decided to pursue interviews at a later date in subsequent research and were needed to send details of the finished thesis to respondents who expressed an interest in the topic.  Participants were notified in the explanatory sheet accompanying the questionnaire proper that feedback of the research results, where requested, would be provided in the form of the abstract, with the option to receive the whole study electronically, if required.  

A list of the number of educational psychology services in England and Wales and their contact addresses was obtained from the AEP.  In a few cases, where the information provided was incorrect, a personal telephone call was made to the service in question to establish a current e-mail address.  An explanatory letter (Appendix IV) was sent electronically (i.e. by e-mail) to the Principal, Acting Principal or, where neither of these positions were filled, to the Senior Psychologist of every educational psychology service in England and Wales, with the request that the questionnaire (Appendix II) might be forwarded to team members.  No data is available as to how many Heads of Service actually did so.  Nor is it possible to state with complete accuracy the total number of EPs working in local authorities, (and therefore potentially in receipt of the survey), because most, (93%), but not all EPs are members of the AEP (AEP, 2007) and because most, but not all full members of the AEP work in local authorities.  However, the full membership of the AEP in 2006 comprised 2,633 (Appendix 3) and this number represents the likely maximum number of possible questionnaire responses.  The questionnaire and explanatory letter was sent to a total of 113 Psychological Services in England, 32 Psychological Services – London Boroughs, and 24 Psychological Services in Wales, lists of and contact details for which were provided by the AEP.

Initially, only the electronic version of the questionnaire was attached to the emails and available for downloading.  However an unforeseen problem occurred.  The researcher had initially made an assumption that respondents would have the technical knowledge to fill in the questionnaire electronically in a manner to enable the spaces between the questions to expand according to the information provided.  Boxes were initially omitted deliberately in the electronic versions, so as not to give an impression of how much/little response was required/ expected and to prejudice thereby the responses.  In fact, feedback from participants indicated this not to be the case.  Some respondents could not fill in the questionnaire as intended and a more user-friendly electronic version of the hard copy, (Appendix III), was quickly produced and distributed after the first few responses began to arrive. 

Additionally, a notice and link to the questionnaire was posted on EPNET, the educational psychology online forum, and the researcher also contacted personally a number of EP colleagues.  At an EP conference held in the North West of England in December 2006, a hard copy of the questionnaire was distributed to all delegates.  Respondents had the option of responding anonymously (by sending a postal hard copy) or of identifying themselves (by responding via email or filling in contact details on the postal hard copy).  Although only EPs in England and Wales were targeted with the questionnaire, two responses from EPs in Scotland were received, presumably via the EPNET listing.  These were included in the overall analysis.  

The distribution of the questionnaire was therefore extensive within the profession and provided a geographical spread of responses from EPs.  This decision was made in order to maximise the breadth of the survey (see Results section for a list of the geographical areas from which responses were received).  Many EPs have trained and subsequently work in the same broad geographical area.  The number of training institutions is small (currently 12 in England) and it was considered possible that the ethos of a particular university training course might influence the thinking of its graduates.  If the survey had been limited to one area, then results might have reflected responses idiosyncratic to that area.  Even so, respondents were self-selecting and arguably more likely to have an interest in the topic than non-respondents.  For further discussion of this, see Discussion of Results: Research Question 2.

The total number of responses received, either electronically or by post, was 120.  Conventions of confidentiality and anonymity were observed.  Only the researcher knows the identity of the respondents who identified themselves.

Details of the data analysis of the questionnaires

The computer-assisted recording of the data has established that the
frequency patterns reported exist in the data as a whole and are not based on anecdotal examples.  Of 120 responses, two respondents (Respondent 11 and Respondent 48) filled in only question 8, explaining why they had not completed the questionnaire.  This question asked, If, having perused this questionnaire you do not fill it in, what are your reasons?  The two responses were omitted from the database.  The resulting frequency data is therefore normally based on 118 completed questionnaires, except in occasional cases where individual respondents omitted a question in error or by design.

Research question 1: Do educational psychologists have a common understanding of the term ethical in the context of their working practices?
Data was sought through the following questionnaire questions:
Questionnaire question 2: What do you understand by the word 'ethical' in the context of your professional behaviour?

Questionnaire question 7: Does your team discuss the ethical issues surrounding EP practice? Yes/ No
If yes, is it your opinion that there is a general commonality of views on ethical issues?
Can you elaborate further on your reply?

In the first stage of data analysis, each questionnaire response to questionnaire question 2 was scrutinised, and coded a posteriori (i.e. the start list of codes emerged after the collection of the data), with each discrete meaningful unit of data given a name (Appendix VI).  The researcher carried out a grounded analysis of the ideas/ beliefs expressed and identified the main concepts.  Some of the level one codes for this question were discussed at team meetings and informally with colleagues.  This first level of coding yielded 41 codes.  The process of coding enabled the researcher to become very familiar with the responses and to reflect over time on their meaning.  Analytic and explanatory memos were written to act as an aide-memoire, to describe the rationale for certain choices of coding.  The memos were periodically revisited as coding continued.

Level two categorisation, when the 41 level one codes were reduced to 10, was done by the researcher alone.  In the process, although the totality of level one codes remained unchanged, some individual responses were re-coded as the researcher reflected on the data.  For example, level one code 14 was sub-divided as it was deemed to contain some responses, which fitted more appropriately into different level two categories.  Although there was a temptation to hold rigidly to the initial coding, which would have made for a neat and satisfying progression to level two, in fact as the researcher’s theoretical sensitivity to the data increased, and as the level two categories emerged more clearly, it became evident that a small number of the original coding decisions would benefit from being amended. 
Question 7 called for straightforward closed questions which were inputted into the database, but additional comments/elaborations offered were noted and content analysed.

A small minority of respondents gave a description of an ethical dilemma in this section rather than a definition of working ethically in professional practice.  These responses were not coded. 

The level two categories were further interpreted by the researcher and grounded within existing philosophical frameworks.

Research question 2: To what extent do EPs believe that they regularly encounter ethical dilemmas in their practice?
Data was sought through questionnaire question 3: Do you encounter dilemmas in your practice as an EP, which you consider have an ethical dimension?
YES/NO? 
Would you describe the incidence of these as
DAILY?
FREQUENTLY? (several times a week)
REGULARLY? (but not every week)
QUITE OFTEN? (on a number of occasions a year)
RARELY? (from time to time in your working life)
NEVER?
Do you wish to comment further on this?

This research question produced largely quantitative data.  The responses to questionnaire question 3 were closed or multiple choice and were entered directly into the database.  Frequency counts were calculated.  Additional comments/elaborations offered by respondents were also noted.

Research question 3: What is the nature of the dilemmas perceived to be ethical by EPs?
Data was sought through questionnaire question 4: Please describe one or more examples of such dilemmas. 
Each questionnaire response was scrutinised, open coded and a total of 54 level one codes emerged (see Appendix VII).  Some of the dilemmas described by respondents were again discussed at team meetings and a number of codes agreed by consensus, with the remainder being interpreted by the researcher.  Nine level two categories were generated from these codes under conditions of theoretical sensitivity, reflection and discussion as previously.  An overarching basic psychological theory was proposed.

Research question 4: How do EPs resolve perceived ethical dilemmas?

Data was sought through questionnaire questions 5 and 6.  These were respectively, In resolving these dilemmas, did you have or do you have recourse to any particular philosophy/religion/world view? and Who and/or what do you identify as supporting you to resolve ethical dilemmas at work on a practical level?







Among the many slices of data that may be collected, which one is the best to obtain?  The answer is, of course, the collection technique that best can obtain the information desired, provided that conditions permit its use in some manner.  For an extreme example, Dalton had to bribe a secretary in order to see secret personnel records so that he could find out the ethnic composition of an executive hierarchy, rather than trying to guess its composition from names (Glaser & Strauss, 1967, p.66).

No inducements of any kind have been offered to questionnaire respondents in this study.  Questionnaire respondents were a self selecting group.  EPs had the discretion to fill in the questionnaire or not, and those who returned it were deemed to have done so by voluntary consent.  A few responses, again self-selecting, were received via EPNET or through personally distributed hard copies.  A complaints procedure was offered to respondents should they have wished to express disquiet about any aspect of the research.  Respondents were offered access to the completed research.

Only the researcher is aware of the identities of respondents.  All responses were numbered on receipt and identified thereafter only by that number in quotations or references.  The researcher has securely stored the original responses.








1. Geographical area: Responses were received from educational psychology services in the following areas of the country; (Individual educational psychology services have not been identified.)  
Cambridgeshire, Cheshire, Cumbria, Derbyshire, Devon, East Riding of Yorkshire, Flintshire, Gloucestershire, Greater Manchester, Herefordshire, Lanarkshire, Lancashire, Leicestershire, Lincolnshire, Greater London, Merseyside, Midlothian, Northumberland, North Yorkshire, Somerset, South Yorkshire, Warwickshire, West Midlands, Wiltshire. 

2. Gender distribution: The distribution of the responses was as follows:






This compares similarly with the gender distribution of the Full membership category of the AEP in the year 2006 which was 26% Male and 74% Female.  (Source AEP, Appendix IX)

3. Number of years qualified as an EP: The distribution of respondents’ number of years qualified as an EP was as follows:







Figure 3: Employment status 
 

No information is available regarding the employers of the employed respondents, but the great majority of EPs in England and Wales are employed by local authorities.  A small number are employed by independent schools and charitable organisations.


5. Contact availability: A total of 71 Respondents (59.2%) indicated willingness to be contacted, if required, by providing contact details.


6. Uncompleted questionnaires: Two EPs completed question 8 only, i.e. If, having perused this questionnaire, you do not fill it in, what are your reasons?  Their responses, which have not been included in the database, were:
Respondent 11: Sorry I haven’t filled in the questionnaire.  It’s because the topics are covering sensitive topics, with issues to do with confidentiality involved.  It’s just a personal point of view that I hold – I would never feel comfortable in sharing the sort of information you are collecting, outside of my immediate team of colleagues and line manager even if the information is presented in an anonymous way.  

Respondent 48: Having only just started, I have not yet come across anything I would consider created a dilemma, except in the personal sense.  I am temporarily working for an authority that has segregated special education, and remains wedded to this and thus there is the wider expectation that a certain group of children can be assessed…as being segregateable.  Inasmuch as schools and systems are adjusted to this, it is not something I am in a position, or readily prepared to challenge in the absence of a broader view of what kinds of provision ordinary schools need to make to lead to more effective inclusion…

Their responses reveal the ethical dilemmas of the respondents in different ways, the first with issues of confidentiality, and the second with issues of inclusion.  As such, they could have been considered as typical instances of the dilemmas, which have been categorised in Research Question 3 as Category I: Issues of Confidentiality and Category 2: Challenging Other Discourses.  Discussion of these categories is in the relevant section.


Research Question 1: Do educational psychologists have a common understanding of the term ‘ethical’ in the context of their working practices?

Two questions in the questionnaire were designed to generate responses to this question.  These were questionnaire question 2 and questionnaire question 7 (see below).  The initial analysis of responses generated a total of 41 codes (see Appendix VI).  Then, level two categories were generated from these codes under conditions of ‘theoretical sensitivity’ achieved through knowledge of the general literature, reflection and discussion with colleagues.  These categories are described and enumerated below, with examples provided.  Finally, the categories were linked into the existing framework of the three major approaches which dominate current moral philosophy, namely the previously described deontological, the consequentialist and the virtue-ethical.

Questionnaire question 2: What do you understand by the word ‘ethical’ in the context of your professional behaviour?
Level two categories and descriptors







Category 1: Seeking well-being/doing no harm

A total of 41.5% respondents included in their response a concept which was thus categorised.

These responses suggest that ethical behaviour in professional practice is that which is prompted primarily by a desire on the part of the EP to seek actively to optimise the well-being of other people.  Many respondents refer only to children and families as the object of this well-wishing, while others include a broader client base that includes the local authority, schools, other professional services and colleagues.  As it is not possible to promote well-being in conditions of inequality or deprivation, the notion also has political overtones; that it is necessary to maintain a political environment where it is possible for people to flourish.  Terms such as ‘well-being’ and ‘best interests’ are contested phrases, open to different interpretations, that do not necessarily share a universal model of childhood.

The corollary to the expressed well-wishing is the conviction that the professional person must at least ‘do no harm’.  This is a reference to the Hippocratic Oath, one of the earliest professional codes dating from classical Greece, where doctors were enjoined to actively seek to improve the health of their clients but that, as a minimum standard, they should do no harm to the patient.

The ethical act here is that which promotes individual and stakeholder well-being.  

Examples were:
Respondent 2: Practice, which takes into account and strives to ensure the well-being of others.
Respondent 25: Doing what is in the best interest of the child.
Respondent 31: Behaving in a manner that respects and supports client well-being in their cultural context.
Respondent 73: Working within boundaries which support the well-being of children and young people and not engaging in any practice which would compromise anyone’s well-being.
Respondent 78: Working in a manner that will do no harm to the situation.  Trying not to make a situation worse.
Respondent 105:*Acting with professional integrity to promote the best interests of the child/children. 

Category 2: Rule following

A total of 39.8% respondents included in their response a concept which was thus categorised.

This grouping categorises responses which suggested that to be ‘ethical’ in professional practice presupposes behaviour which is in accordance with, follows and adheres to explicit or implicit consensual ‘norms’ such as a professional code, professional guidelines, a policy, a statute or a law (hereafter jointly called ‘rules’) which have been put in place by a body of people with acknowledged authority to do so within a more or less hierarchical structure, and which may be revised by those authorities when it is politic to do so.  

There is an assumption that adherence to the rule is the ethical act, not necessarily the consequence that may ensue from the act.  Providing due process has been followed, the behaviour is generally seen as ‘ethical’.

Examples were 
Respondent 26: I see being ethical as working within the codes of conduct of my profession.  I am a non-evangelical atheist and so do not have any ‘higher callings’ that may affect my judgement.
Respondent 28: *I understand ethical to pertain to the rights and wrongs of my professional conduct.  The ‘rights and wrongs’ are drawn from professional guidance, employer policy and individual morality.
Respondent 29: I refer to the BPS Code of Ethics and Conduct – i.e. paying heed to the protection of the public, following core values, standards and principles, prompting those standards in others and helping others make decisions which have ethical implications.

Category 3: Respecting human rights

A total of 32.2% respondents included in their response a concept which was thus categorised.

This grouping categorises responses that suggest ‘ethical’ in the context of professional practice relates primarily to behaviour shown to others that admits to the universality of basic human rights and dignity, regardless of factors such as race, gender, sexuality, age etc.  This entails a belief that people have the right to have their views and wishes respected (and, logically, must respect other people’s views and wishes) and that they should have equal opportunities to access communal goods, such as education.  Some respondents defined ethical in narrower topical terms such as disability rights, informed consent and rights to data protection (confidentiality), which have been interpreted as ensuing logically from belief in the intrinsic worth / dignity of all human beings.

The ethical act is interpreted here as that which promotes the right of individual human beings to seek to achieve their potential within the boundaries of respect for the rights and dignity of others.  I have also included in this category instances where respondents show empathetic concern about the impact of their action on others.  

Examples were:
Respondent 5: Respecting people and views
Respondent 45: *It means ensuring that individuals and groups are treated with respect and with equal opportunities.  Examples of ethical practice would include gaining informed parental consent before starting work; challenging prejudice and considering the effect of what you do on those involved before you do it.
Respondent 70: Ensuring the rights of those I work with are met.  Consent- ensuring I get this; Confidentiality.
Respondent 93: Guiding my thoughts and behaviours to respect the dignity of every human being.

Category 4: Doing the right thing

A total of 27.1% respondents included in their response a concept which was thus categorised.

This grouping categorises responses where the respondent refers to an informal internalised code of moral principles based on notions of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ and ‘what it is right to do’, in contrast to ‘what it is good to be’.  It encompasses the notion of conscience, i.e. having a moral sense of right and wrong.  It seems to hold that some actions are intrinsically right and that there is a moral imperative to act accordingly.  What the right thing is, is usually unspecified in the responses, although inevitably personally and culturally situated.

In this category, the ethical act appears to ensue from the intuitive or rational application of the Moral Imperative, which emerges from the practitioner’s internal questioning of conscience.
Examples were:
Respondent 18: Behaving in a way that is moral, that is, true to my conscience and what I feel to be right – rather than what might be easiest or what may be expected of me.
Respondent 32: *Making decisions based on what is morally and professionally ‘right’.”
Respondent 38: What is the morally correct action to take in a given situation, regardless of any external pressures to act in another way.
Respondent 43:  *That which accords firstly with my personal code of ethics, and secondly with the BPS Professional Practice and Ethics guidelines.  
Respondent 86: *Any area in which there might be a right or wrong element (in relation to morals, responsibility, duty of care, doing no harm etc.
Respondent 96: Working within a set of moral principles which determine my behaviour towards service users and with my co-workers.
Respondent 102: Acting in a manner which I consider to be right…

Category 5: Practising virtues

A total of 14.4% respondents included in their response a concept which was thus categorised.

This grouping categorises responses, which involve the notion that certain qualities of character are inherently good, (virtues) and that it is incumbent on the professional practitioner to develop these qualities within themselves.  It also embodies the notion that to be a ‘good’ educational psychologist, one must strive to be both professionally competent and to work to a personal best standard, to ‘do one’s best’.  The level one code of ‘transparency’ in professional behaviour has also been included here, as it was considered to entail qualities of honesty and openness in practice, which are desirable other-regarding virtues.

The ethical act here ensues from the application of these virtues in decision-making, for example from courage, integrity, wise judgement, diligence, benevolence, honesty, compassion, etc.

Examples were:
Respondent 30: Doing my job to the best of my ability.
Respondent 35: Giving consideration to and acting according to the ethical principles of autonomy, beneficence, non-malfeasance, fidelity, integrity.
Respondent 51: I agree with Francis (….) who says something like EPs act ethically by showing benevolence and acting with courage.

Category 6: Overseeing fair distribution of resources

A total of 9.3% respondents included in their response a concept which was thus categorised.

This category focuses responses that embody a view that the distribution of resources should be fair and just.  ‘Just’ in this instance implies that each person should receive goods and services according to their needs or merits; these being decided according to socially constructed criteria which are perceived to be equitable.  Their needs are mostly described by respondents as financial or placement provision or they might be emotional needs. 

The ethical act is that which seeks to fulfil the needs of the parties involved by fair and just allocation of resources.
Examples were:
Respondent 12: equitable treatment.  as a strategic manager, balancing needs of minority (e.g. SEN) with majority – needs of high level vs. budget etc. 
Respondent 71: *Fair and transparent use of resources.
Respondent 84: Equality of treatment for all service users and colleagues
 Respondent 50: *Working in a way that is honest and fair to all parties.

Category 7: Following a religious code or fragment of religious belief

A total of 1.7% respondents included in their response a concept which was thus categorised.

Here the ethical act is similar to that of Category 1, in that it consists of following a code or dictum that the practitioner has chosen to follow but which has essentially been put in place by a third party deemed to have authority to do so, in this case of a divine authority.  
The responses were:
Respondent 77: A basis for my thinking about ethics is ‘Do unto others as you wish to be done to yourself.’’




Level three (theoretical) coding

The seven categories which emerged from level two coding of the data can be interpreted as all expressing aspects of  the three broad theoretical frameworks which currently underpin Western moral philosophy and which comprise the deontological, consequentialist and aretaic approaches described in the Definitions of Terms (p. 7).  This argument will be considered more fully in the discussion of the results.








 Questionnaire question 7: Does your team discuss the ethical issues surrounding EP practice?  Yes/ No?  

Figure 6: Team discusses ethical issues?


If yes, is it your opinion that there is general commonality of views on ethical issues?  
Figure 7: Perceptions of agreement

Can you elaborate further on your reply?

A total of 83 EPs (70%) took the opportunity to add further comments to their replies.  These comments were very diverse in nature.  Some have been used to illustrate points made in the discussion section.


Research Question 2: To what extent do EPs believe that they regularly encounter ethical dilemmas in their practice?

Questionnaire question 3 (below) was designed to elicit responses to this question and was subdivided into three sections.  The results of each section are reported separately.  

(i) Do you encounter dilemmas in your practice as an EP, which you consider have an ethical dimension?
Yes / No.





(ii) Would you describe the incidence of these as?
Daily
Frequently (several times a week)
Regularly (but not every week)
Quite Often (on a number of occasions a year)




Figure 9: Frequency of occurrence

(iii) Do you wish to comment further on this?  

A number of EPs added comments to this section.  Some of the comments were specific examples of dilemmas and they have been categorised as such.  Some of the remaining responses are reported below.

Webster and Lunt (2002) make the point that,
The reach of ethics is far greater than the level of ‘critical incident’ between client and practitioner...  In fact, psychologists generally work in isolation in institutional contexts where day-to-day practice is driven by policy, bureaucracy and the exigency of someone else’s making (Webster & Lunt, 2002, p.98). 
This is still clearly the case, as shown by the following examples given by respondents who considered that they met ethical dilemmas daily, frequently, quite often or regularly.

Respondent 8: These are usually times when a parent is insisting on a diagnosis of a problem which does not exist or when the LA criteria or practice mitigate against the best result for the child. Response=Quite often
Respondent 19: Usually involves adults requesting me to do work that I consider irrelevant, inappropriate or avoiding more important issues. Response=Regularly 
Respondent 23: In practice, these probably occur more in the context of actions I take as Head of SEN rather than as an EP. Response=Daily
Respondent 32: This relates to the circular question of who is our client.  Sometimes we end up having to decide where our allegiances lie.  If we are advocating for a child, sometimes this brings us into conflict with others e.g. causing us to challenge school practice.  We need to constantly question whether what we do is the ‘right’ thing or whether we are doing it to curry favour with a school, to gain status/respect or simply to make our lives easier-  or whether we are doing it because it is in the child’s interests.  Response=Quite often
Respondent 44: EPs are in a strange position where our service is frequently commissioned by someone other than our primary client.  A teacher or parent will identify one child as having issues that we are asked to work with – the child is seldom consulted at that stage. Response=Regularly
Respondent 63: Often conflicting interests between authority, school, parent or child. Response=Frequently

When institutions evolve, changing according to the (usually politically driven) manifesto, one EP commented that challenges to a professional ethic increase, for example,

Respondent 71: In a process of change, dilemmas seem to happen more often. Response=Frequently

Many EPs acknowledged the ethical underpinnings of all their actions, even if, as noted by Respondent 17: But [I] don’t necessarily reflect on them daily. (Response=Daily)

Respondent 24: I cannot imagine any situation which does not have an ethical dimension at some level. Response=Daily
Respondent 82: I find it hard to imagine a day at work when ethics does not surface as we make a series of decisions as to how we prioritise our use of time, what we do, how we do it and how our decisions are guided by these principles. Response=Daily
Respondent 86: This area permeates my practice all the time – but I guess it depends on how wide or narrow one’s definition of ethical dilemma is – mine may be very wide. Response=Daily 
Respondent 102: Most aspects of my work have an ethical dimension. Response=Daily
Respondent 110: I guess most days something happens that has an ethical component, since most conversations and interactions take part in relationships where there is a power differential which I attempt to reduce as much as possible.  From this point of view, every aspect of my work has an ethical dimension… Response=Frequently

For some, there is recognition that complex situations do not lend themselves to a ‘one rule for all’ mentality, implying a moral particularist view, for example,

Respondent 12: What would often be the ideal solution for one is not for all. Response=Daily

Some comments referred to the degree of the practitioners’ familiarity with and experience in the field of ethics, for example, implying that ethical decisions are more easily reached and the incidence of dilemmas reduced when the practitioner has knowledge of moral philosophical positions.  For example,

Respondent 64: There would be more [dilemmas] if I had less exposure to the field of ethics. Response=Rarely 

The converse of this is that, for the ‘new recruits’ to the profession, situations may appear unproblematic because the novitiates lack critical awareness of the potential ethical issues within a given situation.

Respondent 10: I haven’t really been doing the job very long. Response=Rarely

Both of these cases lend support to the case for raising the profile of ethical issues and basic moral philosophical debate during initial training courses.

Some comments implied that, for experienced practitioners, similar situations recur time and time again and that the learning experience of ethical decision-making can be generalised from one situation to another and thus decision-making becomes more routine.  However, it is also conceivable that, through long familiarity with and exposure to cases, and in the absence of on-going debate, experienced practitioners might cease to critically reflect and question, and their responses might become habituated.

Respondent 118: The longer you work the less they are dilemmas, as you have thought it out before. Response=Regularly
Respondent114: I suspect the incidents of making ethical decisions are daily as they are likely to be part of the way I ‘operate’.  However, I don’t think I have many ‘dilemmas’ as I think I am generally decisive about how to respond to incidents. Response=Rarely

Where EPs reported no conflict between their personal ethos, and that of their employer, and also that the established codes are likely to suffice to inform any choices of action likely to arise, they tended to report few or no dilemmas, for example,
Respondent 26: I do not find it difficult to work within the bounds of my professional codes of conduct and I do not find that adhering to them causes me conflict, nor does it seem to mean that my behaviour towards clients or colleagues is adversely affected. Response=Rarely
Respondent 43: It depends on whether you view conflicts between ethics and practice as problematic, as in questions relating to where one stands in relation to ’political’ issues in one’s authority, in which case dilemmas are rare, or whether one views statutory assessment as ethically indefensible, in which case dilemmas would be a daily problem. Response=Rarely
Respondent 113; Only rarely because I like to think that I am clear about what conduct is required of me as an EP and that this sits comfortably with my own personal ethical system.  I have therefore rarely encountered what could strictly be called a dilemma for me….. Response=Rarely 

Where EPs felt that they had professional independence at work, then they also reported having few, if any ethical dilemmas, for example, 

Respondent 1: I am in control of my work and don’t have to make any compromises in relation to practice. Response=Rarely
Respondent 88: No, not really.  Starting from the child’s interests (as defined by me) first, then parent’s wishes (assuming they are not likely to be actually harmful to the child as far as one can see) second, and ending with duties of employer, which I’m here to put into practice, I have found that I do not usually have what I would describe as ‘ethical’ dilemmas.  These might only arise if I felt under pressure to re-arrange the order of the priorities indicated above and I do not. Response=None

The final comment of Respondent 46 below implies that one can be a moral agent and exert moral judgement without necessary adherence to the prevalent ethical orthodoxy,

Respondent 46: They are frequent but rarely matters of life or death.  Decisions have to be made on the balance and weight of experience and chances have to be taken to move things forward.  There is a danger that ‘ethical correctness‘ will make us impotent.





Research Question 3: What is the nature of the dilemmas perceived to be ethical by EPs?

This research question was probed by questionnaire question 4: Please describe one or more examples of such dilemmas.

The initial analysis into the level one codes generated a total of 54 codes, (See Appendix 5).  Then, level two categories were generated from these codes under conditions of theoretical sensitivity, reflection and discussion as described previously.  The level two categories are reproduced below together with the frequency counts of responses coded into those categories. 
 Level two categories and descriptors


Figure 10: Frequencies of respondents’ reported ethical dilemmas

Descriptions of each category are illustrated by examples taken from the questionnaire responses.  Many of the instances reported are revealing in terms of the very wide variety of EP experiences of ethical dilemmas and of their perceptions of conflict and so have been quoted at some length in order to illustrate this heterogeneity.  The reported examples were perceived as ethical dilemmas by the respondents who described them.  They may not be universally perceived as such.  Some instances, for example, may be seen by other EPs as originating from inexperience or an omission of training.

Category 1: Weighing and balancing 

A total of 27.1% respondents identified this issue as causing them one or more ethical dilemmas.

1.	 A number of EPs described dilemmas, which had, as a core feature, the balancing of needs between a range of different parties and the fine judgement required to meet those needs, where the EP has arguably a duty to all involved.

Respondent 21: Most of the ethical dilemmas I experience are about deciding on the right course of action in the best interests of a child who is the focus of my work, when there may be conflicts of interest.
Respondent 39: They would usually be about provision.  A child’s capacity to benefit from such input versus having 1 provision meaning another is removed.
Respondent 46: Value judgements have to be made, sometimes on inadequate evidence.  The psychologist inevitably has to act as a kind of referee.
Respondent 62: Knowing how far to push schools/ families/young people in finding solutions to problems, The balance between what might be ideal and what might be feasible/possible/good enough.
Respondent 97: Sometimes we have to take on work to reassure parents when a child is likely to not have a problem.  In the long run, if we don’t become involved, the parents are likely to pursue other professional assessments for their child.  It is better to take on the case so that we can work to reassure parents with the hope that the child is then left to develop at their own rate without intrusive assessments.
Respondent 99: As individual psychologists and also as a team we face dilemmas as to how our resources should be prioritised.  Do we prioritise resources towards children with child protection needs, knowing that they are a group at risk of negative outcomes, or do we prioritise resources to children with things going for them, where might show quick impact?
Respondent 102: Making decisions on limited information, ensuring the best possible service to clients in difficult, complex and changing contexts.

1.1	In some instances, this included the needs of the EP, for example either in terms of their need to earn a living, while providing a fair service, for example,

Respondent 1; Really only in respect of how I set my charges regarding profit element.
Respondent 91: I have only fairly recently begun to work as an ‘Independent EP’.  This usually means that one is working for the parent or their legal representative…. There can be an assumption on the part of the parents that the psychologist will entirely support their point of view.  If they don’t like your opinion, they tend not to pay!

1.1.1	Or in terms of work-life balance, given that the potential need for EP involvement is much greater than the ability of the profession to respond.  

Respondent 12: e.g. time needed to do work not being enough so that all need cannot be met – the issue is that there will never be enough time and we have to make the best of it.
Respondent 114: It could be a dilemma whether or not to respond to a query from a school about a pupil when the school’s allocated time has been ‘used up’.  

1.1.2	Or in terms of personal safety

Respondent 64: Risk assessment in having to see young people (both sexes) on their own and to be on home visits.
Respondent 97: Offering Portage to a family with a history of abuse.  We have to consider if we can offer an equality of service if this puts our Portage Home Visitor at risk.
Respondent 120: Safeguarding the EP when working with child/young person from any accusations of misconduct.

1.1.3	A common balancing of needs was that of the individual child versus the majority of children in a school or of other groups of children.

Respondent 29: Contribution to the assessment of a child accused of sexual misdemeanours, where there is a clear need to advocate for his right to education versus a need to protect others from potential risk/harm.
Respondent 45: Sometimes there is a huge dilemma between what is right for the system (and therefore lots of children in the future) and what is right for the individual you are currently dealing with.  For example, if a school have asked for additional support but have not done all they could to help the child first – do you turn them down, knowing that they probably still won’t put the provision in place but giving them the message they must do more, or do you give the support for the benefit of the child, giving the message that the school don’t need to bother because the Authority will make the provision for additional needs.
Respondent 54: The interests of one child versus the interests of the rest of the class.
Respondent 99: Do we prioritise resources towards children with child protection needs knowing that they are a group at particular risk of negative outcomes or do we prioritise resources to children with things going for them, where might show quick impact.
Respondent 112: When a child is causing disruption in mainstream school and this is impacting on the education of other children, however I believe remaining in mainstream school will confer the best outcomes for my client.

1.1.4	Or the balancing of the need of the child against other pressures of time.

Respondent 35: Having to make a time management decision over who should be a priority for my immediate involvement (assessing how pressing a need appears to be for those concerned including the child).
Respondent 87: Working short term with children who need longer and more regular therapeutic intervention. Not doing the best that could be done because I don’t have the time to do it.

1.1.5	Or balancing the needs of the child, parents and/or school simultaneously.

Respondent 46: Reports have to be written for a variety of audiences and risk doing a disservice to one or more.
Respondent 51: Out of county provision which is not offering a good standard of education but there is not an easy alternative to utilise – balancing children and families’ needs.
Respondent 69: Families with severe social difficulties when considering whether child should be removed from parent.
Respondent 82: I am working with a five year old whose behaviour is completely out of control.  My clients here include the child, the mother, the stepfather, the teacher and the acting HT and this all creates conflicts of interests.  There is the ethical dilemma of deciding how much emphasis to put upon within child as opposed to outside child factors.  There is the ethical dilemma of whether to focus on the problems at home or at school or probably in the end at both locations.  There is the ethical concern of whose voice to follow and who is the victim.  There is concern about other professional responsibilities that have been deliberately marginalized to allow lots of time to be focussed on this single high intensity case.
Respondent 86: Today-discussion with a caseworker in relation to a child in school where school and parents disagree on the difficulties that the child has and working out how to meet the child’s needs within this context whilst developing a particular stance ourselves via assessment.  Once we have a hypothesis as to what the difficulties might be, do we ‘take sides’ in order for the child’s needs to be met or do we make sure all parties can develop a better relationship by not taking sides and meet the child’s need in the longer term?  We decided the latter was the more moral decision – this would address the family needs and therefore the child’s needs ultimately whilst working on a relationship (parent/school) over time.

1.2	    Sometimes professional integrity has to be balanced against a child’s welfare within a system perceived as rigid and inflexible, such as authority criteria for additional funding.

Respondent 63: Balancing ‘hard’ statistically based criteria against a more subjective evaluation of needs.
Respondent 113: Reliable, transparent and objective administration and reporting of assessment test data versus immediate interests of the YP tested in terms of the LA’s criteria for statutory assessment.

1.3	    Child protection issues are very sensitive as the evidence is sometimes ambiguous.

Respondent 64: The boundary line for reporting child protection issues based on a judgement about the likelihood of whether there are such issues affecting a child or young person.

Category 2: Respecting confidences

A total of 24.6% respondents identified this issue as causing them one or more ethical dilemmas.

2.	EPs experienced dilemmas with regard to being entrusted with information by a third party and having to make judgements about its use.  The dilemmas involve balancing considerations of the rights of clients to have personal information respected and kept confidential against the potential value of sharing that information with parents or other professionals who may be able to add value to the service being provided and to the eventual outcome. 

Examples were:
Respondent 5: Whilst wanting to respect confidentiality – feel need to share info.
Respondent 20: Issues of confidentiality when working hard to maintain inter-disciplinary working practices.
Respondent 46: Sharing information about a child could infringe their rights but might be essential to protect their interests.
Respondent 74: Who to tell, when to tell…how much?  Confidentiality versus positive effect of informing others of any intervention.
Respondent 75: Who I talk about children to (e.g. assessment info sharing).
Respondent 78: When to share information outside of a conversation that you have had, that you have not explained it may be passed on.
Respondent 84: Issues of an ethical nature are often present in decisions about the disclosure of information, or the acceptance of information relating to named service users.
Respondent 90: General day to day casework, i.e. not discussing cases with people outside the permission loop.

The confidential information can come from a number of sources, as follows:

2.1	It might be privileged information from within the management of an education authority.  Respondents cited examples of having insider knowledge of budgetary information, of school closure and of school placement availability that might affect colleagues, children or families.  
Examples were:
Respondent 3: Whether/what to tell staff about budget cuts.
Respondent 44: One of our special schools is almost certainly closing down.  We are not free to say this yet and children are still being sent there.  This causes conflicts.
Respondent 101: Is it ethical to encourage a parent to fully explore all possibilities for placements for her child, if I know that in reality there will only be a place available in one school (e.g. due to other resources being full)?

2.2	The dilemma might concern privileged medical information.

Respondent 67: Doctor told me child was terminally ill, mum didn’t appear to know.

2.3 	The dilemma might concern sensitive information passed on by school staff.
Examples were
Respondent 51: Staff telling you things ‘confidentially’ which may be contentious or need to be shared with others.
Respondent 91: Working in a LA, there are sometimes difficulties in breaking confidences or in upsetting schools or individual members of staff when reporting verbatim.
Respondent 103: When teachers share issues that are their own ethical decisions such as when children have disclosed but they promised confidentiality – and they seek advice.

2.4	 The EP may obtain media information that is not, in itself, confidential, but places the EP in a dilemma between their duties as a ‘good citizen’ versus their duty to maintain the confidence of a family.

Respondent 117: Seeing a photo of a child’s mother in a newspaper which was seeking further information re. Shoplifting/defrauding.

2.5	 In a number of instances, children and families provide the sensitive information.  EPs are entrusted with private information by a child or family and have to make decisions about the boundaries and wisdom of sharing this information.

This involved having to make decisions about disclosing enough information to enable other colleagues to make informed decisions regarding actions to be taken in respect of a child’s best interests, for example, in meetings, by telephone or in correspondence, which might be by letter or by report. 

Examples were:
Respondent 28: How we report the information given to us by children.
Respondent 47: An occasion when a young person disclosed information which he did not want documented in written form.  The information being collected was for a re-assessment and was therefore relevant.  To report or not to report?
Respondent 72: Discussions in forums where obtaining consent has not been managed by EPs and confidentiality issues in multi-agency discussion forums.
Respondent 77: How to phrase feedback from a pupil who perceives their teacher to be aggressive, nasty and picking on them.  How to investigate whether the pupil’s perspective is accurate and the extent to which accuracy matters versus how they feel.
Respondent 92: Report writing, deciding what parents need and have a right to know.

2.6	 In other cases, the EP had to weigh the benefits of disclosure to others who were not professional colleagues or to the local authority, but who could arguably have a right to know or whether it was in the child’s interests that they should know.

Examples were:
Respondent 2: Whether to divulge confidential information as to a child’s view of the world to their parents or teachers.
Respondent 24: A child chose to speak about her feelings re: her family.  At the end of our session, she said that she did not want me to tell anyone what she had said.  She went home and told parents I had been asking about her family and parents were very upset.  I had to deal with the situation of the upset and angry parents without breaking the child’s confidence.
Respondent 40: A child disclosed that they were using cannabis in a residential school whilst attending the local college on a day basis.  The child was 16 and I took the view that it was not abnormal behaviour among 16 year olds.  I documented the information in a sealed envelope in the child’s file, discussed it with my senior but did not report it to the police or the school.

2.7	   Sometimes, the information involves child protection issues.

Examples were:
Respondent 68: Breaking confidentiality during therapeutic work e.g. when child protection issues are present.
Respondent 109: In the course of conducting focus group research, the issues arose about a teacher physically handling some of the young people involved.  The researcher then had to make a decision about what to do with that information, given that we had told the group that their discussion was confidential.
Respondent 120: Assessing a pupil who referred to another pupil being bullied.

The above instances deal with sensitive information that has been given to the EP by the education authority, by professional colleagues, by teachers and by children/ families.

2.8	However in some instances, it may be that EPs themselves have information or an opinion on an issue, which they feel unable to disclose, because of a perceived responsibility to an employer, a setting, or a child.

Examples were:
Respondent 23: Feeding back info to young people.  How honest should I be?  Do I tell them the truth if I complete an assessment?
Respondent 34: Today I had to advise parents of a child with ASD about whether their child would best be placed at a provision which looks suitable on paper but in reality is very poor.
Respondent 44: Very recently a mother was very keen for her child to attend an Assessment nursery.  In our authority, these fill the role of feeder schools for the special schools and the practice in the nursery in question was poor.  I felt that a lot of the child’s difficulties related to an impoverished environment and that the best course of action would have been a full-time placement in a local and very good nursery with additional support for mother at home.  I felt unable to say that this particular nursery had very poor practice – a position the Local Authority would not have supported but knew that this little boy would not have been adequately supported…I feel I have let the boy down as three days a week he has an hour’s bus journey to a dismal setting.
Respondent 63: Do I recommend alternative provision if school is poorly skilled/motivated/resourced in comparison to a mainstream provision in a ‘better’ school?
Respondent 69: Incompetent teacher making life difficult for child…
Respondent 80: not able to advise parents not to send their child to a particular nursery which I feel would not be inclusive or able to meet needs.
Respondent 89: consultation request signed blank by parents then filled in by school.
Respondent 95: Child age 6 yrs – started to refuse to go to school because of the teacher’s attitude to them – parent trying to get child back into school – no confidence in teacher!  Has been a history of this type of situation for other children.  I am aware this is the case but have to remain impartial!!  And work to solutions for all!!  Personally, I’m with the parent.  I wouldn’t want my child treated this way but professionally, I can’t let that enter into it….  Work with the teacher professionally but in the meantime what is happening to the child’s view of education!

2.9	 EPs have to make decisions regarding the role of confidentiality in shadowing and training opportunities.  On the one hand, new entrants to a profession, and those interested in entering training have to be offered reasonable shadowing opportunities in order to make informed decisions about their suitability for the work.  Also those with allied professions (e.g. speech therapists, clinical psychologists, special needs coordinators) are often encouraged to shadow educational psychologists in order to promote inter-disciplinary understanding and cooperation.  On the other hand, and particularly in cases where there are local connections, the EP has to weigh the possibility of sensitive information being ‘leaked’, whether deliberately or in the form of thoughtless gossip. 
The only example was:
Respondent 10: Whether or not to allow learning mentor from a local school, who wishes to train as an EP, to shadow me whilst being involved in sensitive cases, particularly in interviews with parents.

Category 3: Challenging other discourses 

A total of 21.2% respondents identified this issue as causing them one or more ethical dilemmas.

3.	 In this study, discourse is defined as the language that different people and different groups of people use to communicate their opinions and beliefs, their knowledge and their life stories.  The professions, for example, psychologists, social workers, teachers, doctors, have idiosyncratic discourses each based on their own particular organisation of knowledge and practice.  Families and children have different discourses.  Language is a means of communicating our mental representations about the social world and what is and can be known.  It is the dilemma of understanding, communicating and sometimes confronting these different mental representations that sometimes face the EP.  One respondent put this succinctly:

Respondent 12: Different discourses around SEN.

3.1	 EPs are sometimes presented with views about a child or a family that are not merely different in a professional sense but derogatory or demeaning to the respect and dignity to which the child/family are entitled.  This can also happen when derogatory opinions are expressed about colleagues or professionals from other services.  
The ethical dilemma is if, when, how to challenge the attitudes of others who show discrimination, prejudice, lack of care, or lack of respect.

3.1.1 Sometimes the challenge may be to a school.

Respondent 4: Attitudes of school staff to certain parents.
Respondent 70: A SENCO suggesting we don’t tell a mother that I am going to observe her daughter in order to ensure her daughter is in school.  Not really a dilemma!!  Had to be very clear about need for parental consent.
Respondent 89: Serf told EP that they wanted to get rid of her because she was MLD but hadn’t told parents who thought EP was doing routine assessment.

3.1.2	The challenge may be to colleagues in the widest sense.

Respondent 29: Challenging colleagues who make comments which could be deemed to have racist overtones without having access to the legal situations (e.g. the rights of the children of illegal immigrants to education) yet need to address the issue promptly.
Respondent 101: Is it ethical to be in a professional meeting at which someone is gossiping about someone else without taking a stand?

3.1.3	The challenge may be to a pupil.

Respondent 120: Assessing a pupil who referred to an SSA as an Asian who stunk (the dilemma would have been if he had referred to her as something else).

3.1.4	The discourse may not be explicitly derogatory or demeaning, but nevertheless be disrespectful in other ways, for example, by betraying confidences.

Respondent 29: Challenging colleagues who present information offered from one person in confidence about another who has offered compromising advice to the middle party regarding a child – without damaging relationships yet keeping the child’s needs at the heart of the issue.
Respondent 84: An example would be when discussing a named child at a planning meeting, the Senco or other staff member may volunteer information about the child or family that is of a strictly confidential nature and which has no direct bearing on the issues being discussed.

3.2	 Professional colleagues often have different epistemologies, different training, different priorities and a different service ethos. In other words, they work within different paradigms. Through dialogue, ideally, the differences between the professions can lead to a mutual enrichment and understanding, but sometimes in practice, the differences lead to mutual incomprehension, rivalry or power struggles, which ultimately act as barriers to cooperative working practices and hence to the quality of service provided to children and families.

Respondent 66: Other professionals chasing particular agenda/ game playing usually at the expense of parents’ rights/needs. E.g. apply for a statutory assessment ASAP so you can get your out of borough place and have plenty of time for appeals.

3.2.1	An example of working with colleagues from a different paradigm is with children’s social care, where each professional may prioritise need differently.

Respondent 100: Where there is a child protection issue within the home: my view of the risk (especially if it is chronic emotional neglect) may differ from that of the social worker who often considers it less risky.  The dilemma then is whether to let matters lie with the social worker’s judgement or to make more of a fuss.  To be frank, the pressures of the daily work generally make the decision for me.

3.2.2	Another example of a different paradigm is the medical model.

Respondent 8: A parent insisting on a diagnosis of ADHD and prescription of drugs for a child who is acting out as the result of sustained physical, sexual, and emotional abuse and where the psychiatrist is refusing to accept any alternative view of the case.  
Respondent 56: Issues around youngsters having ADHD diagnosis when you know that no parenting strategies have been tried…so the kid ends up on drugs that stunt its growth and could give it heart problems!

3.3	Challenging children and parents’ discourse is a particularly sensitive area, which additionally is linked with issues of power.  Rightly or wrongly, EPs are often seen as ‘experts’ whose knowledge is imbued with greater authority than that of their clients.  The dilemma for the EP is to know if choices made by children and parents are informed choices, when, if, and under what conditions it is acceptable to override the opinions and wishes of others.   As Billington (2006, p.151) states, A commitment to the children with whom we work does not mean simply accepting their views and acting upon their choices, for as professionals we have a responsibility in accordance with the best interests of social government.

Respondent 8: A parent who is insisting on a diagnosis of dyslexia and constant testing for a child who has epilepsy and cerebral palsy.
Respondent 30: The service ethos is very inclusive and there are times when inclusion might not meet the child’s needs, but parents advocate for mainstream provision.  I find this a difficult situation as there are many dimensions, such as service ethos, best interests of the child and parental preference to consider, in addition to supporting the school.
Respondent 36: A particular dilemma that I am facing at the moment involves a pupil in Y5 who has significant physical and learning difficulties.  At present he is placed in a Y1/2 class in which he appears to be happy.  Socially and by height he fits well in this class although academically he is at the bottom.  His parents would like him to attend a mainstream secondary school.  My dilemma is that although I feel the best place for most children where they will thrive socially and academically is in mainstream.  However, I cannot see how this little boy will be able to be happy, make friends and achieve his potential in any of our secondary schools.
Respondent 96: The authority I work for makes generous provision to support pupils in mainstream schools.  The authority also maintains a large number of special schools, and is in fact spending heavily to refurbish and rebuild these schools.  While I have concerns about segregated special provision, I have to recognise that this is how our elected representatives have chosen to organise provision for their constituents. I also have to recognise, here a degree of parental choice and (to a lesser extent) a choice for young people in how their needs will be met.  I’m frequently not sure if this is an entirely free and informed choice, and I have additional difficulties if I perceive the choice to be not in the young person’s best interests.
It makes for an interesting interview question:
Shaun’s behaviour is a real problem at school and his mum wants you to send him to the EBD School.  What do you do?
You’ve discussed this with Shaun.  He says he wants to go.  What do you do?
Shaun says it will be better for him.  His Mum and his Head of Year have told him this.  You don’t agree.  What do you do?” Etc. etc.
Respondent 110: Where a parent wants a child to go to special school, but from your opinion and the evidence gathered, the most appropriate placement is their local mainstream school.
Respondent 112: When a child wants to go to college but I know there is a high risk of this failing and them being left with no educational provision.  When I am asked to work with a child who says they do not want to work with me but I believe I can make a difference for them. When a parent wants their child to attend mainstream school and in my view the child’s needs would be better met in a specialist provision.

3.4	Other challenges may have to be to school staff.  In examples 21 and 84, I have included the teacher’s behaviour as ‘discourse’ because it involved a clear ‘message’ to his pupils.

Respondent 15: The way some adults treat children.  Children with learning difficulties being described as BESD etc when their skills in certain areas are delayed.
Respondent 21: A very good example was when I was observing a child in a lesson.  The behaviour of the good, sympathetic teacher was sexist (unconsciously, I’m sure) He called on about eight boys to two girls to answer questions or work on the board.  Having called on one girl, he then gave the task to the boy I was observing, who volunteered after the task had been allocated to the girl.  He called on the same girl to give out books and then go and get him a glass of water.  He might, of course have been consciously using strategies to keep the boys engaged.  Even so, as an observer, it was painful to watch the eagerness of the girls and the lack of acknowledgement of them.  I was observing a pupil, not the teacher and could not think of any way of constructively feeding back on this.  I once worked with a teacher who was using a punitive strategy with a girl in a special school.  He had read some psychology and, without an ethical framework thought it was ok to hold her nose when she made a particular noise.  In this case, I did not have a dilemma.  It was clear that I had to challenge his approach and explain the ethical issues.
Respondent 45: Annual reviews – challenging the adults involved to include students and parents in a meaningful way (not just lip service).
Respondent 53: Most often to do with parental or school views which seem to conflict with child’s rights
Respondent 84: Another example would be when an issue of concern on the part of a member of staff is observed during a session in class (e.g. inappropriate behaviour on the part of the member of staff towards a child) when the agreed purpose of the visit was to collect information, say, on the response of a child to curricular activities provided.
Respondent 10: When schools do not support inclusive practice, but lie to parents to cover themselves, e.g. deliberately winding up children with EBD to ‘get them out for good’.

Category 4: Being between a rock and a hard place

A total of 19.5% respondents identified this issue as causing them one or more ethical dilemmas.

4.	 In these types of dilemmas, EPs invariably found themselves at the centre of a triad of individuals or systems where there was a conflict of interests between the needs of the two other parties.  The EP was being required to make choices as to whose interests to prioritise.

4.1	EPs are in a particularly difficult position with some schools as they are required to work with individual school staff over time, their work may be evaluated by those staff reporting back to the education authority employer, and schools are in a position to make complaints about their EP to the authority.  Driven by government and local authority political agendas, head teachers may feel that the perceived welfare of the whole school takes precedence over the perceived welfare of an individual child, or family whose needs may be costly in terms of budget, staff time or expertise, for example:

Respondent 28: The drive (both personal and professional) to develop and maintain positive relationships with our schools can lead us to collusion with the school.  This can have implications where the school is in conflict with parents.
Respondent 76: When you are trying to decide whether in your judgement a school is meeting an individual’s needs appropriately, and at the same time trying to maintain a working relationship with the staff.
Respondent 92: Deciding on how to fully inform parents of the extent to which the needs of their child are being appropriately met, while maintaining a positive relationship with schools.  Particularly in cases where schools do not seem to be doing all they can and should.
Respondent 100: When the needs of a teacher and pupil conflict and where my duty is to help both parties.  However, that is perhaps better described as a tension of dialectic where the contradictions can lead to a higher and more fruitful resolution.
Respondent 104: When schools do not support inclusive practice, but lie to parents to cover themselves, e.g. deliberately winding up children with EBD to ‘get them out for good’.
Respondent 105: Generally where schools are pushing parents towards their choice of action – not respecting parental views.  School wants me to condone their wish to place a child in special school against parents’ wishes. Also where schools want to recruit me, as EP, to collude with a blame and labelling approach to a child/and or parents.

4.2	Similarly some parents do not appreciate that the EP has a duty to the child, but see themselves as the primary clients.  For example:

Respondent 42: A pupil presents with behaviours associated with those on the Autistic Spectrum but parents make it clear they are not interested in pursuing a medical diagnosis.  Do I use the label or describe the behaviour?
Respondent 64: Issues where it is difficult to make decisions between children’s rights and parental rights in situations of conflict.
Respondent 73: Where a young child was experiencing distress at his parents’ lack of communication and acrimonious divorce.  The child was unwilling to visit his father and felt intimidated by him.  His father was also distressed that he didn’t want to see him and he wanted me as EP to ‘get to the bottom of it’ and persuade the child to see him.  I wasn’t sure if this was in the child’s best interests.
Respondent 95: Year 8 girl – eating issues – parents causing the difficulty.  I have to work in a way to have the young person’s trust but have to work with the parents, very aware that I have to be selective about how I do this because it could have repercussions for the child.  When I know I should be transparent with them too.
4.3	One common example was the political agenda and economic requirements of the education authority versus the needs of the individual child and the dilemma faced by the EP in trying to fulfil the duty to the employer and also the duty to the child.  Numerous examples have been deliberately quoted, as this specific issue is discussed later with reference to an on-going Government consultation exercise :

Respondent 3: Conflict between LA interests (cost) and need for a child.
Respondent 9: There can be a dilemma between working within the financial constraints of a LA and the needs of a child.  For example, it might be in the child’s best interests to receive specialist education that is not available within the LA and this has to be balanced against cost ( and hence possibly depriving another child of specialist provision) as well as the implications of taking the child out of his/her community.
Respondent 14: Sitting on decision making panels for LA and having needs of child at odds.
Respondent 17: Where I feel child has difficulties/needs but employer criteria does not allow for support.
Respondent 18: When I believe a child’s needs will be best met in a way that I suspect the authority would rather I didn’t voice.  Focus for LA is meet the child’s needs in most expedient and least expensive way.  I see myself as an advocate for the child and strive to make a case for the best provision.
Respondent 20: Professional judgement that special/residential school would meet a child’s needs but as an employee of a local authority encouraged to promote inclusion in mainstream school.
Respondent 27: When I feel I am being used to facilitate the smooth running of a system which is not acting in the best interests of the child, such as justifying an exclusion or removal to EBD facilities when the system is falling short.  Example, I took on a high school recently which I hadn’t dealt with before.  They were wanting to permanently exclude a Year 7 pupil (very bright but very unsettled probably linked to dire domestic circumstances).  The TA had been used to observe, collect examples of unacceptable behaviour (solutions…???) to aid their case.  I was unpopular because I could not go along with the process and tried to put a case for stability, security etc.  
Respondent 28: The level of funding available for children with special educational needs in the local authority can determine policy direction and a focus on money saving measures.  This budget driven culture may influence how comfortable educational psychologists are with providing statutory and non-statutory advice that addresses the needs of the child independently of financial implications for their employer.
Respondent 93: Systems, which do not always put children and their families at the centre e.g. due to financial constraints.
Respondent 114: It could be a dilemma what to recommend about a pupil’s needs – i.e., do we say what we think the child needs, or do we suggest/tailor what we say according to what is available?”


Category 5: Malfeasance/ doing harm

A total of 18.6% respondents identified this issue as causing them one or more ethical dilemmas.

5.	 EPs experienced ethical dilemmas when they felt that they were being required to support decisions or to take actions that, in their professional opinion, might not be in the best interests of the child or might even be harmful to them.

5.1 	Assessments, particularly psychometric testing:

Respondent 6: Related to use of IQ tests, the intensity of assessment, the amount of professionals in a child’s life, decisions being made without full knowledge/ understanding of child and family.
Respondent 25: When asked to carry out cognitive testing because a school would like a child to go to a special school.
Respondent 28: Where cognitive test scores are used by other professional groups, should educational psychologists agree to provide them purely for this purpose.  For example, a child with poor speech and language skills may be denied speech and language therapy if their language abilities are found to be in line with their cognitive abilities.
Respondent 41: Whenever I assess a child – needs to be justified.
Respondent 72: Requests to use standardised/ normative/ psychometric tests with groups where I feel it is not appropriate, e.g. very young i.e. preschool children, children with EAL, disabled children
Respondent 101: Is it ethical to ask a child questions beyond their ability just because they need 5 consecutive failures as part of a psychometrics test.

One EP indicated a concern about the consequences of disclosing assessment results to the child.
Respondent 22: Feeding back info to young people.  How honest should I be?  Do I tell them the truth if I complete an assessment?

5.2 	Disrespecting Children’s Rights

Other EPs felt concern that children’s human rights were being infringed.  This stems from a belief, enshrined in the Convention on Human Rights, that children have a right to have an opinion on what happens/is done to them and that they should be given the opportunity to give informed consent to procedures involving them. 

Respondent 28: The genuineness of informed consent from children about whether they wish to work with us or not.  This has particular implication for classroom observation i.e. the teacher may wish us to observe as a ‘stranger’ to the child but in this case the child has no opportunity to give or refuse consent.  The intellectual abilities and the emotional state of some of the children and parents we work with can sometimes give rise to the difficulty of ascertaining that we have informed consent.
Respondent 45: When doing a classroom observation – I would want to have the young person’s informed consent before doing any work on their behalf, but their knowledge that I am observing them changes their behaviour.
Respondent 50: Deciding if a Year 9 boy should be seen by me without his parents’ knowledge.
Respondent 62: Making decisions about how/where to interview young people to allow them equal opportunity to develop/express their views.
Respondent 72: issue of child giving consent, particularly for children with speech/ language/ communication needs and young children, particularly informed consent.
Respondent 111: Pupils are not informed that it has been arranged for them to see me until somebody collects them to bring them to me.  They have no say in the matter and are not given the opportunity to discuss it.

5.3     ‘Pathologizing’ children.

This occurred when the EP felt that the ‘problem’ was being inappropriately located ‘within child’ rather than as a function of the child within that particular environment.  

Respondent 44: I have had several instances where children are referred to the EPS because of the difficulties experienced by teacher or parents in accepting the child’s personal style and abilities.  The expectation is that I will make the child perform in a manner closer to the norm – this being easier in their minds than adjusting their expectations or the curriculum to match the child’s needs.  I am not convinced that this is in the child’s best interests.  Often this is at quite a low level but there have been occasions where I have felt that the child was being damaged by the focus on their behaviours.  I have felt very uncomfortable at being asked to contribute to this.
Respondent 71: Offering training in ADHD.  Are we collaborating with views in schools that such children are a problem and need ‘fixing’. 
Respondent 74: The ‘truth’ about the reality of identified SEN – is it a social construction? Conflict in regards the expectations of LEA and school – EP may want to explore strengths, exceptions, resources and not pathology/needs (within child attributes).
Respondent 104: When all the adults working with an individual identify an area of need (including parents and/or carers but the child does not believe they have a difficulty and do not want support.

5.4	Some EPs expressed concern about the large number of professional people with whom children were expected to develop a relationship and its corollary, where long term involvement has smudged the boundaries between professional and personal involvement.

Respondent 64: Issues that arise when the need for long term major involvement with a young person leads to their identifying you as a personal friend as well as psychologist.




Respondent 87: Being aware that EPs sometimes carry out therapeutic work with inadequate supervision and training.

Category 6: Dilemmas of social justice

A total of 11% respondents identified this issue as causing them one or more ethical dilemmas.

Some EPs expressed disquiet about perceived injustices, and the extent to which they were expected to be complicit with these.  There were also issues of perceived inequality of access to provision, where some parents were able to gain advantages over other parents by dint of their affluence, their intellectual resources or even by bullying tactics.

Respondent 13: Usually when school management has an agenda of control/ coercion regarding their staff/ students/ parents.  
Respondent 19: Being asked to do a cognitive assessment of child immediately before going to tribunal to support LEA refusal to assess.
Respondent 28: Where the individual psychologist feels uncomfortable with the provision offered by the local authority.  Well-informed parents with the emotional, intellectual and in some cases, financial capability to question these decisions, generally do so.  Less able parents often do not and the psychologist has to weigh their loyalties to their employer, who would wish the parent to accept the decision, against the best interests of the child.
When time is pressured, the decisions around who to see first are difficult.  They can be influenced by external sources such as vocal parents or schools who are known to complain. A related issue, do we see more children or fewer children more often?
Respondent 38: At times as an EP you are out into the position where you need to decide who is your client – in whose interest you are working – the child, the school, the authority. This can cause difficult decisions to arise that have to be resolved in a moment when you are in conversation with people.  Usually this occurs for me around statutory assessment.  There is undoubtedly an unspoken pressure to reduce the number of assessments and placements in special provision, however if the child meets the criteria or would benefit from a different placement that is available, and their parent/school is not going to pursue the issue, how far do I go in encouraging them when my employer is pulling in a conflicting direction?
Respondent 112: When parents want expensive out of city provision for their child but I know that other children are in greater need of this provision but their parents are not being so forceful.

6.1 	Whistle blowing 

This brought the question of who is the client into sharp focus for EPs.  In defending the rights of one stakeholder, EP could see themselves as being disloyal to another.  As Albanese (2008) comments, Misplaced loyalty inhibits reporting of unethical conduct.  Loyalty is often a good attribute but it is not a virtue in itself.  When it is treated as a virtue, loyalty can be misguided, leading to protection of illicit conduct of all kinds in the name of ‘loyalty’. (Albanese, 2008, p.157)

Respondent 31: Whether to take the time to contact advisor regarding unsatisfactory response from school department which affects a family with few resources to complain themselves.
Respondent 43: A child’s needs are being deliberately not addressed for a variety of reasons, but one is aware that the underlying cause is lack of resources, and one has to advise parents and possibly take a view in a Judicial Review.
Respondent 52: Employer’s policy or funding practice at odds with codes of conduct, DfEE guidance etc. e.g. DfEE full time education entitlement for excluded children, not available locally.





A total of 10.2% respondents identified this issue as causing them one or more ethical dilemmas.

7	This refers to EPs’ disquiet about the consequences on children’s lives of the power of labels.  This involves the manner in which labels or diagnoses are used increasingly by children’s services authorities as criteria for awarding additional services or additional funding to support intervention or to provide special education.  It also involves the manner in which labels can be perceived as an ‘explanation’ or ‘justification’ for a child’s difficulties, or can give rise to a self-fulfilling prophesy by leading to reduced expectations of child’s ability to make progress.

Respondent 7: They are usually related to pressure from schools/ parents for diagnoses or recommendations that I cannot support as being in the child’s best interests.
Respondent 75: Use of language/terms (e.g. behavioural difficulties) – how I talk about children (e.g. identifying ‘within child’ factors)
Respondent 77: Whether to succumb to providing the label of ‘dyslexia’ for a child’s specific literacy difficulties for the benefit of the parents and teachers and therefore the child, even though I have not yet resolved the debates surrounding the notion of dyslexia and my professional opinion may evolve to reject the label.
Respondent 115: A teacher asking what she should do about a child whom she thinks may be ‘dyslexic’.  The option is always to do nothing different but in asking the question of herself and me it becomes a potentially life altering event for the child, whatever decision is made.

Category 8: Conflicting principles/ conflicting roles

A total of 7.6% respondents identified this issue as causing them one or more ethical dilemmas.

These dilemmas encompass those where the respondent felt torn between two ideological positions, or between two different roles of responsibility.

9.1	 The EP’s personally held belief conflicts with the equally held belief that parents’ opinions should be respected.  The dilemma may occur when parents want special education for their child, contrary to the personally held beliefs of the EP in inclusion or vice versa.  The EP may feel that principles deriving from different discourses have equal merit but are incompatible.

Respondent 12: The need to rationalise places in special provision versus parents feeling strongly they do not wish this (not an issue for myself since I have a strong discourse re: inclusion, but an issue in that carers feel strongly that they are not listened to and we should be listening to partners.
Respondent 96: The dilemmas arise for me in casework.  They also arise in my role as a service manager: in supervision, in issues which arise between colleagues, and at the point where the service interfaces with schools and other agencies.  The dilemmas usually occur when two or more ‘good’ principles come into contact.
Respondent 71: Early assessment based on thorough assessment following NICE guidelines (Early Years Social Communication Pathway) – versus social model of disability that seems to criticise use of early labelling and specialist help. 

9.2	They also include those where the EP has to make a decision about the extent to which personally held beliefs can be superimposed on a system and the extent to which collegiate loyalty is due or defensive practice required.

Respondent 28: Labels: who should give a label and who should not?  When should a possible label be first mentioned to a parent and who should do it?  Additionally, if an individual psychologist does not feel labels are helpful, should they be obliged to give them as another psychologist would?  Should an anti-labelling psychologist give labels to protect him/herself against any future legal action?

9.3	The role conflict can be experienced in different ways.

Respondent 54: Being an educational psychologist versus an officer of the authority.
Respondent 55: I work both as a LEA EP and an EP in private practice.  Sometimes the edges become a little blurred.




Category 9: Challenging competences

A total of 4.2% respondents identified this issue as causing them one or more ethical dilemmas.

9. 	Sometimes, the ethical dilemma for the EP extends beyond challenging other discourse to challenging actual competence to practice.

9.1      Sometimes this involves challenging EP colleagues, for example,

Respondent 23: An example from work as PEP might be the extent to which a report from a colleague should be queried if in my opinion the recommendations do not seem to follow from the data or appear to be reflecting the school’s view rather than the child’s best interests.
Respondent 32: As a manager of a team of EPs, dilemmas crop up when we are dealing with complaints.  We need to ensure that we are supporting staff but also have to challenge inappropriate behaviour or practice because it affects the customers we serve i.e. the children, families and schools.  Sometimes it would be easier to turn a blind eye, but this would not be acting in an ethical manner.
Respondent 49: Inappropriate practice by colleagues.

9.2	 Sometimes it involves challenging other professionals.

9.2.1	 These may be doctors.

Respondent 119: Diagnosis given by Community Paediatricians – particularly related to ASD based on Clinic visit and parental report which is not backed up by any other discussion/observations etc.  Consequently, these children have a label that ‘sticks’ and the diagnosis could, in some cases be considered spurious, and can affect the life chances of the child, in my opinion.

9.2 2	 They may also be teachers.







Level 3 (theoretical) coding

The ethical dilemmas categorised above represent situations where EPs have described perceived conflicts in resolving situations that ‘tug’ them in opposing directions.  I suggest that there is a four fold tension between the so-called universalistic impartialist, justice and utility themes in ethical decision-making, the ethics of virtue and care, EPs’ personally held beliefs about what it is to be ethical and their self identity as practitioners.  One way of viewing this tension can be considered through Festinger’s theory of cognitive dissonance.

Festinger (1957) argues that people’s beliefs and attitudes are, for the most part, internally consistent and congruent with their actions.  He uses the term consonance to describe this harmonious relationship.  Where exceptions occur, where there is inconsistence and incongruence, i.e. where there is dissonance, ‘psychological discomfort’ ensues, which people are driven to reduce, similarly as when they experience physical discomfort.  This will be further expanded in the later section in which the analysis of these results is discussed.

Figure 11:   Diagrammatic representation of cognitive dissonance (Festinger      1957)






If a person holds cognitions A and B such that A follows from the opposite of B, then A and B are dissonant  (Cooper, 2007, p. 6).

*A cognition is ‘any piece of knowledge’ a person may have.  It can be knowledge of a behaviour, knowledge of one’s attitude, or knowledge about the state of the world (idem).


Research Question 4: How do EPs resolve perceived ethical dilemmas?

This research question was probed by two questionnaire questions, question 5 and question 6.  The resulting data is analysed below.

Questionnaire question 5: In resolving these dilemmas, did you have or do you have recourse to any particular philosophy/ religion/world view?
From the questionnaire responses to question 5, a total of 40 level one codes were identified.  They were then further categorised into 9 level 2 codes.  

Level 2 codes
Figure 12: Respondents’ philosophy, religion, world view
A total of 6.8% respondents either left this question blank or gave unclear responses, for example,
Respondent 16: Personal
Respondent 46: Not one I could defend in a philosophical or religious debate
Respondent 106: Yes
Respondent 61: My world view/ political views.


Category 1: Being child/ person-centred

A total of 28% respondents provided responses which were grouped into this category.

This category has subsumed those initial codes which seemed to place the integral worth of the child or young person at the centre of the decision-making process.  There is frequent mention of humanism in the responses, but it is not always clear whether these are references to humanism as an ethical belief system, to humanistic psychology or to humanism as a philosophy.  In either case, they are not incompatible in emphasising as they do human values and individual worth.  I have chosen to place in this category the responses that seemed to me to be more motivated by a desire to promote individual well-being.  Where responses appeared to refer to a more abstract concept of Humanism, they have been categorised differently.

Examples were:
Respondent 1: Basic Humanist principles – but not in any formal sense.
Respondent 9: ‘Do no harm’.  Working towards the betterment of outcomes for individual children and for all the children in the LEA.
Respondent 68: *A person-centred philosophy/set of values
Respondent 112: *I believe it is very important that people have autonomy to make their own decisions and that part of my role is to support them to develop the knowledge that enables them to make appropriate decisions.  I believe that I have a responsibility to consider the future as well as the present, decisions made now may have future implications that may not be easily undone.  These beliefs are my own but may be considered to be consistent with humanist thinking.  I am not religious but as I was raised in a Christian tradition I am likely to have been influenced by the moral beliefs of Christianity which are not dissimilar to those from the other main religions.

Category 2: Believing in a religious precept

A total of 21.2% respondents (provided responses which were grouped into this category.

Responses were placed into this category when respondents mentioned a world religion as influencing their ethical decision-making, even if they did not practise a faith actively.  Some respondents did not name a specific religion but quoted a particular passage from the bible; others spoke about having a spiritual outlook but did not name any organised religion.

Respondent 2: A Christian ethic, if anything, but I wouldn’t describe myself as a Christian.
Respondent 3: Buddhism – compassion, fairness, all equal, kindness.  Events/Phenomena as fleeting – like a dream.
Respondent 18: Do as you would be done by!!  I am a person who ‘struggles’ with faith but feel it is worth the struggle and therefore attend church weekly (C of E).  I think I am influenced by Christian philosophy and am aware that I try not to be judgemental and to ‘love’ my fellow man.
Respondent 23: As a Christian, that would be the world view I would adopt.  This I assume entails a bias towards those who are less able to present their views for themselves and a commitment to seek to reconcile people.  I think it also entails seeing life as having a particular purpose.  In terms of ethics I suppose the Sermon on the Mount would be a particularly important source of guidance.
Respondent 99:  *Yes.  Socialist /Christian value base which values those who are most marginalized.

Category 3: No particular world view

A total of 18.6% respondents provided responses which were grouped into this category.





Respondent 15: Not really.
Respondent 19: No –not consciously. I don’t think so, but maybe my early years’ religious indoctrination has been absorbed and is part of my ethical/moral decision-making process.
Respondent 23: Don’t think so.
Respondent 33: No.  I use an eclectic approach.
Respondent 57: *No.  Come to the situation as an EP who holds an interactionist perspective and values equality, supports inclusion, hearing “voice of child/young person etc. and who is aware of AEP, DECP, BPS ethical guidelines.
Respondent 65: No – (catholic background so who knows!)  Intelligent solutions can resolve dilemmas.
Respondent 105: No – just hopefully ethical practice and support of PEP.
Respondent 111: No – just try to remind schools what they should be doing.

Category 4: Believing in a political goal/ social justice

A total of 15.3% respondents (provided responses which were grouped into this category.

Some respondents stated clearly that they were motivated in their ethical decision making by a specific political ideology or government or intergovernmental agenda.  Others described beliefs consistent with a liberal enlightenment tradition
Examples were:
Respondent 28: *My own political views e.g. Socialist, humanitarian.
Respondent 44: Not beyond my belief that regardless of who pays me I am an advocate for the child and the child has the right to autonomy, no matter how young or how limited in ability to communicate.  It is my duty to protect that right all the more where the child has difficulty in exercising it.  As my mum would put it, ‘the more privileged you are the greater your responsibility to protect those who are less privileged’.
Respondent 45: Inclusion – the principle that all children should have equal opportunities to access education in its broadest sense.
Respondent 53: Equality for all individuals regardless of race, gender, wealth, sexuality, age, learning levels.
Respondent 71: * A socialist approach.  We should not allow psychology to be used to oppress people.
Respondent 79: I try to avoid this, but I know it is impossible – at heart I believe that all children should have equality of access to resources, regardless of their (or their parents) ability to access these.  This is my driving philosophy, although I know that this itself is flawed from a philosophical standpoint – it’s the best I can do though.

Category 5: Adhering to statutes

A total of 11% respondents provided responses which were grouped into this category.
This category of respondents expressed having recourse, at least in the first instance, to externally imposed standards such a codes of practice and legal frameworks for assistance in resolving perceived ethical dilemmas.  A number also revealed other influences such as religious beliefs, but placed these apparently secondary to statutory or quasi-statutory guidance.

Examples were:
Respondent 6: *I have strong Christian faith beliefs, but I think the human rights charter and BPS assessment and code of conduct/ethics etc I refer to. 
Respondent 8: My chartered status, which obliges me to follow my professional opinion as a psychologist and places the child’s needs as paramount.
Respondent 90: I follow guidance as outlined by my professional bodies, law, my LA and EPS service.
Respondent 109: In resolving the dilemma we adhered to the BPS code of conduct – protecting participants in research. ‘In exceptional circumstances, where there is sufficient evidence to raise serious concern about the safety or interests of recipients of services …take such steps as are judged necessary to inform appropriate 3rd parties, after first consulting an experienced and disinterested colleague.’
Respondent 113: Only what I have outlined above. There are standards that I am bound by as an employee of *** and that my work will be judged according to (e.g. attendance patterns, fulfilling the service level guarantee) but the way I see it is that I am employed as an educational psychologist to provide professional advice as an EP and therefore I am bound not to bring that role into disrepute equally in terms of my employer’s interests as if I were practising privately.
Respondent 116: *Difficult to separate out – do have spiritual faith but ethical views more influenced by ‘professional standards.’

Category 6: Being influenced by a philosophical paradigm

A total of 10.2% respondents (provided responses which were grouped into this category.

Some respondents expressed their responses in terms which implied their having been influenced in their thinking by philosophy, either specifically as part of their training or through their own thinking and reflection.
Examples were:
Respondent 29: A humanistic one which places absolute equality on the rights of each of us but which occasionally entails placing the good of all against those of the individual (including myself)
Respondent 36: I try to resolve issues according to the ethical principles outlined above.” “Giving consideration to and acting according to the ethical principles of autonomy, beneficence, non-malfeasance, fidelity, integrity.
Respondent 49: Ethical considerations suggested by Tim Bond. ->1) autonomy 2) beneficence 3) non-malfeasance 4) Justice 5) Fidelity 6) Integrity
Respondent 52: *Greatest benefit for the greatest number (utilitarianism).  Do unto others etc.  Help the oppressed and disadvantaged.  Minimize individual distress.  Maximize individual happiness.  Advance society to do likewise.
Respondent 53: *Greatest good for greatest number from fixed resources.
Respondent 54; A humanist perspective – making the best of the time we have on this earth.

Category 7: Being influenced by a psychological paradigm

A total of 9.3% respondents provided responses which were grouped into this category.

Other respondents expressed their responses in terms which implied their having been primarily influenced in their thinking by psychological theories, again either specifically as part of their training or through their own thinking and reflection.

Examples were:
Respondent 12: *Currently influenced by discourse psychology/ work of philosophers such as Foucault along with Vygotskyian approaches such as activity theory – there can be conflicts here where schools/SENDIST etc want a definite answer and I feel no definites exist anymore!
Respondent 42: I usually go with a descriptor of the behaviour and suggest we review the interventions I recommend in a year’s time or sooner if the parents so wish. My judgement would be guided by social interactionist principles and ensures the needs of the child are met without compromising an important relationship with the parents.
Respondent 72: * Personal unconditional positive regard for others – Rogers.  Construct psychology – Kelly. Socio-cultural activity theory:Humanism.
Respondent 74: *Solution-focussed – belief that people have strengths, resources e.g. there is nothing wrong with a person that what is right with them can’t fix.
Respondent 77: Yes, I think my religious and philosophical views are firmly embedded in my thinking pattern.  However I do check them out against the ‘psychological world view’ by speaking to other EPs, reading BPS advice and other psychological books and looking to see what EPs have done in the past.
Respondent 86: *I am a practising Catholic and this has coloured my perceptions of ethics from an early age – but first and foremost I am a psychologist and feel I work from the perspective of evidence and scientific theory predominantly with a fair amount of practical experience in the field of schools, families and meeting need and developing an understanding of what works and when and how it works.
Respondent 110: *Feminist psychology / feminism.

Category 8: Listing pragmatic heuristics used

A total of 5.1% respondents provided responses which were grouped into this category.
Examples were:
Respondent 80: Be honest.  Be supportive (of) parents/child.  Treat others as you would want to be treated.  Look at things from different perspectives.
Respondent 85: I would like to do more work with the adults working with these pupils, in a proactive way, in order to avoid the need to work with the pupils individually.

Category 9: Using common sense/ personal judgement/ past experience

A total of 3.4% respondents provided responses which were grouped into this category

These respondents adopted an approach that was characterised by being highly subjective.

Respondent 7:Past experience.
Respondent 17: *If pushed, I’d probably adopt a utilitarian position, but don’t necessarily feel comfortable with that, and would balance it against personal judgement.
Respondent 28: Personal morals sourced from culture, family, friends etc.
Respondent 30: Just a feeling of moral justice and a strong personal conscience that would motivate me to do what I felt was right.
Respondent43: Only my own conscience, guided by as much advice as I see fit to take.
Respondent 107: No.  I use a ‘commonsensical’ approach Cohen et al 2000.








Figure 13: Respondents’ support framework 
Responses divided between the ‘Who’ and the ‘What’ of this question, with some responses identifying both.
Responses that identified other people as supporting have been grouped as follows:

Category 1: Peers, whether EPs or from another discipline

A total of 74.6% respondents provided responses which were grouped into this category.

Examples were:
Respondent 21: trusted colleagues.
Respondent 32: My colleagues.  I talk through with them and they help me to reflect on what I should be doing and whether I am doing it for the right reasons.
Respondent 46: Colleagues are very supportive and understand the problems.  In general, management and council structures are not interested in ethical issues and there is little formal support, even on such things as work-life balance.
Respondent 81: Opportunities to test ideas and positions against commonality of colleagues’ views.  In this regard, peer supervision can be an important tool.
Respondent 96: I find it helpful to discuss dilemmas with a number of my colleagues; and also with social workers and medical colleagues whose perspective may be different to my own.

Category 2: Line managers/ supervisors

This category included responses where the respondent stated that they would seek support from a senior officer, either within the EP team (i.e. a qualified EP) or within the wider management structure (i.e. a manager who was not necessarily EP trained)

A total of 45.8% respondents provided responses which were grouped into this category.

Examples were:
Respondent 10: Supervisor/team leader or other senior member of the service.
Respondent 26: Supervision meetings have been helpful for me to consider some arguments and rehearse others.
Respondent 43: My Principal who will back me whether I am right or wrong.
Respondent 57: supervising Senior EP, Principal EP.
Respondent 68: I have supervision for therapeutic work (outside service).
Respondent 72: Direction, guidance, supervision – PEP.
Respondent 79: Sometimes my PEP, although she has responsibility over the SEN budget and so could be seen as a stakeholder just as much as everyone else is.  My supervisor has a more impartial role.  Generally though, I am able to resolve these issues with them both to my satisfaction.
Respondent 117: Supervision, formal and informal.

Category 3: Personal Reflection

Responses that did not specify people identified problem solving processes.  This mostly involved reflection on values or past experiences.

A total of 24.6%respondents provided responses which were grouped into this category.

Respondent 19: My own view on what I believe is my role as an EP.
Respondent 21: My value system.
Respondent 35: I think having done some work on ethical issues (…) has been useful in raising awareness of the different types of situations which arise with an ethical dimension to them.  I tend to support myself, although occasionally I may raise an aspect of the dilemma at a peer supervision meeting with EP colleagues. 
Respondent 38: My own moral judgement based on how I would wish to be treated were I in the other person’s shoes.
Respondent 65: Sense of right and wrong strongly instilled from birth by family.
Respondent 83: Being reflective and considering issues from different angles.
Respondent 84: Myself and my own sense of fairness and justice. 
Respondent 86: I guess when working I am always asking questions like – how would I feel about this if it were my child, or if I was the child – so acting as a parent and attempting to empathize and asking myself about possible consequences of actions and where there may be an ethical issue.
Respondent 87: My own logical reasoning and methods of protecting myself from undue guilt.
Respondent 95: Own professional experience! The solutions from the case/ situation itself with – solution focussed therapy – personal construct psychology.
Respondent 108: reading, research, experience.

Category 4: Referring to established guidelines

A total of 16.9% provided responses which were grouped into this category.
Examples were:
Respondent 3: Professional ethical codes.”
Respondent 8: the professional associations to which I belong.
Respondent 44: “The AEP The BPS. (I’ve never tested the AEP or BPS on this and would rely more on my colleagues.).””
Respondent 45: “National/ Borough legislation, systems and policies.”
Respondent 64: “The Code of Conduct, local authority guidelines on practice.”
Respondent 72: “guidance from professional bodies, BPS, AEP.”
Respondent 74: “AEP/ BPS guidelines (when I have to!)”
Respondent 88: reference to the publications of the professional bodies.”
Respondent 91: I have already contacted the BPS for advice and was given immediate attention and good advice.”
Respondent 96: “I may also look for guidance in the BPS Code of Ethics and Conduct.  I do find it helpful.”
Respondent 98: “Local Authority Policy and Procedures and BPS Ethical Code (Professional); Supervision from APEP and PEP, and referring to Codes of practice.
Respondent 113: In some cases the AEP.

Category 5: Family and friends 

This category included husbands, wives, partners and friends.  Some respondents mentioned that the friends were also professionally qualified.

A total of 12.7% respondents provided responses which were grouped into this category.

Respondent 17: family and friends 
Respondent 21: my husband. 
Respondent 24: spouse 
Respondent 28: Spouse. Friends, usually within the profession of education
Respondent 49: Partner (also a psychologist), friends and family (common sense view).”
Respondent 75: personal support network.
Respondent 86: On a personal note, I also discuss particular ethical issues with my father at times, when I am unsure of what to do or after the event to check out perceptions of action.

Category 6: The client

A total of 4.2% respondents provided responses which were grouped into this category.

Examples were:
Respondent 10: In this particular case, I also contacted the schools and parents involved and sought their opinion.
Respondent 36: All those involved in the dilemma.
Respondent 82: clients.
Respondent 114: I have an anxious trust that bringing people together to discuss the best thing to do will usually create a good outcome.

Category 7: Researching/ professional development

A total of 3.4% provided responses which were grouped into this category.
Examples were:
Respondent 7:’The research of Dr James Ogloff.’
Respondent 16: ‘Prof.Dev.’
Respondent 28: ‘training or reading e.g. Gersch’s work on the voice of the child.’
Respondent 71: ‘Opportunity to attend CPD.’

Category 8: A role-model

0.8% respondent provided a response which was grouped into this category.









The experience of cognitive dissonance is likely to be unpleasant.  It is a state of tension which can be felt as anxiety or confusion or guilt or loss of identity.  As a result we are motivated to reduce or eliminate it and gain consonance, i.e. easement. 

Figure 14: From cognitive dissonance to consistency (Festinger 1957)








In this chapter, the results obtained from analysis of the data will firstly be discussed as they relate to each of the research questions.  The results represent a historical snapshot of the respondents’ thoughts at the time of filling in the questionnaire.  Their subsequent reflection upon or discussion of the issues investigated in the questionnaire may subsequently have changed their thinking in different directions.  Then in chapter 5(b), I broaden the discussion to develop an argument for an aretaic turn in educational psychology.

Research Question 1: Do educational psychologists have a common understanding of the term ‘ethical’ in the context of their working practices?

Lindsay (1991) noted that several North American studies during the 1980s and early 90s indicated that the psychological professions in general had a broad spectrum of views on ethical standards and behaviours.  The research undertaken here supports the view that educational psychologists in the UK have a wide range of definitions of the term ‘ethical’, in terms of professional practice.  Possible reasons for the above and the role of ethics in professional knowledge are discussed here.  The ethical views expressed by the respondents are linked to the three major moral philosophical frameworks previously described and a link made to Alasdair MacIntyre’s ‘Disquieting Suggestion’ made in After Virtue (1985, pp.1-5).

The definitions returned in the questionnaire appeared to reflect very personal interpretations of what it means to be ethical and did not on the whole reflect a collective professional view, which might have been articulated as a result of a cohesive training programme or agreed within services.  This may reflect curricular and time pressures on the discussion of ethics on university educational psychology training courses, which, prior to 2006, were of one year duration.  Some training courses may have given greater pre-eminence to the subject of ethics than others, depending on the fields of interest of the trainers.  Within an EP team, there is also a pressure of time and workload which can militate against reflection on ethical practice and the development of consensual views. 

Some responses attempted to define ethical behaviour at a wide or ‘macro’ level with direct reference to recognised moral philosophical frameworks. Other definitions were at a narrow ‘micro’ level which latter referred either to specific professional codes or standards or to personal values.  These variations in turn may reflect societal, cultural and professional problems of definition and the lack of narrative unity regarding the nature of ethics within professions, including the psychology professions.  For example, Pratchett (2000, p.114), quoted in Kyarimpa and Garcia-Zamor (2006, p.31) claimed that, public service ethics are ambiguous despite the clarity which has been given to the core values of public administration.  By way of explanation, ethics as professional knowledge and as a field of study outside of university philosophy departments has been, to a great extent, a post-war phenomenon, which, with the arguable exception of bioethics, is a relative newcomer to both the business and professional world.  Its emergence has coincided with the increasingly fast pace of change in the organisation of public services in Europe and North America. The globalization of the market economy, debate about political theory in the post-modern world and a number of global scandals of corruption and instances of misuse of public office may have nurtured rising public interest in ethical issues.   

A total of 80.5% of respondents reported that the ethical dimension of their work was discussed in their team and 61.9% felt that common views were held.  Whether these expressed views were based on fact, intuition or wishful thinking is open to question.  In an interview conducted as part of a pilot study for this research, one participant said, While this has never been discussed and therefore raised as an explicit issue, I have an implicit intuitive impression that most EPs would share a similar ethical stance (Bennett, 2007, p.29).  From the same piece of work, it was noted that three of the interviewed EPs, who were from the same local authority as the researcher, reported that they believed that they broadly shared the same ethical stance as their colleagues, but one said that s/he did not know, as the topic was not overtly discussed.  S/he assumed that views were broadly similar but thought that discussion did not take place because it might be considered ‘rude’, in the same way that the topics of religion and politics might be avoided in polite company so that fundamental differences did not lead to disputes and damaging splits in the team.  The figures quoted are more likely, I believe, to represent an aspirational ideal of discussion and agreement.  Further research would be necessary to establish the ‘reality on the ground’. 

It has been the author’s personal experience that ethical issues by that name are rarely discussed between colleagues or debated in a public forum but that specific topics which derive from an ethical position, such as informed consent and respect for confidentiality are discussed.  Since the requirement to complete the annual CPD log for the BPS, which includes an ethical dimension, and since involving colleagues in this research, anecdotal reports to the author suggest that discourse about ethics has been more in evidence in the author’s own service.  However, this mandatory requirement was ended in September 2008 in preparation for the HPC becoming the new independent regulator responsible for monitoring CPD.  

Eraut (1994) discusses the development of professional knowledge and competences, specifically the kinds of knowledge that are available for professional learning.  In particular, he states that important aspects of professional competences and expertise cannot be represented in propositional form and represented in a publicly accessible knowledge base.  This tacit or implicit knowledge describes what we know but do not clearly articulate, however, what comes easily to some may need ‘spelling out’ for others.  The question persists as to how much professional knowledge is essentially implicit, and how much is capable with appropriate time and attention of being described (Eraut, 1994, p.42).

Thornton (2006), writing from a medical perspective and with reference to clinical judgement claims that, although explicit guidelines and codes can support clinical practice in a practical way, good judgement remains ultimately irreducible and uncodifiable.  The variety of surveyed responses to the request for a definition of ‘ethical’ in terms of professional practice, and the researcher’s personal and subjective observation of the apparent discomfort which many colleagues experienced in articulating a response, suggest that such professional knowledge currently remains largely in the implicit or tacit stratum but is arguably capable of being described and drawn out to become explicit and conscious.  The analysis of the data in this study can be viewed as an initial broad brush attempt to tease out that description of the current state of educational psychologists’ knowledge and experience of ethics, and to situate it in the wider context of current debate about ethics.

In discussing theories of professional expertise, Eraut describes and critiques several models of skill acquisition and problem-solving from beginner/novice to expert practitioner.  He notes the non-reflective and intuitive nature of much expert performance and the advantages and limitations of this.  He addresses questions about the appropriate balance between intuitive and analytical approaches and their optimum combination.  In particular, he describes, in some detail, Schön’s (1987) theories on reflective practice, reframing Schön’s contribution as a theory of metacognition during skilled behaviour and during periods of deliberation.  An aspect of the theory relevant to this argument is that, 
Reflection is triggered by the recognition that in some respects the situation is not normal and therefore in need of special attention.  The trigger may be an unexpected action or outcome, or just an intuitive feeling of unease that something is not quite right (Schön, 1987, p.144).

This reflection by EPs upon the ethical aspects of their practice is in many cases overtaken by the demands of workload, due process, lack of time and lack of mental space.  However, without entering here into the minutiae of the debate surrounding Schön’s precise meaning of the word ‘reflection’, EPs’ reflection processes are arguably assisted and informed by explicit knowledge of ethics and by awareness of the discourse surrounding its relevance in practice.

The initial codes created from the data analysis of research question 1 were subsumed into seven broad categories, and a large number of respondents’ definitions of ‘ethical’ contained elements which derived from more than one category.  However, all of the coded responses and all of the emerging categories appeared to the author to link to and be consistent with, albeit in an inchoate fashion in some instances, aspects of established moral philosophical frameworks.  I suggest that the views expressed are rooted sometimes explicitly or, more usually, implicitly in three culturally well-established moral philosophical frameworks, the deontological, the consequentialist and the virtue-ethical.  Although it can be argued that there may be a degree of overlap around the margins of these, in essence they are different and mutually exclusive epistemologies which have their origins in different historico-socio-political contexts.  An ethical belief held or ethical action undertaken which is congruent with one or more of these established belief systems may, at the same time, be dissonant with another.  An understanding of these real differences can help to explain the differences in ethical views taken by individual EPs.  Once this is clear, EPs’ ethical discourse can be enlightened in a way which reduces the power issues inherent in any debate which is based purely on emotive or intuitive responses to questions of ethics, and where assertion and counter assertion can spar interminably or until the assertion of the more powerful prevails.  

It may be that EPs have internalized fragments of western cultural and societal moral philosophies which are retrieved as and when required, but which do not especially conform to any canon of consistency.  If this is a reasonable interpretation of the results obtained from this questionnaire, then the results would support MacIntyre’s ’Disquieting Suggestion’  which was introduced in the literature review.
The hypothesis which I wish to advance is that in the actual world which we inhabit the language of morality is in the same state of grave disorder as the language of natural science in the imaginary world which I described.  What we possess, if this view is true, are the fragments of a conceptual scheme, parts which now lack those contexts from which their significance derived.  We possess indeed simulacra of morality; we continue to use many of the key expressions.  But we have – very largely, if not entirely-lost our comprehension, both theoretical and practical, of morality (MacIntyre, 1985, p.2).

Further discussion of MacIntyre’s moral philosophy and its relevance to the practice of educational psychology will be continued in the Discussion Part Two.

The results of research question 1 have indicated that the respondents did not have a common understanding of the term ‘ethical’ in the context of their working practices.  Factors militating against discussion of ethics and reflective practice in educational psychology services have been discussed, as well as the scope of and limitations to the transmission of professional knowledge, of which induction into a professional ethic might be deemed a part. The respondents’ definitions of ‘ethical’ did generally derive from one or more of the three overarching frameworks of Western moral philosophy, the deontological, the consequentialist and the virtue-ethical.  The fragmentary nature of the responses may be consistent with the Disquieting Suggestion proposed by Alasdair MacIntyre, described previously.  


Research Question 2: To what extent do educational psychologists believe that they regularly encounter ethical dilemmas in their practice?

In 1994, the then president of the BPS, Geoff Lindsay, predicted that, as the delivery of psychological services was affected by political decisions regarding funding and social policy, the number of ethical dilemmas was likely to accelerate.

The results of this survey indicated that the majority, (85.6%), of educational psychologists who completed the questionnaire, considered that they do experience, on a continuum from ‘daily’, ‘frequently’, ‘regularly’ to ‘quite often’, dilemmas which they consider to be of an ethical nature, as defined by them.  A minority (13.6%) reported that they rarely encountered ethical dilemmas.  Only one, (0.8%) reported having no dilemmas at all.  Therefore, if the numbers of EPs who reported encountering ethical dilemmas, even if only rarely, are totalled, then 99.2% of the respondents reported affirmatively.  This may appear to suggest, if the results could be generalised to the whole EP population, that currently practising educational psychologists have a relatively high incidence of ethical dilemmas in their practice.  The figure of 99.2% can be compared with the figures obtained by Lindsay and Colley’s (1995) BPS survey where 63% of respondents reported ethical dilemmas and Lindsay and Clarkson’s (1999) survey of psychotherapists, where 77.9% of respondents reported ethical dilemmas.

However, it is possible that the respondents in this study, being self selecting, represented primarily those EPs who found the nature of the research interesting or who were experiencing ethical issues in their work.  It may be unsafe to generalize the findings to the whole EP population.  A disappointingly low number (n=2) returned the questionnaire with an explanation of why they had not completed it. 

One of these was Respondent 88 who is quoted here in full, because it is at least possible that his or her expressed views may reflect those of other EPs who did not complete the questionnaire, thus throwing into question whether the initial finding that a very high percentage of EPs experienced ethical dilemmas can be generalised to the EP population.

The first time I looked at it (the questionnaire), I did not fill it in because of a strong feeling that the topic, though professionally important, is closely allied to the kind of navel-gazing which has got the practising social sciences a bad name over the years.  Especially at a time when the profession is trying to convince cash-strapped local authorities and an unconvinced central government that they should be jointly funding the extended training of educational psychologists who, it is argued, can make a real difference to outcomes for real children, it seemed to me that Ed. Doc dissertations should be aimed at proving that assertion to be true by adding to the knowledge, skills and models for intervention which would enable the rest of us to make more of a difference too!......evidence-based practice and all that?
However, on second thoughts, you might as well have the response of at least one sceptic, otherwise your returns might be in danger of being challenged as representative of only a partial, self selected group.  Besides which, the topic is not irrelevant to our day-to-day practice, I’d just prefer that it was dealt with thoroughly on initial training courses!

This EP response is significant because, if it were to reflect the views of the majority of EPs, i.e. the greater number who did not respond to the questionnaire, (and there is no evidence that it does or does not), then it would throw into question the previously drawn conclusion that there is a relatively high level of experience of ethical dilemmas within the profession.  The unpublished research of Mancini (op. cit.) does lend support to the findings of this study in terms of prevalence of ethical awareness, but, at the very least, Respondent 88’s comments serve as a reminder that the findings of this research alone cannot be generalized to the EP population as a whole.

It is, of course, not possible to draw a direct comparison between the present findings and those of Lindsay and Colley, any more than it is with the earlier American studies.  Important differences between the 1995 BPS study and this study were that the respondents in this study were all self selecting, not randomly selected, they were all educational psychologists, not a sample taken from the whole BPS membership representing different psychological professions, and they were practising some eleven to twelve years after the Lindsay and Colley publication and five years after the publication of Ethics in Practice containing the article by Webster and Lunt (op. cit.), with its rallying call to ethical literacy.  In the wider cultural context, the ethics debate within society as a whole has, arguably, a higher profile (for example, with the advent of programmes such as Radio 4’s The Moral Maze).  

Is it possible that the increased reporting of ethical dilemmas in this study as opposed to that of Lindsay and Colley could reflect a more challenging politico-educational climate? that educational psychologists experience ethical dilemmas more frequently than other psychologists?  Or is it the case that that all psychologists are now more aware than in the 1990s of potential ethical issues and are therefore more likely to report experiencing them?  The current evidence from this survey cannot answer these questions.  Other surveys, both longitudinal and of other psychological service providers would be required. 

This research has, however, clearly demonstrated that the vast majority of EPs who did respond, affirmed that they experienced ethical dilemmas in their professional practice and reflected on their own moral agency, One EP reflected on the issue thus, Part of the role of the EP – and what makes the job so interesting-is considering the ethical and moral implications of decisions-considering what ‘pressures’ lead me to take one decision rather than another. (Respondent 9) Response=Regularly





Research Question 3: What is the nature of the dilemmas perceived to be ethical by educational psychologists? 






	Being between a Rock and a Hard Place
	Malfeasance/Doing Harm 
	Dilemmas of Social Justice
	Labelling
	Conflicting Principles/ Conflicting Roles
	Challenging Competences

I shall now consider some of the issues emerging from these categories, drawing some parallels, where appropriate, with previous studies and then discuss the decision to view them through the lens of the Basic Social Psychological Process of Cognitive Dissonance.

Confidentiality was the most widely reported category in both the Lindsay and Colley study (1995) and the Lindsay and Clarkson study (1999).  In this study, client confidentiality, the second largest category reported, was perceived by EPs as a complex and multi-faceted issue, involving competing and sometimes confusing considerations of duty to a variety of different stakeholders.  Perceived duties were owed to close and distant stakeholders in casework, for example, to the employer, to professional colleagues both from the same and different disciplines, even to society as a whole as a ‘good citizen’, as well as the traditional duty of service to the ‘client’, perceived either in the form of the child as an individual, or as the child and family unit jointly.  The category of confidentiality involved a duty to safeguard confidences, implicit in which was an Enlightenment legacy of respect for the rights of the individual.  That duty could, however, be ‘trumped’ by a duty of care, whether to protect the individual, as, for example, in the case of the reporting of abuse, or whether to actively promote the client’s best interests, care and well-being.  This was the nub of many reported dilemmas and is consistent with Tirri and Husu (2002), who similarly reported that the best interest of the child was a generally agreed goal of education.  The dilemmas arise when education professionals differ in their interpretation of the best interests, and when competing moral judgements interact. 

Respondents reported that this process of weighing and balancing rights and best interests, compounded by conflicting client/stakeholder demands was the most common source of ethical dilemmas.  This is consistent with, for example, Norwich’s dilemmatic perspective to the educational provision for pupils and students with difficulties and disabilities (Norwich, 2002, p.482).  His view recognises the inherent tensions in social and educational values, This means that there is no clear overall and coherent set of values that can justify policy and practices at all levels in education. Because of these tensions, and the dilemmas they give rise to, there is no ideological purity in education (ibid., p.483).  Gallagher (2001, p.651) wrote in similar vein, with specific reference to the inclusion debate …the question of inclusion requires a struggle of conscience through free, open and informed moral discourse.  There is no neutral arbiter, scientific or otherwise, that can obviate our responsibility to choose with great care and deliberation what kind of world we will make for our children and ourselves.  Weighing and balancing time and resources in individual cases is problematic, and is often dependent on the management decisions of individual EP services.  Billington (2006, p.154) describes the tough choices inherent in adopting a high involvement approach in just a few individual cases.

Issues of challenge and confrontation figured highly in EPs reports of ethical dilemmas.  Challenges and confrontations, which involve a complex tapestry of decision-making around when it is wise to speak out and when it is wise to be silent, take place against a background of personal relationships, career aspirations, interdisciplinary rivalry and availability of education authority provision.  Issues of duty of care to the client, loyalty to the profession and/or other stakeholders, or to the ideology of professionalism, and universalist principles of fairness and utility clash, peppered with a dash of understandable self interest.  Speaking out and, in extremis, whistle blowing can be personally stressful and the utilitarian consideration that working relationships have to be maintained for the benefit of the many rather than broken for the advancement of a single case can be very convenient.

Lindsay and Colley (1995) identified dilemmas of reconciling needs with provision as the single largest category of dilemmas reported by the school psychologists in their survey and although it has not formed a discrete category as such in this study, many of the quoted examples from respondents have cited this dilemma.  The extent to which this issue constitutes an inherent conflict of interest has been addressed in the House of Commons: Children, Schools and Families Committee: Second Special Report (2007-8), where a proposal has been made for the separation of systems of assessment from systems of provision.  While this may address parental concerns about the independence of the psychological advice offered, the proposal will have far-reaching implications for the profession of educational psychology as a discrete branch of applied psychology.  There is also evidence in this research that the Government’s view (ibid, para. 1.13) that, the Government believes that the local authority educational psychologists do provide professional independent advice, may be misinformed.  

If the proposal to have a multi-disciplinary approach based on the ‘team around the child’ approach is operationalised through the Common Assessment Framework (CAF), then the incidence of some of the ethical dilemmas previously described regarding working with other professionals may increase as those involving conflicts of interest with the local authority decrease.  The government guide to inter-agency working under the ECM agenda, ‘Working Together to safeguard Children’ states that work to safeguard and promote the welfare of children should be child-centred,
Some of the worst failures of the system have occurred when professionals have lost sight of the child and concentrated instead on their relationship with the adults.  The child should be seen by the practitioner and kept in focus throughout work with the child and family.  The child’s voice should be heard and account taken of their wishes and feelings (H.M. Government, 2006, p.99).

For psychologists who carry out psychological assessment and consultation, often based on tests which claim to be scientifically validated, the potential for causing harm, abuse or distress to clients is not inconsiderable, for example, in the potential for misunderstanding of those test results by non-psychologists who fail to understand their limitations, and in the assumption of ‘infallibility’ that the use of those tests can imply.  The assumption of the mantle of ‘expert’ brings a certain power to the practitioner, which, in the absence of reflective practice, can easily fail to have due regard to the human rights of children and families involved.  Haverkamp (2005) writing from a North American standpoint, warns that applied psychologists are differentiated from other scientist-practitioners who practise qualitative methodologies, by their knowledge base, their practitioner skills, the values embodied in therapeutic relationships and the public’s expectations of what service they provide.  She argues that these advantages, not possessed by colleagues in other disciplines, create additional responsibilities and may increase the risk of causing harm.

To cause harm would violate a core standard of educational psychology.  One of the dilemmas for the EP is that the overall outcome of a cognitive assessment, or of any well-intentioned intervention or lack of intervention, for good or ill, often cannot be anticipated.  A short term gain may be outweighed several years later by an unforeseen consequence.  An example of this might be the short term benefit of a ‘label’ in order to access needed funding and support for a child in school.  The government collect data on special needs through the Pupil Level Annual Schools Census (PLASC), and in the author’s personal experience, serious errors are sometimes made in submissions, for example, where a pupil with dyslexic difficulties is classified as having moderate learning difficulties.  That label then becomes part of the narrative which surrounds the child and may have unforeseen consequences for the child in later life.  Fernald et al. (1985) concluded that labels had a weak impact on perception but did specify conditions when labelling might or might not be helpful.  The author’s subjective experience has indicated that the effect of labels for children in some individual cases has been sometimes positively and other times negatively life-changing.  Norwich (2008, p.70) sums up what he calls the identification dilemma as follows,
	If children experiencing difficulties in learning are identified and labelled as having a disability (needing special education), then they are likely to be treated as different, devalued and stigmatised.
	If children experiencing difficulties in learning are NOT identified as having a disability (needing special education) then it is less likely additional resources will be identified and ensured for them.

Another area of EP unease identified was that of children’s informed consent.  In the Children Acts 1989 and 2004, a child is anyone who has not yet reached their 18th birthday.  Referrals to educational psychology services are invariably made by adults, usually teachers. EPs expressed a number of reservations about the extent to which children had consented to the referral, and the damage caused to professional relationships caused when an EP subsequently declined to conduct assessments or observations to which a child had provided informed consent.   For a discussion of the ethics surrounding the role of adults who act in a gate-keeping role as regards access to children by psychologists and researchers, see Homan (2001).

Among the most intractable dilemmas reported were those where action of any kind directly contravened a perceived duty to one client/stakeholder or another.  Sometimes these situations situated the EP as ‘referee’, sometimes as ‘judge’, sometimes as ‘advocate’, and sometimes as ‘scapegoat’.  In all cases the conflict and the identification of a ‘solution’ was difficult for the practitioner because making a choice of action, any choice, violated at least one of a competing number of possible ethical stances.  EPs’ experiences of ethical dilemmas involve themes of conflict, challenge, guilt, stress, betrayal, de-skilling, and power.  These themes present challenges to EPs’ collective wisdom, consensual thinking and codified principles, that result in cognitive disharmony and discomfort.  Hence, I suggest that Festinger’s theory of cognitive dissonance, described previously, is a useful overarching theory which may help to explain some of the processes involved.  

The theory predicts that living with feelings of disharmony and discomfort such as those generated in an ethical dilemma gives rise to drives, within the individual (and, arguably, within a profession?) to reduce the dissonance.  The dissonance has a magnitude which is determined by the degree of discrepancy between the cognitions.  Reduction of the dissonance may be achieved by reducing the discrepancy between cognitions either by changing one’s behaviour or one’s beliefs or by seeking new information.  

It is at least possible that this theory may contribute to one interpretation of the prevalence results of Research Question 2, which showed a continuum of experience of ethical dilemmas amongst EPs from never to daily.  By holding beliefs that are already congruent with those of important stakeholders, or by changing their attitudes to the existence of perceived dilemmas, or by altering their behaviour in the face of certain situations, EPs may reduce the amount of cognitive dissonance experienced, and therefore report fewer instances of ethical dilemmas.  In doing so, they may be demonstrating Festinger’s principle of cognitive consistency which holds that people are motivated to reduce feelings of cognitive discomfort and disharmony in much the same way as they are motivated to sate feelings of hunger, thirst and cold.  If EPs’ reporting of ethical dilemmas is viewed in this way through the lens of cognitive dissonance theory, then some of the variations in prevalence data reported may be interpreted as showing individual EPs’ relative ability to tolerate feelings of cognitive dissonance .  

Cooper (op.cit.) has reviewed the current literature on cognitive dissonance theory, concluding that dissonance is aroused through behaviour that is discrepant from attitudes and that this has been shown to be a reliable phenomenon.  He describes some of the moderating factors of dissonance, which, I believe, are relevant to this study, in explaining why some EPs experience more ethical dilemmas than others and why those dilemmas have magnitudes.  I describe some of these factors below, relating them to EP practice, with the caveat that many of the research findings were conducted in laboratory studies, and that evidence ‘from the field’ is less well documented.

One factor in the experience of cognitive dissonance is that of decision freedom, that is, the EP would have to feel that s/he had a degree of choice or responsibility in the ethical decision-making.  If the power to decide were removed, for example by local authority rules or criteria, then the theory predicts that there would be a reduction in the amount of dissonance felt.  This may be one factor amongst others in the reported prevalence of ethical dilemmas.  In another sense, (and this is perhaps where personality traits are relevant) in a work culture such as educational psychology services, there is arguably always a certain amount of freedom in decision-making, that being the decision whether, or not, or how, to resist the imposed rules or criteria in the interests of individual children.  

A second factor reported by Cooper is that a decision, once made, increases in attractiveness to the decision-maker while discarded choices decrease in attractiveness.  When EPs reflect with hindsight upon their ethical decisions, the theory predicts that they will find them more attractive than the discarded choices and this may lead to a decreased sense of there having been a dilemma at all.

A third relevant moderating factor described by Cooper is that of commitment.  He argues that dissonance occurs when one is held to account publicly for actions or statements which are inconsistent with privately held beliefs.  EPs are required, usually as a matter of course, to set out recommendations in writing, that is to say, open to public scrutiny.  In consultations with parents and schools and at tribunals, they also may be expected publicly to ‘toe the authority line’.  Cooper reports research indicating that participants came to believe more what they said when they were publicly committed to their position.  However, dissonance continued to occur when there was an unwanted consequence.  For example an unfavourable pupil outcome might ensue, that outcome might have been foreseen, and be irrevocable and the EP might feel personally responsible for allowing that outcome to happen. 

Festinger’s dissonance theory states, and Cooper reiterates, that dissonance is a negative, uncomfortable, even physiologically arousing state which we are motivated to reduce.  Cooper claims that attitude change occurs to render the consequences of behaviour non-aversive (p.79). 
 He adds that,
The measuring rod for deciding if a consequence is undesirable can be the internalized standards of one’s own society, culture or family, or it can be very personal standards that have been generated by what one thinks of oneself.  Either measuring rod is possible but the playing field is not even.  It tilts toward normative standards unless something in the environment specifically makes personal standards particularly accessible (Cooper, 2007, p.182).

Cognitive dissonance theory is not being held up here as anything other than a possible hypothesis in partial explanation of the wide differences in EPs’ reported experiences of ethical decision-making, as reported both quantitatively and qualitatively in this study.  Other theories from the fields of personality and self evaluation research, including research into how people protect the integrity of their self construction may all be relevant.  Mercieca (2007), for example, refers to psychoanalytic literature in her analysis of an EP's responses to ethical dilemmas.  She discusses the practitioner's need for certainty and stability and the anxiety provoked by uncertainty and contradictions, arguing that this need for security should be resisted, 
a different possibility of the practitioner can be seen…This practitioner can acknowledge the differences and inconsistencies in dilemmas, in his/her own accounts and also in those of others without needing to suppress them or dismiss them as distortions.  Rather than endangering the confidence which others put on such a practitioner, this stance is actually a better guarantee that a child will not be needlessly categorised in an unthinking attempt to rationalise and put messy situations in order (p.40). 





Research Question 4: How do educational psychologists resolve perceived ethical dilemmas?

The overlap between categories of response in this analysis and the interpretative analysis has been particularly challenging and would particularly benefit from further development through other methods such as interviews or reflective diaries.  As might have been anticipated, respondents volunteered a wide range of opinions in response to the two questions posed.  In terms of world views, many responses reflected a broad humanistic world view.  Humanism has many different connotations, but is interpreted here in the Enlightenment sense of placing humankind as the focus of interest rather than divine authority.  Ethical humanism situates the ethical act in the welfare of all or of a section of humanity rather than obedience to divine authority.

However, many respondents whose responses referred in any sense to what I have interpreted as ethical humanism also referred back to their Christian religious upbringing as being influential in their thinking.  This is not particularly remarkable since there is a strong emphasis in Christianity on directives of the Love thy neighbour as thyself variety.  Where EPs have been brought up and/or educated in a broad Christian tradition, but do not or no longer have a practising faith, then they appear very likely to have retained social and familial influences which emphasise the value of individual human worth and the morality of promoting individual well-being.  

Those who approached the issues from a more politically than religiously influenced background, tended to emphasise rights (both legal and natural) of human welfare, rather than human well being in a sense of ‘the good’ or happiness or flourishing.  They appeared to be more influenced by power balances in society which drive political and social systems.  The nuance appears to favour a scientific rationalist argument rather than one resulting first and foremost from feelings of empathy towards one’s fellow man.

The EPs who approached the question from a religious ethic, Christian and other, were more likely to name specific qualities, values or maxims which guided their approach to ethical decision-making.  These were, for example, kindness, compassion, fairness, ‘love’, being non-judgemental.  However this was also the case for some EPs who quoted specific principles or virtues which did not presuppose a religious influence.  Some EPs who claimed a moral philosophical basis for their world view offered responses which could trace their lineage directly back to one of the three moral frameworks described in research question one, namely the aforementioned utilitarian/consequentialist,  virtue-ethical or  deontological paradigms.

The group of respondents who felt that their world view was primarily influenced by their psychological training, tended to have views which were at the relative end of a continuum stretching from relative to absolute.  They mostly stressed a social constructivist interpretation of the contextual nature of ethical decision-making.  Some named specific psychological theories which guided their professional judgements, citing the scientific/evidence-based nature of such knowledge.  Others referred to their world view as being most influenced by their professional identity as psychologists who had a primary duty to follow their code of practice and other legal statutes.

A number of respondents quoted their life experiences as influencing their world views and morality without specifying what these might be, but perhaps most surprising was the large number of respondents who denied having any particular world view.  It is possible that some of those respondents found the question too broad to be answered in a short and time-pressured questionnaire response and therefore wrote ‘none’ because they were unwilling to define their views in such a superficial manner.  Others may have interpreted the question as a requirement to self label which they found too facile or limiting.  If one’s feeling of identity is not specifically and primarily defined by membership of a group, for example, Catholic, or Socialist, or Chartered Psychologist, then trying to encapsulate the complex pot pourri of influences which construct our identity and define our sense of morality in a few words is difficult.  A number of respondents who replied ‘none’ to this question did imply that, although early influences must have played a part in the construction of their world views, these influences had either not been actively reflected upon or remained at an unconscious level of thought. 

Many EPs included in their responses a reference to consultation with colleagues.  This could imply a worldview of professional practice as a collegiate process where professional consensus alone justifies the ratification of ethical positions taken.  As a pragmatic strategy, the vast majority of respondents replied that they would seek the support of other EP colleagues, whether peers or line managers, to resolve an ethically troubling issue.  This is advised in the BPS guidelines.  Singer (1998), in a report of an empirical research study into ethical decision-making used a model framework which included social consensus as a characteristic contingency of ethical decision-making.  He reported that his results revealed that, social consensus was accorded a high importance in the overall ethicality judgements across all scenarios.  This indicates that the most essential consideration of ethicality resides in the perception of how the moral issue at stake is judged by others in society (Singer, 1998, p.675).  However, consensual views cannot not, per se, be regarded as ethically defensible views, unless one takes a position of complete ethical relativism, and denies the existence of any universal moral absolutes. 

EPs, by dint of their knowledge, training and authority are in a position of power vis-à-vis the children and families with whom they work.  Power and knowledge in the hands of any professional body can and should be used to uphold client’s rights, welfare and entitlements, but it can in some circumstances manifest in lack of respect and repressive or exploitative practice, whether at an institutional or individual level, consciously or unconsciously.  Perhaps in partial acknowledgement of this, a number of respondents included reference to family and friends.  Respondent 28 specifically added that this was to obtain the common sense view.

Nearly 17% of respondents to the question referred to published sources of guidelines in general, but of these, only 9 specifically named the BPS Code of Conduct and Ethics.  Of these 9, one (respondent 44) said, The AEP, The BPS. (I’ve never tested the AEP or BPS on this and would rely more on my colleagues.)   Another (respondent 74) said, AEP/BPS guidelines (when I have to!).  One might infer from this that the BPS Code is not currently referred to by the majority of EPs as a working document or used to structure reflective practice.  No mention at all was made of the DECP code.  However, that is not to say that aspects of the code are not being operationalised, albeit in an informal way.  

The evidence is that many of the educational psychologists who responded to the questionnaire are familiar with the existence of the BPS code of ethics and conduct and acknowledge it as a possible practical source of advice when faced with ethical issues.  It can act as both guide and protection to the practitioner, as illustrated by Respondent 26: I have had to defend my practice when complaints have been made to the BPS suggesting ‘unprofessional conduct’.  I have had two or three of these and all have been rejected – largely because I do pay attention to the codes of conduct.  However, it is unclear how many respondents used the code as a working document.  With hindsight, a questionnaire question which probed this specific issue would have been valuable.  There is a difference between being aware of a code’s existence, and having read it, or referring to it on an individual or team basis regularly.  Eraut cites Steadman et al. (1994) as recognising four sets of values which were identified as impinging on ethical conduct at work.  These apparently derived from the same general domains as this research has surveyed, namely, legal values, values of the profession, values of the individual and values of employers.  Professionals have to be competent in recognizing and applying the values appropriate to the situations they encounter, and able to resolve any conflicts between them (Eraut, op. cit., p.206).

The research question required respondents to try to identify ideological stances and pragmatic strategies used to resolve ethical dilemmas, and a number of these have been identified.  Influences on EPs' ethical decision making were often reported to have originated in childhood through the experiences of family, education and religious upbringing.  In adulthood, however, major influences were political and professional. As a pragmatic strategy to support the ethical decision-making process, the majority of respondents reported that they would be most likely to consult EP colleagues and managers, and the limitations of such consensual views has been discussed.  Although the majority of respondents were aware of the various professional codes of practice available, the codes do not appear to be used as working documents to support ethical decision-making.










CHAPTER 5(b): DISCUSSION CONTINUED

Towards a possible unifying framework


Current ethical thinking and behaviour in the psychology (and other) professions has traditionally rested upon the codification of principles, conceptualised as prima facie theoretical obligations, which, while retaining a degree of flexibility, provide a framework for ethical analysis and justification of decisions and behaviours to which practitioners must have regard.  The results of this survey have indicated that the majority of EPs who responded held ethical beliefs consistent with the above, and were aware of the existence of their professional code(s) even if they were not used as working documents.  I argue below, however, that principles alone are not a necessary and sufficient basis for ethical decision-making, and I make a case for an aretaic turn in the practice of educational psychology.  Only a minority of EPs in this survey referred to possession or cultivation of virtues as defining their ethical professional practice.  I speculate on some of the possible benefits of an aretaic turn and how it might be given momentum, and conclude with a discussion of two examples, taken from the questionnaire responses.

Notions of duty and obligation

We have prima facie obligations, that is, obligations to which we should have regard as moral norms, duties to be carried out as impartially as possible.  Within a profession, moral norms are important.  They can represent the collective wisdom of generations of practitioners, they can represent consensual thinking between peers about what it is right to do, and they can be codified in such a way as to provide a common framework for action amongst practitioners of widely different religious and cultural backgrounds.  They are an essential component of professional practice and they distinguish it from other work for which legal or contractual constraints suffice.  The moral agent is one who rationalises the right thing to do and then does it.  In this conception of morality, EPs are bound not only by the law of the land and by the terms of their employment contracts but also by their professional codes of practice.  

However, individuals and professions can think and act in habitual ways leading to complacent thinking and morally fuzzy actions.  Collective wisdom based on historical scenarios may prove inadequate to modern problems.  Consensual group thinking may be affected by group (psycho) dynamics, group defences, group polarisation and may unquestioningly ‘buy into’ hidden assumptions which have reified over time.  Aspects of professional codes can be usurped or interpreted or prioritised through the agendas of particular hegemonies.  (I refer the reader back to the advantages and disadvantages of professional codes as discussed in the literature review.).  As stated by Eraut (1994, p.46),
Learning to work in teams and in organisations…raises problems of when the undeniably positive qualities of ‘getting on with people’ and ‘fulfilling one’s role’ shade into undesirable qualities such as ‘uncritical conformity’ and ‘value complacency’…Professional ethics is a particularly difficult area of knowledge to handle.  To discuss moral dilemmas arising from casework seems relevant and straightforward, until one recognizes that many proposed courses of action conflict with organisational policy or professional norms.

We also have obligations proper, that is, obligations which it is right to do in specific and personal circumstances, and to which normative concepts of morality sometimes fail to have regard or provide clear solutions.

EPs contribute professional opinion within teams of other professionals, therapists, clinical psychologists, doctors, teachers etc., within hierarchical and hegemonic organisations such as local authorities and health trusts, and within traditional client-practitioner relationships with families and with children.  They have a complex web of obligations, which sometimes puts them in a position of conflicting interests, as has been demonstrated above.  Sometimes, they are faced with situations where norm-based or criteria-dependent solutions may fail to provide a solution which contributes to the well-being of an individual child or family and where the EP could be regarded as having an obligation proper to seek an individual solution to a unique set of problems. 
 
Sometimes, the prima facie obligations inscribed in professional codes of practices are very broad.  For example, the HPC documentation Standards of conduct, performance and ethics: Your duties as registrant states, (item 16), make sure that your behaviour does not damage your profession’s reputation (HPC, 2007, p.5).  Later, under The main responsibilities of health professionals (item 3), it appears that this is treated as a negative standard whereby, providing that one’s behaviour is not actually criminal, violent, abusive or involving sexual misconduct, it is regarded as of high standard.  The BPS Standard of General Responsibility (BPS, 2006, p.17) states, Avoid personal and professional misconduct that might bring the Society or the reputation of the profession into disrepute, recognising that, in particular, convictions for criminal offences that reflect on suitability for practice may be regarded as misconduct by the Society.  By contrast, I argue that virtue ethics provides a more complete account of what it means to be an ethical professional and that we have an obligation proper to aspire to this more positive standard.

Should prima facie obligations necessarily ‘trump’ other obligations including those of obligation proper?

With the advent of three year doctoral training for educational psychologists, there arises the opportunity to include in that curriculum, some aspects of moral philosophy, leading to demonstrable ethical knowledge and enhanced sensitivity to ethical dilemmas in the competences required to practise as an educational psychologist.  This is not by any means to undermine the ethics component of existing training courses but rather to suggest that, in some cases, the rationale for a strong professional ethic has not been given the primacy that I argue it should have.  Where EPs do have a view on what it is to be ethical in professional practice, this piece of research would appear to indicate that the traditional universalist and consequentialist ethical views, where obligations are prima facie, currently predominate.

With Webster and Lunt (op. cit.), I agree that educational psychologists require awareness and understanding of, and ability to critically reflect upon, ethical issues, and to internalise the ethical norms of the profession.  EPs need to be aware of their prima facie obligations.  Against Webster and Lunt, I argue that this per se is not sufficient for ethical literacy, and that an aretaic turn in the profession of educational psychology would enhance ethical awareness of obligation proper, which is also a necessary component of ethical literacy.  

It is necessary to have this broader concept of ethical literacy on several counts.  Not only should practitioners recognise the existence in the work environment of a situation which has an ethical dilemma or ambiguity; and have some rational process for justifying the ethical validity of professional decisions and actions; but also, given that codes of ethics and conduct cannot prescribe for every eventuality that occurs in daily work practices and that some codes may contain morally dubious requirements, they should have a theoretical framework to develop the practical wisdom needed to know when an obligation proper has to take precedence over a prima facie obligation.  The recent thrust of legislation regarding the centrality of the welfare of the child may lend weight to the requirements of obligations proper.  As Eraut (op.cit., p.152) states, We need to note that it is the ability to cope with difficult, ill-defined problems rather than only routine matters which is often judged to be the essence of professional expertise. 

If prima facie obligations are followed uncritically, or as part of defensive practice, the direction of therapeutic practice can be governed by them.  I interpret Respondent 46’s reference to ‘ethical correctness’ as referring to blind adherence to a moral norm without reflection on the needs of a particular case, [ethical dilemmas] are frequent but rarely matters of life or death.  Decisions have to be made on the balance of evidence and weight of experience and chances have to be taken to move things forward.  There is a danger that ‘ethical correctness’ will make us impotent (Respondent 46).

A number of writers, for example, as cited in the literature section of this thesis, argue that a more comprehensive moral philosophy than currently exists can evolve if virtue and care ethics and ethics of justice are seen not as exclusive but as complementary.  These writers and numerous others are influenced in their views by the work of philosopher, Alasdair MacIntyre, whose work, I argue, is very relevant to this research study.

Brief description of modern virtue theory with reference to Alasdair MacIntyre

Virtue theory, initially introduced in the literature review, is currently undergoing a renaissance, which began in 1958 with the publication of an article by philosopher Elisabeth Anscombe.  Cited in Rachels (2003) she said,  
The concepts of obligation, and duty - moral obligation and moral duty, that is to say - and of what is morally right and wrong, and of the moral sense of ‘ought’ ought to be jettisoned….It would be a great improvement if, instead of ‘morally wrong,’ one always named a genus such as ’untruthful’, ‘unchaste’, ‘unjust’. (Rachels, 2003, p.173)

Virtue was ousted from its prime position in classical times by the rise of firstly, Christian ethics (through the Divine Law) and later by the ethics of the Enlightenment (through the Moral Law).  Sandage et al. (2001) attribute the loss of virtue language in modern social science to its moral valence at a time when the emerging discipline sought a more morally neutral terminology for its empirical research and clinical practice.  

 MacIntyre, in After Virtue (1985) invites us to perform the following thought experiment.  He describes a disaster scenario in the natural sciences whereby books, laboratories are destroyed, science teaching is outlawed, and scientists executed.  At a later date, a few refusniks attempt to revive the largely forgotten and fragmented knowledge base but possess both skills only half remembered and aspects of the body of knowledge only partial and incomplete.  From this pot pourri, a reassembled science is created which bears little relation to the original.  People would argue about the respective merits of this or that scientific practice without realising that, in the absence of the context of the original canons of consistency and coherence, through which the knowledge base had been built, no proper sense could be made of it.  

From the analogy of this imaginary world whose language of science has become disjointed and incoherent, MacIntyre proposes his hypothesis that the present language of morality has become equally disjointed and incoherent.  The result of this is that moral argument is treated either as logical exercise, or as assertion of preference based on emotions or intuitions, where the assertion of the most powerful wins the day.  

In virtue theory, the emphasis moves away from universalist notions of ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ and from Consequentialist notions of utility, towards what is ‘the good’, and in particular ‘human good’ and the cultivation of certain dispositions which are regarded as essential to a humanly flourishing life.  A key concept is telos, translated as ‘purpose or ‘aim’.  Everything we do is directed towards an aim, the final aim being that of the ‘good’, that is, to become good qua human.  A good person will become a good judge of the right thing to do.  The supreme good is eudemonia, which, I would argue, appears not to be dissimilar in individual psychological terms to Maslow’s (1967) concept of self actualisation, being that state of mind achieved from feelings of self fulfilment and realisation of potential, i.e. flourishing as a human being.  However, the expression eudemonia refers additionally to the good of the community, not just of the individual.  It would be reasonable, the teleological argument goes, for rational people to want to develop these virtues in themselves, as being intrinsically valuable components of a good life and the good of the community as a whole, no matter how that particular life and community are conceived in terms of specific practices.  A virtue-ethical approach can accommodate particular instances based on normative concepts of excellence.  Unlike a consequentialist approach, virtue theory does not require that good be maximised, i.e. that it should be the greatest good or the good of the greatest number.  Unlike a deontological approach, it does not require a duty bound moral agent to apply a universalist and impartial moral imperative.    





MacIntyre argues the contemporary relevance of virtue ethics, with reference to professional practice.  He uses the term practice in a specifically defined way and I suggest that the discipline of educational psychology is clearly a practice in the terms he describes;
By a ‘practice’ I am going to mean any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are systematically extended. (MacIntyre, A. in J. P. Sterba (ed), 1998, p.281)

MacIntyre expands what he means by goods internal to a practice by contrasting them with the goods external to a practice, that is to say, in professional terms, prestige, status and money, which become possessions of the individual practitioner.  The goods internal to a practice are those of a certain kind of life which the practitioner obtains when s/he becomes self motivated to excel at a practice through the intangible but real satisfaction and reward intrinsic to developing skill in performance, excellence in product, sustaining progress in a discipline and defining its best standards.  It is characteristic of goods internal to practice that their achievement benefits not only the individual, but also the whole relevant community.

Practices require a certain quality of relationship between practitioners, a relationship that requires certain dispositions to do the right thing and to develop certain qualities of character, for example standards of truthfulness and trust.  In the absence of a range of such key virtues, goods internal to practice become inaccessible.  Without, for example, the virtues of honesty, courage or benevolence, it would become possible to ‘cheat’, to pay lip service to the standards of a practice, rendering the practice pointless except as a means of gaining money, status or prestige.  Professional and social success then becomes measured by wealth and status.  Practices can flourish within societies with very different mores but goods internal to practices can only flourish where virtues are valued.  Practices are sustained by habits of virtue and virtue is sustained through practices.  Each practice has a history, which is more and other than simply extending technical competence and which involves a dynamic ethical narrative;
The virtues therefore are to be understood as those dispositions which will not only sustain practices and enable us to achieve the goods internal to practices, but will also sustain us in the relevant kind of quest for the good by enabling us to overcome the harms, dangers, temptations and distractions we encounter (MacIntyre, A., 1985, p.216).

The implications of the above are that by developing dispositions to practise the virtues, practitioners can cooperate and resist pressures of institutional expediency.  MacIntyre argues that human beings and their communities are governed by one kind of narrative unity, in which thoughts, feelings and habits take place within specific practices, traditions and institutions.  The historical narrative of these practices, traditions and institutions enable what is the good for oneself and others to be realised, even though the specific interpretations of virtues may vary across traditions, cultures and ages.

However, MacIntyre recognises that a life informed only by the conception of the virtues described above would be pervaded by conflicts and arbitrariness where one allegiance points one way and a conflicting one elsewhere, resulting in vacillation instead of rational problem-solving.  An overriding conception of the telos, purpose or unity is needed in order to allow prioritised decisions to be made, which warrant putting other goods in a subordinate position.  

What is the relationship between virtue ethics and care ethics?

Opinion differs as to the degrees of separation between virtue and care ethics, where the focus in virtue ethics is on the inner qualities of the individual and the primacy of reason and the emphasis in care ethics is on relational qualities, such as empathy and the primacy of affect.  Arguably, there is at least a strong interdependence since it is difficult to conceive of a caring relationship being possible without the presence of other-regarding virtues.  Benner (1997) states the position thus;
…in contrast to an emphasis on reason not emotion in the Virtue Tradition, a care ethic explores the relationships between emotion and rationality.  A care ethic incorporates emotion and rationality and emphasises particularity and relationship.   An Aristotelian vision of emotion governed by reason is a step in the right direction, because it comes closer to capturing the way that one’s emotional responses are developed in the acquiring of a practice or habitus (Benner, 1997, p.48).
She argues that the normative or culturally situated nature of virtue can prove an obstacle to open and responsive relationships, and that primary focus on one’s own cultivation of virtue blocks meeting the other in his or her own terms. The health care provider-patient relationship is for the sake of the patient’s growth and well-being, not for the self-improvement of the practitioner’s inner character or even of society (idem).

Billington typifies  an ethic of care in the context of assessments of the needs of autistic children and young people, when he states, In order to act ethically in the field of autism, therefore, it is necessary to hold on to fundamental human issues-of feeling, thinking and meaning (Billington, 2006, p.10).

Unlike the ethic of justice, concerned with the universal nature of all men or with the greater good of the many, both care ethics and virtue ethics, are able to provide justification for having regard to the particular individual case as opposed to the generality of cases for which rules, principles and maxims provide guidance.  Gilligan (1982) and Noddings (1984, 1992) have promoted the framework of care ethics as a feminist argument to Kohlberg’s stages of moral development.  Given the increasing female majority of EPs (Murphy & Monsen, 2008) care ethics may develop more prominently in the future of educational psychology. 

To whom does the educational psychologist owe a duty of care?

As indicated by this research, the educational psychologist employed by a Children’s Services Authority is required to work closely with administrators who may not be similarly constrained by professional ethical codes, and although they may be bound by their own practice code of conduct or local authority guidelines, they may be under different financial or politically expedient pressures.  In speaking out against an institutional practice that the educational psychologist believes is contrary to their own professional code, for example, in that it may militate against the best interests of children, s/he may be regarded by the employing institution as instigating a healthy debate or, alternatively, be regarded as failing to be a ‘team player’ and, in extremis, may be vulnerable to disciplinary action.  For example, an EP may be under pressure from employers to meet work-based targets which limit the time available to make a thorough or even adequate assessment of a child’s needs.  Another example might be when an EP is prevented by the employee from writing an adequate description of a child’s needs because of financial constraints, or when a block of therapy is time limited such that it raises hopes but fails to make a difference for the client.

The ideology of professionalism is based not only on a specialist knowledge base but also on ideals of autonomy (being in control of and taking responsibility for one’s own work) and service (professional action premised on the needs of an identified client).  Both of the latter are compromised when professionals are also public servants.  This situation was acknowledged by Lunt and Majors (2000) who stated that, given educational psychologists’ role in a state bureaucracy which restricts their professional autonomy, they could be viewed as only semi-professionals or ‘street level bureaucrats’ rather than independent professionals.  However, EPs operating within the private sector also experience pressures as described, for example, by Respondent 91 with reference to matters of financial recompense and its dependence on parental satisfaction, There can be an assumption on the part of parents that the psychologist will entirely support their point of view.  If they don’t like your opinion, they tend not to pay!  Other professions, for example, doctors, are similarly in the position of being remunerated by a third party, i.e. the State, but have a duty of care to their patients.  They may experience pressure, for example, to prescribe cheaper drugs or not to perform certain operations or to exclude a certain category of the population, say, the very elderly, from certain expensive treatments.

Lunt (1997) reflected that the question of who is the educational psychologist’s client is much debated, in spite of the statutory basis of practice in the welfare of the child, since wider responsibilities are also due to schools, parents and the employing authority.  The role of educational psychology services has been defined as follows, 
to promote child development and learning through the application of psychology by working with individuals and groups of children, teachers and other people in schools, families, other LEA officers, health and social service and other agencies (DfEE, 2000).  The BPS Code of Ethics and Conduct (2006, p. 5) states that the term ‘client’ can encompass at one and the same time those receiving, commissioning and evaluating the professional activity.  Keith-Spiegel and Koocher (op.cit., p.319-347) explicitly recognise the ethical pressures placed by the agenda of the workplace on the maintenance of professional values in the psychological professions.  They take a measured, if perhaps ambivalent stance, by noting merely that, in such circumstances, the psychologist should clarify the nature of the ethical obligations due to each party, inform all concerned about the ethical constraints, if any, and take whatever actions are necessary to ensure appropriate respect for the client(s).  Webster and Lunt (2002, p. 98) state that, educational psychologists generally work in isolation in institutional contexts where day-to-day practice is driven by policy, bureaucracy and exigency of someone else’s making.  Francis (2002, p.13) suggests the following problem-solving heuristic, Does the solution make the best compromise outcome, and does it leave the situation improved for each of the interested parties?  Other decision-making models have been developed, for example, Bond (2000), Kitchener (2000) and DeMarco (2005).  The BPS Code of Ethics and Conduct contains a section on decision making (BPS, 2006, p.7-8), as do other codes of practice, for example, the 10 step decision-making model incorporated in the Canadian Psychological Association Code of Ethics for psychologists (2000).

The Professional Practice Guidelines for the Division of Educational and Child Psychology were issued in January 2002, and may be subject to update following publication of the new Code of Ethics and Conduct.  They provide clear direction to the educational psychologist in respect of their duty of care.  
…their primary focus should always be on promoting positive outcomes for young people.  This primary focus on the well-being and needs of young people may bring educational psychologists into conflict at times with interests of other parties (parents, teachers, or other professionals with whom they work).  Professional educational psychologists should adhere to the principles expressed in the Children Act (1989) which encourages the provision of support to those responsible for the welfare of children while attending primarily to the rights and well-being of the child. (my emphases) (DECP, 2002, p.4).  
This position is also reflected in the Children Act 2004, as follows, 
The arrangements are to be made with a view to improving the well-being of children in the authority’s area so far as relating to— 
(a) physical and mental health and emotional well-being; 
(b) protection from harm and neglect; 
(c) education, training and recreation; 
(d) the contribution made by them to society; 
(e) social and economic well-being;  (Children Act 2004, Chapter 31, Part 2: 10 (2)
I argue that the individual EP owes a duty of care to the individual child to whom they provide a service even though that child is arguably the client of the organisation rather than of the individual EP.  The organisation has delegated that part of its service provision to the EP, (either individually or as part of a specialist team) who thereby gains specific knowledge about the distinctiveness of individual cases.  The role of other stakeholders who are in an accountability relationship with the EP has to be given due weight.  Managers and schools, for example, may have different priorities, perhaps to raise overall academic standards.  Theirs may be primarily a utilitarian calculus where the ethical act is to promote the good of the greater number. The EP has a moral commitment to optimize the service outcome for that child and hence experiences the inherent tensions involved in that role. 

The case for an aretaic turn in professional ethics in educational psychology

I maintain that educational psychology is a practice in the same way as MacIntyre’s own examples of medicine and physics.  It is sustained in most part by the institutions of local government and academia, scrutinised by the institution of government and works within the structures of teaching institutions.  The relationship between them is symbiotic,
Indeed, so intimate is the relationship of practices to institutions – and consequently of the goods external to the goods internal to the practices in question – that institutions and practices characteristically form a single causal order in which the ideals and the creativity of the practice are always vulnerable to the acquisitiveness of the institution, in which the cooperative care for common goods of the practice is always vulnerable to the competitiveness of the institution.  In this context the essential function of the virtues is clear.  Without them, without justice, courage, and truthfulness, practices could not resist the corrupting power of institutions (MacIntyre, A., in J.P.Sterba (ed.), 1998, p. 285-6).

Educational psychologists are already uniquely placed by dint of their training in the practice (after MacIntyre) of psychology, and by dint of their experience with and in educational institutions, to understand the competing claims surrounding rational discussion of children’s needs and welfare, and to negotiate on behalf of children from this position of understanding, in the knowledge that they are supported in so doing by their code of practice and by government legislation.  (For a discussion of the application of an aretaic turn in the ethics of a related profession, that of teaching, see Higgins, 2003.)

Francis (2002) puts forward the consequentialist argument that we should be ethical because ethics keeps you out of trouble, because it is good risk management in that there is evidence that it may make promotion more likely, because good ethics is shown to make educational facilities more attractive and prestigious and because it improves work output.  He adds that rational arguments for valuing ethics are that good ethics improves morale and avoids debilitating arguments and attracts and keeps good staff; and that an ethical environment is one more pervasively beneficial to good education as well as fostering the value of ethics indirectly (Francis, 2002, p.9).

One proposed way forward might be to combine the ‘principles’ approach with insights drawn from the ‘virtues’ approach.  With Jordan and Meara (1990), (1991), and Meara et al. (1996), inter alia, I suggest that the moral compass needed to navigate professional ethics should indicate not only the direction of the professional code of ethics and conduct, but also to the direction of the practitioner’s search for the goods internal to practice and for an answer to the fundamental question, ‘What sort of psychologist am I to become?’  In other words, that in order to be ethical in our practice we should not only adhere to (or at least not breach) codifiable rules and principles but also develop the goods internal to the practice of educational psychology, because that is what is needed to be a ‘good’ psychologist.  Meara et al. (op. cit., p.5) state that …part of the void in conversations about ethics can be filled with a consideration of virtue ethics as a complementary phenomenon to principle ethics.  We believe a conversation that includes a thorough integration of virtue ethics can result in better ethical decisions and policies and enhance the character of the profession.  In doing this, educational psychologists would join a wider community of professions (see literature review) which are increasingly looking to virtue theory to add value to existing practice.  Oakley and Cocking (2001, p.25) introduce the notion of the ‘Regulative Ideal’ as being, an internalized normative disposition to direct one’s actions and alter one’s motivations in certain ways.  Consistently with Jordan and Meara’s views (above) it includes, (p.27) normative dispositions that govern one’s actions in accordance with standards of correctness and also normative dispositions that govern one’s behaviour according to standards of excellence, (my emphases) which go beyond the merely correct or incorrect.  Although Oakley and Cocking illustrate their argument using the exemplar of friendship and apply their argument to the professions of medicine and law, their assertion (p.87) that, properly occupying a professional role depends not only on the sorts of actions one performs or is disposed to perform, but also, and importantly, on the sorts of guiding ideals that one has internalised is equally relevant to the professional practice of educational psychology.

Projected benefits of such a ‘turn’

Oakley and Cocking (ibid.) examine a virtue-ethical approach to professional roles, beginning from the premise that, 
to generate a defensible professional ethic, the norms of the profession in question cannot simply be taken as given; rather they must be shown to reflect commitment to an important substantive human good that contributes to our living a flourishing human life...an appropriately action-guiding professional ethics cannot be generated without specifying what the appropriate orientation and essential guiding concerns of the particular profession ought to be……………………… The ethical significance of the distinctive goals of different professions is often ignored by contemporary approaches to professional ethics, in their understandable eagerness to highlight to professionals the importance of honouring client autonomy (Oakley and Cocking, 2007, p. 75).

This research has indicated the multiplicity of views (and absence of views) held by EPs regarding the role of ethics in educational psychology and a certain ambiguity within the profession regarding professional decision-making which has an ethical dimension.  

In the terms described above by Oakley and Cocking, the proper goal of educational psychology as a practice is, I would argue, the flourishing of the child, with particular reference to the child within the education system.  This flourishing would have as necessary, but not necessarily sufficient, considerations, psycho-physical functioning (the child is helped to be healthy, safe and have an enjoyable educational experience), emotional resources (the child is helped to develop resilience and emotional intelligence), physical resources (the child’s need for learning aids and an appropriate learning environment is addressed), and learning itself (the child is provided with appropriate opportunities to learn and achieve within their capabilities).  None of the above is incompatible with the stated aims of the present government’s educational reforms.  

So if educational psychology is a good profession because it has a commitment to an important human good (described above), then the ethical practitioner is the one who aspires to excellence in performing that role and whose actions and motivations are determined by their internalized regulative ideal of the various goods that contribute to the flourishing of children and young people, specifically in the particular context of the education system.  
Oakley and Cocking argue (p.115) that in medical terms, virtue ethics promises a particularly appropriate ethical framework to accommodate the nature and value marking the professional role of the good general practitioner, and likewise, I argue, for the good educational psychologist.  Is it possible to speculate on what one might be able to see in an academic and applied discipline of educational psychology in which virtue ethics were being practised?  Some suggestions are hypothesised below.

1. Resistance to managerialism and other hegemonies

For the ability of a practice to retain its integrity will depend on the way in which the virtues can be and are exercised in sustaining the institutional forms which are the social bearers of the practice.  The integrity of a practice causally requires the exercise of the virtues by at least some of the individuals who embody it in their activities: and conversely the corruption of institutions is always in part at least an effect of the vices (MacIntyre, 1985, p.286).

A powerful example of an institution’s attempt to erode professional independence is described by Annan (2005), who asked what currently made the profession vulnerable to the kinds of initiatives he described which were instigated by senior managers in his local authority to control EP practice, and what could make the profession more resilient to such colonial aspirations.  I believe that one possible response to his question is emerging in this paper, that a virtue-ethical approach would strengthen the profession’s ability to resist institutional pressure in the interest of promoting the well-being (flourishing) of children.  There is an indirect reference to virtue in Keith-Spiegel and Koocher’s call to ethical awareness in practice, in their critique of defensive practice;
Being ethical ensures delivery of the best possible service to consumers. …Reaching for the highest standards emboldens us in the face of ethical uncertainty.  Holding high ethical standards requires acting with benevolence and courage rather than donning protective armour and running for a safe place to hide  (Keith-Spiegel & Koocher, 1995, p.4).

If it is the goal of educational psychology to promote the flourishing of children within the education system, then it is important that practitioners practise the virtues, for example, beneficence and courage, vis-à-vis their clients.  An EP practising ethically in these circumstances would demonstrate commitment to the well-being of particular children and young people in the face of managerial pressure to work towards other criteria (for example, the convenience of administrators) and have a disposition to justice, in order to offer equality of opportunity to access their expertise so that limited resources are not unduly appropriated by the powerful, the rich and the articulate. 

2. Enhanced quality of service delivery

The applied practice of educational psychology is immeasurably complex in its tangle of relationships, power webs and institutions.  Emotionally intense and sometimes life-changing family and child-based problems arise, on what seems like a daily basis, which require finely considered personal judgements of the sort which cannot be legislated for by the blunt instrument of codified guidelines or regulations.  Virtue ethics arguably provides a ‘value-added’ quality to this decision-making process.  The significance of this approach is that judgements and actions will be enhanced by the practitioner’s seeking of ‘the good’ which is at least partly constituted by the development of the virtues, not necessarily in a secondary or derivative role but at least equally with other forms of morality.  It is necessary but not sufficient for a psychologist to follow the ‘letter’ of the laws and codes.  Adherence to quantitative measures of ethical conduct (for example, Has a rule been breached or not? How many rules have been breached? To what extent has the rule been broken?) fails to address issues of the quality of the service provided.  Crucially, this approach impacts on individuals whose circumstances fall outside the criteria usually provided.  Professional practice in relationships with clients, in assessments, in interventions and in research will be enhanced by having regard to key concepts derived from virtue ethics, of virtue (arête), practical wisdom (phronesis) and human flourishing (eudemonia) so that particular circumstances of particular clients can be addressed.  Such an approach can enhance public trust of the profession.  Onora O’Neil (2002) delivered the BBC Reith Lectures, on the subject of trust in public institutions, with reference to the on-going governmental agenda for transparency, target-setting and accountability.  She claimed that this was resulting in a paradoxical lessoning of trust between the public and service deliverers.
Each profession has its proper aims and this aim is not reducible to meeting set targets following prescribed procedures and requirements….The new accountability is widely experienced not just as changing but I think as distorting the proper aims of professional practice and indeed as damaging professional pride and integrity  (O’Neil, 2002).

If professional trust and integrity is compromised, then both trust and service delivery can be compromised.  Glisson et al. (1998) claimed that organisational climate (including low conflict, cooperation, role clarity and personalisation) is the primary indicator of positive outcomes in children’s service systems and a significant predictor of service quality.  

3. Practising the virtues benefits the agent

Slote (1992) notes that, if we say of an act that it exemplifies or demonstrates a certain virtue, then that is typically to evaluate it indirectly, through its relation to a certain trait regarded as valuable or admirable.  He also argues that an act can be directly evaluated in virtue-ethical terms, not by using the term ‘virtue’ but by employing other aretaic terms such as ‘admirable’, ‘laudable’ and ‘commendable’, (as compared with, for example, ‘deplorable’), which can as readily be applied to actions as to people. These words incorporate in their meanings a sense of the mean or balance between the good that is done for the other, i.e. other-regarding, and the good that the doing of the act does for the agent, i.e. self-regarding, the balance between which is essential to the concept of virtue. The BPS code alludes to the self-regarding aspects of virtue indirectly in section 3.2.4, where the practitioner is enjoined to have regard to their own well-being and professional competence and to be alert to any impairment to that competence.  A summary of the ethical dilemmas surveyed by this research was presented by the author to an audience of EPs, one of whom remarked It’s like everything that’s wrong with my job!  A virtue-ethical approach helps the practitioner to balance their own needs with the needs of the client in the sense that in providing a laudable service to the client, the practitioner also increases their own store of internal goods.  Could a virtue-ethical approach reduce the reported incidences of ‘drop-out’ in the profession?

Educational psychology practice can be stressful.  As Keith-Spiegel and Koocher (1995, p.319) state of the psychology professions in general;
The ethical pressures from within the workplace may range from subtle erosion of professional values to overwhelming emotional distress.
One might reasonably claim that the educational psychology service where ethical practice is regarded as having a teleological aim rooted in an aspiration to the ‘good’ is more likely to have a high morale, to attract and keep good staff and to maintain an ethical environment which fosters values.  The possession of goods internal to practice, as defined by MacIntyre, benefits the individual practitioner because they are intrinsically valuable components of a flourishing professional life.  Francis (op. cit., p. 9) states that, good ethics improves morale and avoids debilitating arguments and attracts and keeps good staff.  Arguably the same would obviate the need for pleas such as that of Roberts (1985) for professional civility, a quality which is even now sometimes lacking on the EPNET forum.

4. Minimisation of ‘blame-culture’

In the sense and to the extent that professional practitioners such as educational psychologists follow rules of conduct, legal in terms of the law and quasi-legal in terms of professional practice guidelines and research ethics codes, their action and judgements can be described as ethical.  A choice of one action over another is ‘right’ if it is in accordance with established rules and ‘wrong’ if it contravenes the same.  This approach can lead to what one respondent in this study has called ‘ethical correctness’ and can lead to defensive practice which is more in the interests of the practitioner than of the client.  Nagel (1973) points out that, whereas it is intuitively plausible that people should not be morally judged for what is not their fault, for an unforeseen consequence issuing from factors beyond their control, nevertheless, whether an outcome is judged good or bad can depend precisely on those factors.  In such cases, it is but a short step to moving from an assessment of an outcome as bad to an unfavourable moral judgement of a person.  A virtue ethical approach is not concerned with ‘blameworthiness’ as such, but would judge an action admirable or deplorable depending on the quality of the virtuous intention which instigated it, and its congruence with the regulative ideal of the good educational psychologist.  

5. Training ethically literate new entrants to the profession

New entrants to the profession need to be inducted, not only into the skills and practices of the profession but also into the recognised ethical narrative of working and researching with multiple clients, acknowledging that whatever is regarded as ethical in one time, location and culture is subject to change and reinvention in another.  The ethical narrative has to be vibrant and not moribund if it is to draw in the commitment of new entrants.  

Ethical dilemmas of the kind identified in this research can be emotionally very demanding and practitioners need sufficient training to understand these aspects of their work to minimise both ‘burn-out’ and a defensive avoidance of reflecting on the issues, which may impair the service to which clients and stakeholders are entitled.  Eraut claims (op. cit., p.19) that professional knowledge cannot be characterized in a manner that is independent of how it is learned and how it is used.  EP knowledge and skills carry responsibilities and the potential for abuse of power, whether intentional or not.  This knowledge and these skills should be framed in the context of awareness of what it means to be an ethical practitioner.  Handelsman et al. (2005) discuss the complexity of becoming an ethical professional, and ethics training by ‘osmosis’.
Becoming an ethical professional is more complex than simply following a set of rules or doing what one sees one’s mentors do, and helping students become ethical psychologists involves more than teaching certain professional rules to morally upright people who will easily understand and implement them (Handelsman et al., 2005, p.60).

They advocate an ‘acculturation model’ compatible with MacIntyre’s views on newcomers’ induction into the tradition of a profession and predict that its effectiveness could be judged by fewer ethical infractions and trainees who are able to function better as independent ethical thinkers who are able to handle dilemmas that do not correspond so neatly to adherence to rules, (ibid., p.64).  This is compatible with the findings of Adam and Rachman-Moore mentioned in the literature review.  In investigating how a business organisation can best implement an ethical code of practice, Adam and Rachman-Moore found that formal methods, i.e. specific ethics training and courses on the code of ethics combined with means of enforcement, was not sufficient for the purpose of implementing ethical conduct within an organisation.  They found that informal methods, i.e. the examples set by the managers and the social norms of the organisation were perceived by organisational members as having most influence on their conduct, concluding that organisations need to pursue means for enhancing ethical leadership qualities at the management level.  

6. Maintaining ethical and critical awareness amongst expert practitioners

Where conflicts arise between conflicting ethical principles, in determining courses of action, Lyndsay and Clarkson (op. cit.) argue the need for training and supervision at not only initial but also post-qualification levels.

Eraut discusses the fallibility of routinized behaviour and intuitive decision-making among expert practitioners.  Many EPs work in a time pressured environment, with cases that may be regarded as ‘routine’ or at any rate well-defined cases for which there may be procedural precedents.  Alongside these, there are more ‘problematic’ cases that inevitably require more deliberation in the form of analysis.  Eraut (op. cit., p.155) states, there is a need for professionals to retain critical control over the more intuitive parts of their expertise by regular reflection, self-evaluation and a disposition to learn from colleagues.  This implies from time to time treating apparently routine cases as problematic and making time to deliberate and consult.  It is partly a matter of life-long learning and partly a wise understanding of one’s own fallibility.

This has implications for supervision models within EP services.  It is also relevant for decision-making in newly formed multi-disciplinary services.  Clegg (2000) writing from a clinical psychology perspective, states that virtue ethics, social constructionism and clinical practice all share the assumption that mental reframing occurs during discourse.  The supervision needed for reflective educational psychology practice cannot take place where the virtues of trustworthiness and respect, for example, are absent.  Decision-making in multi-disciplinary teams is unlikely to be amicable in the absence of agreed adherence to virtues such as benevolence, respectfulness, humility and prudence.   Ethical practice requires on-going reflection.  The quality of the relationship between client and practitioner in clinical practice has been identified by Fonagy (2002) as more crucial to the success of therapy than the actual therapy chosen.  This healing bond is more likely to be achieved by the practitioner motivated primarily by goods internal to practice than the one blindly following procedures or motivated primarily by external goods.  

7. Encouraging a psychological paradigm which moves away from the focus on the deficit model

Linley and Harrison (2006), writing primarily from an occupational psychology perspective, argue that questions of character or virtue, long absent from the psychology agenda, are the focus of a new emphasis in psychology, Positive or Strength Psychology. They state,
…psychologists are now beginning to provide a common vocabulary for researchers and practitioners interested in the good life of happiness, health, well-being and fulfilment, just as the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders has done for researchers and practitioners interested in psychopathology, illness, disorder and distress (Linley & Harrison, 2006, p.86).










How might an aretaic turn be given momentum?

Is it possible simply to ‘make up one’s mind’ to be honest or trustworthy or to have integrity or whatever the desirable quality is?  Does one either simply ‘have it’ or not?  Can virtue be acquired?  In the first place, these virtues require a context.  What does it mean to be honest or trustworthy or to have integrity in a given situation?  Some academic psychologists, for example Meara and Day (2003) have already attempted to specify core virtues for the academic community.  Can one try to develop those qualities by habitually acting as if one had that quality, by acting as someone who possessed that quality would act in that situation?  Good habits, when they become dispositions, are self-reinforcing, hence the term, virtuous circle.  There are clear implications here for a number of areas of EP practice.  New movements within professions are given momentum by entering into professional conversations and by the induction of new entrants into that modus operandi.  MacIntyre (1998) states that,
To enter into a practice is to enter into a relationship not only with its contemporary practitioners but also with those who have preceded us in the practice, particularly those whose achievements extended the reach of the practice to its present point.  It is thus the achievement and, a fortiori, the authority, of a tradition, which I then confront and from which I have to learn.  And for this learning and the relationship to the past which it embodies, the virtues of justice, courage, and truthfulness are prerequisite in precisely the same way and for precisely the same reasons as they are in sustaining present relationships within practices (MacIntyre, 1998, p.285).

The new entrant to the profession may lack or fail to develop, any awareness of ethical issues at all, if such matters have a low profile on training courses.  New entrants should not come to believe that they are ethical ‘by default’ so long as the formal code of ethics and conduct has not been breached. 

The previously mentioned survey by Lindsay and Colley (1995) found that 37 per cent of BPS psychologists contacted said that they did not experience any ethical dilemmas in their daily practice.  Lunt (2002) interpreted the findings to be an indication, firstly that most psychologists do not place a high priority on consideration of ethical dilemmas, secondly that such dilemmas centre on research issues and day-to-day client contact and finally that psychologists feel constrained in raising ethical issues where clients or employers may have a specific interest.  Both Lunt (ibid) and Francis (2002), point out the need for the new entrant to develop client-oriented values, to encounter good role models in supervision, thereby gaining experience of their professional responsibilities, and to identify ethical goals.  In this way the new entrant learns about goods internal to practice by observing the actions of an appropriate mentor.  

The research described in this thesis was conducted specifically with educational psychologists and the results indicated that 99.2% of respondents did experience ethical dilemmas.  However, as has been previously noted, this figure may represent only the minority of self selected of EPs who actually responded.  There is no way of knowing whether others did not reply to the questionnaire because they considered it to be fatuous, unimportant or ‘navel-gazing’.  Research findings amongst the whole EP population might be similar to those of Lindsay and Colley.  

There are implications for recruitment.  Jordan and Meara (1990, p.111) state that, …professionals would do well to focus on the kinds of persons whom they recruit for their training programs and the kinds of experiences that they seek throughout their careers to enhance their personal and professional integrity.  Some of the potential applications of Strengths Psychology cited by the authors have implications for selection and training of new entrants to the profession.  Are we not witnessing the emergence of an aretaic turn in psychology albeit under a different name, repackaged and marketed under the soubriquet Strengths Psychology?  In their proclaimed search for, an integrative conceptual framework that allows a deeper understanding of the structure and taxonomy of strengths (Linley & Harrison, 2006, p.87), the authors might usefully be referred to psychology’s roots in philosophy.  

In the above section, some suggestions of how a virtue-ethical approach might enhance the practice of educational psychology have been explored.  Below are two examples of practical decision-making, which draw on a combination of principle and virtue ethics. 

It should be acknowledged at once that the full facts surrounding the ethical dilemmas reported via the questionnaire survey and used as illustration below are not known, and that a rounded conversation about any of the dilemmas presented in this thesis would depend on more detailed information having been obtained through an interview.  This area of EP practice is, I believe, ripe for further research, but was not the remit of the current work, whose aim was to survey the broad spectrum of ethical issues in educational psychology in order to gain a broad brush oversight of the current situation.  

Two dilemmas are, however, discussed in general terms. It has been argued in this thesis that the proper goal of educational psychology as a practice is the flourishing of the child or young person, with particular reference to the child or young person within the education system.  The ethical act therefore is considered to be that which is congruent with this goal.

Example One: A dilemma of confidentiality

Respondent 101: Is it ethical to encourage a parent to fully explore all possibilities for placements for her child, if I know that in reality there will only be a place available in one school (e.g. due to other resources being full?)

There is no information as to whether the EP believes that the only available place will be an unsuitable placement for the child, and that point does not seem to be the focus of the EP’s dilemma.  No information is available as to whether the EP feels under any pressure from the employer to encourage the parent to fully explore all the placements available (to ‘go through the motions’? or to preserve the illusion that the authority provides genuine choices of placement for parents when it does not?), or whether this is something the EP feels obliged to do for reasons unknown.
The main issue here appears to be on the relationship of trust between the parent and the EP, and the fact that the EP holds knowledge (i.e. that all other places are full) which the parent does not hold.  
The dilemma is in two parts.
1) Should the EP keep this knowledge secret? Or share the knowledge?
2) Should the EP encourage the parent to explore all possibilities for placements? Or just direct them to the one school where a place is available?

In taking a decision to direct the parent to all possible placements, the EP would be respecting the parent’s right to have access to information relevant to the child’s education and respecting the parent’s autonomy in being able to express an informed choice (even if circumstances prevent that choice from being fulfilled).  By visiting different placements, even if the parent chose freely to send the child to the only school place available, the parent would have gained valuable insight and knowledge about the sort of provision available for that particular child which might be useful for the future.  The parent may, for example, be impressed by a particular practice in one school and suggest that a similar practice should be instigated in the eventual school of choice.  Or the parent may wish to know of the existence of other provision so that if a place became available in the future, an application could be made.  Or, if the child has a Statement of Special Needs, the parent, in full cognizance of the facts, may choose to go to a tribunal to seek the placement of choice.  If the EP makes a decision to deprive the parent of access to this information and of the right to express a choice (regardless of the outcome), the EP would both fail to respect the parent’s rights and break the bond of trust which should bind a practitioner and client/stakeholder.

In taking the decision to share with the parent that, in reality, there was only one available placement, the EP would be demonstrating virtues of honesty, fairness and trustworthiness.  Honesty would compel the EP to share known facts about the case.  A sense of fairness/ justice would prompt the EP to share any knowledge with the parent that enhances the child’s equal opportunities to access a potentially suitable placement.  Trustworthiness, one of the cornerstones of the EP-client relationship, would prevent the EP from deceiving the parent by deliberately withholding information that could impact in any way on the child’s actual or future flourishing in school as described above.

In making a decision to reflect on the case, the EP may consider that s/he could not know for certain if pupils in other schools might be moving on, or if a Headteacher had plans to expand his/her school, and that a place might become available at a future time, as yet unforeseen.  

The ethical act, given this reasoning with the available facts, would be to encourage the parent to fully explore all possibilities of placements but also to inform her honestly and realistically what placement is likely to be available, and what her statutory rights consist of. 

Example Two: A dilemma of resistance to managerial hegemony

Respondent 100: Does anyone else encounter the dilemma that has beset a colleague of mine? In trying to describe as accurately as possible the needs of a non-speaking autistic child he has strayed into the territory of ‘provision’: he has told the parents the type of setting that would best meet the child’s needs.  As a result, he has been firmly told that his words could cost the county dearly; he has also been told to remove the phrase from his report that says the child will need education ‘beyond the school day’.  His dilemma is that one of his core beliefs as a psychologist is that he should promote the best interests of the child yet this can be seen as disobedience by budget holders.  What should he do?  Risk his career or toe the line?

The issue here appears to be caused by the different perceptions of two professionals about their role.
1) The EP wishes to act congruently with his/her core belief that s/he should promote the best interests of the child. This core belief is not idiosyncratic.  It is consistent with the goal of educational psychology as a good profession, and of the good psychologist to promote the flourishing of the child within the educational setting.   In the context of educational psychologists’ advice to local authorities for statutory assessments, the SEN Code of Practice (7:79) states, Those giving advice may comment on the amount of provision they consider appropriate.  Thus LEAs should not have blanket policies that prevent those giving advice from commenting on the amount of provision a child requires.
2) The budget holder also wishes to act congruently with his/her presumed core belief(s).  We cannot know what these beliefs are.  It may be that a good budget holder manages the budget in such a way that it does not go overdrawn in order to protect taxpayers’ money, or in order to keep his/her job.  Or it may be that a good budget holder manages the budget to please political masters so that s/he can receive rapid promotion, increased salary and thereby provide more effectively for their family.  Knowledge of the budget holder’s belief system, though potentially interesting, does not impact on the dilemma as described.

In taking a decision to stand by the psychological advice s/he had provided in good faith, having demonstrated humility and conscientiousness in reflecting on its accuracy and possibly seeking a second opinion on its recommendations from a respected colleague, the EP would be acting consistently with the professional ethic of promoting the flourishing of the child, within the educational context.  The ethical act would therefore be to stand by the advice provided.  It is the responsibility of the EP to provide advice in good faith and the responsibility of the budget holder to say whether the provision recommended can be afforded.  The EP would be demonstrating the virtue of courage in pointing this out to the budget holder and in resisting pressure to alter the report.  The EP would also be demonstrating the virtues of honesty, trustworthiness and integrity in issuing only good reports i.e. reports which were congruent with canons of competence, thoroughness and truthfulness.  The EP would also be demonstrating the virtue of charity in recognising that the budget holder also ‘had a job to do’ and not to hold a personal grudge against him/her such that future working relationships for the benefit of other children might be impaired.  The budget holder would be demonstrating competence and courage in accepting proper responsibility for refusing to implement the recommendation and managing the consequences.

Although it has been claimed earlier in the thesis that the virtues benefit the holder, this clearly cannot be said to be the case in every particular instance.  If the EP in question were to be penalised by losing his/her job or promotion prospects through virtuous conduct in this instance, then it could be argued that s/he was patently failing to flourish.  The vices of cowardice and dishonesty might clearly have led to a more favourable material outcome for the EP in the short term in this specific instance.  MacIntyre’s argument regarding the goods internal to professions is relevant here.  If educational psychology is to be regarded as a good profession, i.e. one which contributes to the flourishing of the community through supporting the flourishing of children and young people in the education system, then the EP should cultivate the virtues necessary to achieve internal goods.  MacIntyre has anticipated this very dilemma, 
Yet, notoriously, the cultivation of truthfulness, justice and courage will often, the world being what it contingently is, bar us from being rich or famous or powerful.  Thus although we may hope that we can not only achieve the standards of excellence and the internal goods of certain practices by possessing the virtues and become rich, famous and powerful, the virtues are always a potential stumbling block to this comfortable ambition (MacIntyre, 1985, p.196).

The dilemma described above and many others similarly reported are indirectly addressed in the House of Commons Children, Schools and Families Committee Report (2006-7, p.6), which investigates options for making EP services more independent of local authorities.  The report affirms specifically that, the Government believes that local authority educational psychologists do provide professional independent advice.  It also cites the AEP response to the Committee which states, (idem, p.6),
We would argue that there is an implicit understanding within Local Authorities that psychological advice is not contaminated by budgetary constraints, but rather first and foremost reflects the needs of the child or young person and how they can best be met.  Given the number of EP responses to this survey which indicate otherwise, the committee report and AEP advice may be considered optimistic.  In considering the question of delivery of educational psychological services, however, the committee members might be mindful of the arguments put forward by Cribb and Ball (2005).  In the context of an article which explores the current trend towards partial privatisation of education through an ethical lens, the authors affirm that, 
In particular, we must ensure that fundamental issues about the nature and quality of educational relationships and character are not erased by the overwhelming dominance of goal-oriented discourses.  Here is where ethical theory is useful.  First, the longstanding debates constitutive of ethical theorising show, in countless ways, how obligations and dispositions cannot be reduced to goals.  Second …we need to find ways to recognise the legitimate claim that each of these three considerations [i.e. the deontological, consequentialist and virtue-ethical frameworks] makes upon our ethical sensibility and reasoning, and hence be ready to operate self-consciously with the tensions between them.  Third, and finally, therefore we ought to be ready to explore the concepts and arguments rehearsed in ethical theory to help us to articulate and analyse policy ethics (Cribb & Ball, 2005, p.126).  

Hursthouse argues that while utilitarian and deontological frameworks of ethical problem solving presuppose that dilemmas are resolvable, i.e. that there is a ‘right’ solution to be found, this is not necessarily the case in virtue ethics,
…proponents of virtue ethics can readily admit the possibility of irresolvable dilemmas as even quite common, because they are relaxed about not providing a decision procedure, not even one that only those with moral wisdom can understand and apply (Hursthouse, 1999, p.68).





Ethical codes, codes of conduct incorporating quasi-legal guidelines, review boards and disciplinary committees have been created by a wide range of professional and academic bodies with the aim of securing the protection from harm or exploitation of their clients or research participants, ensuring standards of competency on the part of practitioners and maintaining standards of professional conduct with respect to peers, clients and wider audiences.  Although their embryonic lineage can be traced to classical times, it is only since the latter half of the twentieth century that they have proliferated and been adopted by an ever increasing number of professional and academic institutions.  This is both laudable in intent and, prima facie benevolent in application.  

The BPS and its Divisions represents the psychology professions in Great Britain and issued its updated code of conduct and ethics in 2006.  There can be no guarantee, however, that the existence of any code per se, will, of itself, be a force for positive change in the life of the individual child.  Once principles have been codified, and homage paid, they can still be subject to manipulation, subversion and cynical application.  If the existence of a code of professional practice is treated merely as a checklist to be ticked off primarily to ward off accusations of poor practice, then it may create more rather than less unethical behaviour.

It is generally considered ethical to act in accordance with a recognised ethical system.  Organisation of groups of people from whole societies down to individual families relies on a level of moral order to flourish.  One line of argument is that what it is right to do is based on reason, and reason requires consistency which should be universal.  Therefore rules should be applied consistently.  It is equally argued that it is a good thing when people follow moral principles which produce good outcomes but break these principles when they produce bad outcomes.  For EPs, the role of situated judgement within a relationship is crucial because no two pupil assessments are identical, whereas managers within a hierarchy, who have not developed a fiduciary relationship with the individuals or families involved, may be adhering to impartial, universal principles which fail to recognise the unique features of a particular case.  ‘Good’ and ‘bad’ outcomes are of course value judgements which can be hijacked by particular interest groups.

In order to be maximally effective therefore, codified ethical principles need to be embedded in a dynamic narrative in which responsive, accountable professional practice is positively reinforced and where there is a shared moral vocabulary, a shared set of moral concepts, rules and purpose.  In other words, they should be integral to the work undertaken, as in MacIntyre’s description of internal goods rather than supplementary.  How educational psychology as a practice retains its integrity will depend, after MacIntyre, on how the virtues are exercised in sustaining the institutions that support the practice.  The integrity of a practice causally requires the exercise of the virtues by at least some of the individuals who embody it in their activities: and conversely, the corruption of institutions is always in part at least an effect of the vices (MacIntyre,1998, p.286).

To reach a moral judgement on the course of action to be taken is to ask what principles or rules apply to the situation and what are their relative urgencies, that is to say, is it right in the given situation that one ‘ought’ should overrule another ‘ought’.  In order to have confidence in a moral judgement, the formal requirements of the ethical code should be met.  Not only formal but also substantive requirements need to be met, that is, the judgement needs to be made with reference to human qualities of honesty, courage, integrity, i.e. virtues.  There are complex moral situations where appeal to a single principle or rule of thumb cannot ensure a rational outcome and where fine or ‘nice’ moral judgements can only be made by practitioners who have experience of and sensitivity to the complexity of the situation.  Those practitioners also need to be reflective practitioners so that they can be reasonably sure that they are not self deceivingly privileging their own personal inclinations.

There is an argument for raising the profile of ethics within the profession, and encouraging on-going debate into sensitive issues from the ‘good’ of an individual life to the power of institutions.  Adherence to a code is arguably the minimum standard to which EPs should aspire and an aretaic turn in EP practice would ground practice in internal goods.  This, I argue, is not the ‘navel-gazing’ claimed by Respondent 88 but a justifiable enterprise necessary to maintain the integrity of the profession.

In the review of the literature surrounding this issue, I referred to Lindsay’s Presidential Address of 1995 and his reference to the debate on-going in Britain at that time about societal values, making the point that psychology does not operate in a social and value free vacuum and can be driven in one direction or another by political and cultural agendas.  Educational psychologists’ and clients’ (in the widest sense) understanding of ethical may legitimately differ and there should be space and time for negotiation of different moral complexities and a shared moral vocabulary.  However, in this apparent ‘solution’ is also contained the seeds of the dilemmas of the next generation.  Moral concepts are neither timeless nor unhistorical.  It can be argued that acceptance by future generations of a ready-made moral vocabulary of the virtues would represent an abdication of responsibility and failure to engage with conceptual conflicts.  Only the continual process of negotiation and re-examination of values between disciplines and between generations can prevent one set of ethical standards becoming absolute and therefore coercive.  The value lies in the process of debate rather than any final account.

Nevertheless it may be possible for a unifying narrative of ethical decision-making amongst the different disciplines thrust together as uneasy bedfellows in Children’s Integrated Services, in a newly formed Health Professions Council, and in a Children’s Workforce Development Council, to emerge in much the same way as the open and free exchange of ideas and the tolerance of ambiguity between different academic disciplines, can be made possible by the virtues of prudence, integrity, respectfulness and benevolence described by Meara and Day (2003).  The disciplines of, clinical, counselling and occupational psychology as well as social work and medicine are already debating the place and value of virtue ethics in their professional practice and the climate is ripe for such a debate both in educational psychology and in the wider children’s workforce of which the government intends that we should become a part under the Children Act 2004.  

The position paper, Approaches to Ethics in Higher Education, produced by the ETHICS project, University of Leeds (2004) claims that the requirement to teach professional ethics is a growing one throughout HE, since a degree qualification has now become a prerequisite for entry into the professions, Helping students to reflect on and deal with the ethical issues they will face in their careers is an essential part of any vocational training (PRS-LTSN, 2004, p.5).   There is increasing pressure on previously independent professions to work in a multi-disciplinary framework to secure best outcomes for clients.  Therefore, a more systematic approach to the teaching of ethics taken by training institutions may result in the development of a common language between different professions and common acceptance of the necessity of viewing professional practice through an ethical lens.

This questionnaire survey of EPs has attempted to map their current ethical thinking, describe the type and prevalence of ethical dilemmas they encounter, and reveal some of the strategies used by EPs to resolve them.  It has indicated that EPs’ views on what ethical professional practice involves varies widely, as does their experiences of ethical dilemmas.  It has shown how EPs’ ethical decision-making may be affected both by their personal circumstances and by the ethos of the service within which they work.  As a piece of research, it has numerous limitations which are discussed in the following section.

However, there may be possible desirable outcomes of this research project.  The first is that the process of participating in the study, or reading about it may lead to increased ethical interest amongst the EP participants and EP services.  These are all members of a profession of whom many may in the near future be re-organised into multi-disciplinary teams. They may be able, in turn, to have a positive influence in promoting ethical literacy in the workplace, much as emotional literacy has relatively recently been embraced.  It may equip EPs with the ethical arguments needed to challenge other services and institutions.  

It may also provide some information to support the current debate regarding EPs’ perceived independence vis à vis their employers.  The government has stated that it wishes to enhance parental satisfaction with the way in which special educational needs are identified, addressed and funded, and enhance parents’ confidence in an assessment system that is both fair and independent.  These results have shown that EPs are, in some instances, influenced by local funding arrangements, despite assertions by the AEP to the contrary.

The third desirable outcome might be that, with the advent of three year professional training for EPs, consideration may be given to including more than a tokenistic ‘nod’ in the direction of ethical teaching and learning, so that ethical awareness becomes engrained in the practice and supervision of educational psychology, and is treated, after MacIntyre, as an internal good. 






CHAPTER 6: LIMITATIONS OF THIS RESEARCH WITH IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ITS DEVELOPMENT

This research project has been ambitious, and possibly over ambitious, in scope.  From one point of view, it would have been desirable to begin at a ‘bottom-up’ level, with detailed interviews of a smaller number of EPs and a purely qualitative analysis.  This approach was considered and would have had a number of advantages.   The data gathered would have been richer and more detailed.  Unstructured or semi-structured interviews could have investigated more thoroughly what respondents actually meant when they produced the raw data.   The brevity of several of the responses to the open ended questionnaire questions required, in some cases, subjective analysis by the researcher, which may be open to the criticism of over interpretation.  Where respondents had printed out and hand written on the first electronic questionnaire (which had been produced without response ‘boxes’ for reasons previously explained), then responses to the open ended questions were noticeably briefer than on the second version which was sent out a few days later, as soon as the problem became apparent.  The disadvantages of using open ended questions in self administered mail questionnaires have been acknowledged.

It would have been equally possible to generate theory using interviews, and have the advantage of being able to return to interviewee for more data based on emergent insights.  This was not possible with the questionnaires returned anonymously.  After much consideration, the researcher decided not to approach respondents who did provide contact details because any such contact would have become a de facto interview, and criteria required on whom to approach and on what grounds.  A total of 71 (59.2%) out of the 120 respondents had indicated willingness to be contacted and the sheer volume of potential data threatened to become unmanageable for a research project of this size.  

The goal of this study was to be exploratory and descriptive – an attempt to start investigating a previously unexplored area and to generate theory surrounding it.  Although the data has been analysed using a grounded theory approach, it has not been possible to provided a saturated analysis to extract the fullest explanatory framework, in the absence of interviewing.  However, all 120 questionnaire responses were analysed, even though no new level one codings were added after Respondent 84, as subsequent responses were deemed to fit into codes already generated. 

An initial survey of the whole profession was considered to be a valuable preliminary step that would provide an oversight of the current situation, upon which framework other ‘richer’ investigations could be built.  However, the findings cannot necessarily be generalised to the whole profession, since it is likely that the questionnaire respondents were more interested in the topic of ethics than those who did not respond.  Some of those who did not respond may have been indifferent or positively antipathetic to the project.  Although 120 responses in total were received, it is not possible to be sure how many questionnaires actually reached the EP population, as this depended on whether the PEP or SEP passed them on to their teams.  It is therefore not possible to calculate the actual percentage of EPs who received the questionnaire and of those who responded to it.  A pilot study was conducted, prior to this survey.  It could be argued that the pilot study was in fact a pre-test, and that this project has been a pilot study for a future investigation into EPs’ views of and experiences in ethical decision making, based on a different methodology, which might be informed by the results obtained here.


All words, written or spoken, constitute discourse and this is by definition subject to techniques of analysis.  The traditional questionnaire, as used in this survey, assumes designated roles, veridical responses and/or descriptions of experience, and the search for objective knowledge, which is implicitly assumed to be attainable.  Wetherall and Still (1996) argue that engagement with anything – be it object, proposition or situation can take on a ‘reality form’, i.e. what is contextually construed or constructed of that reality.  The conclusions of this study into EPs ethical decision-making can be regarded as reflecting one reality-form, but it is one construction of reality amongst many other possible constructions which a different researcher may have construed.  It was not possible to seek consensus with another EP on all of the codings generated because of the sheer volume of data to be analysed.  Wherever possible, within the time demands which could be placed on colleagues, the researcher has sought to discuss and seek agreement on the codes and categories generated.  Although every attempt has been made to ‘ground’ the research data in the reality of EPs’ expressed opinions and experiences, the subjective choices made by the author in analysis of the data, specifically in the choices of codes and categories, have inevitably influenced the outcomes.

Given the pressures of one-year training arrangements, trainee research projects have been individually devised and carried out on a small-scale basis and over a limited time period.  While many trainees have managed to carry out excellent work despite this, the impact of such research on the national scene has been limited and individual projects have, by and large, failed to contribute cumulatively to an evidence-base for educational psychology practice (Miller, 2007, p.6). 

The National Educational Research Forum (NERF) has developed the notion of a national Development and Research programme, whose prime function is to coordinate and disseminate quality educational research on nationally agreed key themes, in order to maximise its effectiveness.   Principal educational psychologists and university trainers and researchers in education, participate in the forum in order to facilitate the inclusion of the contribution of trainee educational psychologists, now engaged in three year training programmes. One of the advantages of this ‘top-down’ approach will be, therefore, that doctoral students can contribute data and findings to coordinated large-scale research programmes.  Course Advisory Committees will generate topics and research questions with reference to certain criteria, one of which will be professional relevance.  
 
The subject of ethics is of significant professional relevance.  I believe that there should be an on-going programme of ethical enquiries to encourage reflection and debate in the profession, contribute to educational governance and plot historical shifts in ethical thinking over time.  Professionals working at all levels in education, and specifically educational psychologists, should have awareness of ethical issues in their own practice in order to have to have an overt personal and professional rationale for ethical decision-making which will lead to improving outcomes for children and young people under the Every Child Matters framework.  I hope therefore that the accumulation of research evidence over time, regarding how EPs identify, and attempt to resolve ethically troubling issues in their practice, contributes to this debate, and provides evidence of the need to raise the profile of the topic in both educational psychology doctoral training courses, in everyday EP practice, and, arguably, in the training of all of the education professions.  

This study has revealed many aspects of ethical professional practice which would have deserved more thorough investigation and discussion than has been possible.  Taking the results forward, it would be possible to construct further quantitative and qualitative studies, with the aim of mapping more comprehensively current ethical awareness and problem-solving in educational psychology.  The findings from this study could be taken back to the respondents for corroboration.  The themes so far grounded could be mediated through close replication and used as a template for the audit of new data.  Over time it would be possible to plot patterns of changing constructs and use the reported results to map out the historical development of changing ethical attitudes in the profession.  Single case studies would be useful to provide evidence for or against the hypothesis advanced here that cognitive dissonance theory is a useful framework within which to view both the prevalence and intensity of ethical dilemmas experienced.  A case study approach would have another value when associated with a grounded piece of research because, Through it, the researcher can depict a type, an average, an extreme or an exemplary case (Strauss, 1987, p.221).  Of interest would be a parallel study into the ethical beliefs of budget holders.

Also, with the hindsight arising from the analysis of the present data, a correlational design study which investigated the relationships between the various responses would be of interest.  For example, do respondents who give ‘rule-bound’ responses to the definition of ethical professional behaviour also cite more dilemmas of a particular category?  Are they more or less likely to consult colleagues?  Is there a gender factor, consistent with Kohlberg’s and Gilligan’s theories of moral development?





CHAPTER 7: PERSONAL REFLECTIONS ON THE PROCESS OF WRITING THIS THESIS

It is easy to sleep-walk into collusion with abuse of power through failure to reflect.  The operatives of any administration, liberal and well-meaning though it considers itself to be or is considered to be, gradually acquire the group’s normative beliefs, which can then be worn uncritically like comfortable old slippers.  It is easy to let ostensibly fair and just processes and systems set up by liberal governments who have signed up to a human-rights agenda lull us into the belief that, in implementing those systems, we are, ipso facto, being and acting fairly and justly.  The comfort zone feels like a safe place to be, and in any case, the work load of an educational psychologist is often relentless and leaves little time for critical reflection or, as some would call it, navel-gazing.

I began to gaze at my navel a few years ago when I heard the word ‘ethical’ being used in the same sentence as ‘tick box’.  About the same time, I became aware that, in my local authority, systems of governance which had been set up with the stated aim of ensuring fairness and transparency for children with special educational needs, were themselves acting as barriers to support needed for some individuals amongst those children.  Nor were they transparent and fair, since those well-educated and articulate parents who metaphorically or literally shouted loudest received the best service regardless of the need of their child.  The systems, criteria, principles took on the aspect of ‘rules’, compliance to which was expected.  Senior administrators who were not EPs could misapply the results of cognitive and other psychological assessments without allowing for the caveats and probabilities inherent in ‘soft’ psychological science, as opposed to the ‘hard’ traditional sciences.  Potentially life changing ‘labels’ were being given to pupils for administrative convenience.

Secure in the knowledge that one is applying the rules is a comfortable place to be.  After all, one is just following orders and many a career prospect has hinged on a person’s ability to efficiently follow orders, meet targets, and apply criteria.  The extreme positions to which unthinking compliance with systems can lead have been described by the philosopher Hannah Arendt (1977) and shown experimentally by the psychologist, Milgram (for example Milgram,1974).  Zimbardo (2007) has shown how the ethos of the social setting influences the individual moral behaviour of the individual.  There seems to be an uneasy tension between reasonable compliance to reasonable requirements and ethical resistance to unreasonable requirements.  It is easy to comply, more difficult to resist.  The comfort zone of cognitive consistency can be replaced by a feeling of discomfort caused by cognitive dissonance, which we are then motivated to reflect upon and perhaps reduce in ways described above by Festinger.

Faced with induced compliance to administration driven rules, criteria and monitoring which have not always contributed to the flourishing of individual children and young people within the education system, I have struggled to cope with the disharmony that this has generated in me.  I have had to reflect on the causes of this disharmony and on my own values and principles.  That struggle generated my interest in how colleagues situated their own ethical decision-making…and the differing extent to which some regarded their professional decisions as even having an ethical perspective.

I was well into the discussion section of this thesis before I realised, eureka-like, that I had set out to reduce my own cognitive dissonance by acquiring knowledge about ethics and ethical decision-making in institutions, as predicted by Festinger’s hypothesis.  Thesis as therapy?  It would appear so.  I have grown in confidence and challenged the social worker who laughed when she said ‘Every Child Matters’ and the jobsworth administrator who told me with mind-numbing circular logic that a child was not entitled to education because she was not on a school roll!  I try in my daily practice, to resolve the dilemmas facing me on a regular basis in a way which maintains both my integrity and my sanity, in other words, I compromise.  Institutions, and especially those in the public sector, work in the light of guiding principles based largely on ethical values founded on notions of universality and impartiality and perhaps necessarily so.  However, ethical values of what it is right to do, and what it is good to be, should override guiding principles which have become stale, rigid or, in individual cases, unjust and oppressive.  
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Appendix (I):  Questionnaire cover letter

Educational Psychologists’ views of and experiences in ethical decision-making.

This questionnaire investigates Educational Psychologists’ views of and experiences in ethical decision-making.

The author is a chartered member of the British Psychological Society, a member of the Association of Educational Psychologists, and works full-time as an educational psychologist in a local authority.

Analysis of the questionnaire will form the basis for a piece of work leading towards completion of Part Two of the Doctorate in Educational Psychology at Sheffield University. The author expresses her thanks to all those who give their time to its completion, but colleagues are of course at liberty to decline to answer any or all of the questions if they so wish.  All questions relate to respondents’ professional opinions and actions.

Please continue on a separate piece of paper if you require more space for your answers and are returning a hard copy.









Any complaints regarding the conduct of this research should be addressed to The Course Director, Ed.D (Educational Psychology), Education Building, University of Sheffield, S10 2JA

Terminology:  For the purposes of this questionnaire the terms used in the questionnaire are defined as follows:Professional practice = your work as an Educational PsychologistEthical issue=any aspect of your professional life which has an ethical dimension.Ethical dilemma= as above but where you find an ethical conflict between one or more courses of action.Ethical problem-solving: any strategy, reasoning, heuristic which you use to help you resolve such dilemmas.The author will be pleased to provide interested participants with a copy of the abstract of the finished work.  Please indicate if you wish to receive this. 
Appendix (II): Questionnaire (first electronic version)





Are you qualified		1 year		2-4 years		5years or more

Are you 	An employee?		In private practice?		Both?

Are you prepared to give your name and contact details below and to be approached for interview if required?  If so, please complete this box.










Would you describe the incidence of these as?

DAILY
FREQUENTLY (several times a week)
REGULARLY (but not every week)
QUITE OFTEN (on a number of occasions a year)
RARELY (from time to time in your working life)
NEVER

Do you wish to comment further on this?


Question 4: Please describe one or more examples of such dilemmas.


Question 5: In resolving these dilemmas, did you have or do you have recourse to any particular philosophy/religion/world view?


Question 6: Who and/or what do you identify as supporting you to resolve ethical dilemmas at work on a practical level?


Question 7: Does your team discuss the ethical issues surrounding EP practice? 		YES			NO

If yes, is it your opinion that there is a general commonality of views on ethical issues?
			YES			NO

Can you elaborate further on your reply?






Appendix (III): Questionnaire (2nd electronic/hard copy version)

Question 1:  (Please circle your responses)

Are you 			MALE?			FEMALE?Are you qualified		1 year		2-4 years		5years or moreAre you 		An employee?		In private practice?		Both?












Question 3: (Please circle your responses) 

Do you encounter dilemmas in your practice as an EP, which you consider have an ethical dimension?

YES				NO
Would you describe the incidence of these as?DAILYFREQUENTLY (several times a week)REGULARLY (but not every week)QUITE OFTEN (on a number of occasions a year)RARELY (from time to time in your working life)NEVER









































































































I am a qualified educational psychologist working full-time in Lancashire and studying for the Doctorate in Educational Psychology part-time at Sheffield University.  I am a member of the AEP and BPS.

For my thesis, I am conducting a survey of educational psychologists’ views of and experiences in ethical decision making, and am hoping to obtain as many responses as possible to the enclosed questionnaire.

I would be very pleased if you would forward the questionnaire to members of your team, with the request that colleagues might be kind enough to spare some time to its completion.  Replies can be returned electronically or a hard copy can be posted.










Appendix (V): Ethical approval


SCHOOL OF EDUCATION 
ETHICS REVIEWER’S COMMENTS FORM

This form is for use when ethically reviewing a research ethics application form. 

1. Name of Ethics Reviewer:	Dr. Tom Billington

2. Research Project Title:	An investigation of educational psychologists’ views of and experiences in ethical decision-making
3. Principal Investigator (or Supervisor):	Pat Bennett
4. Academic Department / School:	Education

5. I confirm that I do not have a conflict of interest with the project application

6. I confirm that, in my judgment, the application should:
	Be approved:	Be approved with suggestedamendmentsin ‘7’ below:	Be approved providing requirementsspecified in ‘8’ beloware met:	NOT be approved for the reason(s) given in ‘9’ below:
	X			

7. Approved with the following suggested, optional amendments (i.e. it is left to the discretion of the applicant whether or not to accept the amendments and, if accepted, the ethics reviewers do not need to see the amendments):

8. Approved providing the following, compulsory requirements are met
(i.e. the ethics reviewers need to see the required changes):

9. Not approved for the following reason(s):












1.	behaviour in accordance with employer policy
2.	behaviour in accordance with professional code of practice (unspecified)
3.	behaviour in accordance with BPS code
4.	behaviour in accordance with AEP code
5.	behaviour in accordance with the law or statute
6.	behaviour in accordance with personal sense of “rightness”
7.	behaviour in accordance with personal notion of being “virtuous”
8.	acting to promote the wellbeing of others (in general)
9.	no response provided
10.	acting to promote the wellbeing of the child (specifically)
11.	acting to promote the wellbeing of parents
12.	acting to promote the wellbeing of families
13.	acting for the wellbeing of the client (client unspecified)
14.	behaviour in accordance with underlying moral principles
15.	prompting moral behaviour in others
16.	showing respect for others
17.	showing respect for the child
18.	showing respect for other adults
19.	respecting people’s views
20.	respecting the rights of the child





26.	behaving in a way which impacts positively on others
27.	securing informed consent
28.	ensuring fair distribution of resources
29.	integrating ethical issues to professional life
30.	ensuring the protection of the public
31.	uncoded because meaning unclear
32.	tautological definition




37.	valuing people’s own resources, supporting resilience
38.	not abusing power




Integration of Level 1 codes into Level 2 categories

Category 1: Seeking Well Being/Doing no harm: 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 25, 26, 37

Category 2: Rule following: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5

Category 3: Respecting Human Rights: 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 27, 30 33, 34, 35, 36, 38, 40

Category 4: Doing the Right Thing: 6, 14 (some), 15

Category 5: Practising Virtues: 7, 29, 39, 40

Category 6: Overseeing Fair Distribution of Resources: 28














2.	 confidentiality issues (unspecified)
3.	confidentiality issues specified in respect of a child
4.	caught between wishes of the child and wishes of the parent
5.	conflict of interest between the needs/wishes of the child and those of  the education authority
6.	conflict of interest between the needs/wishes of the child and those of the school
7.	confidentiality issues of a budgetary nature
8.	whether to challenge other EP colleagues’ opinions/attitudes/discourse
9.	no response
10.	whether to challenge school’s opinions/attitudes/discourse
11.	whether to challenge the education authority’s opinion/attitude/discourse
12.	whether to challenge the parents’ opinion/attitude/discourse 
13.	the circumstances when one should challenge the child’s opinion/attitude/discourse
14.	the use (potential misuse) of IQ tests
15.	the potential for harm of EP assessment on the child
16.	whether to disclose assessment results to a child
17.	unease about the effect of multiple professional assessment on a child
18.	unease about the quality of decision-making with regard to a child’s                 education
19.	pressure NOT to disclose or provide a diagnosis/label (unspecified)
20.	pressure TO provide a diagnosis/label (unspecified)
21.	unease regarding inappropriate diagnosis/labelling by others
22.	pressure from schools to provide a diagnosis/label
23.	pressure from parents to provide a diagnosis/label
24.	pressure from the education authority to provide a diagnosis/label
25.	unease that decisions are being made not in the interests of the child
26.	decision-making re: out-of-county educational provision
27.	balancing needs of stakeholders (unspecified)
28.	balancing the need of the individual pupil-v-the wider community
29.	reconciling different discourses around special needs
30.	tensions between inclusion-v-special education
31.	EP view in conflict with child’s wishes
32.	EP view in conflict with parents’ wishes
33.	EP view in conflict with school’s wishes
34.	EP view in conflict with management wishes
35.	resource issues (unspecified)
36.	resource issue (time)
37.	challenging the competence of others (whistle-blowing)
38.	disquiet about the  informed consent of the child
39.	disquiet about how information should be presented/reported back
40.	who is the client? to whom is duty owed|?
41.	concerns regarding unequal access to resources
42.	concern that “the system” is being abusive in individual cases.
43.	misuse of exclusion issues.
44.	EP professional opinion at odds with others (unspecified)




49.	conflicts of interest between education authority interests and private practice







Integration of Level 1 codes into Level 2 categories

Category 1: Weighing and Balancing: 1, 27, 28, 39, 40, 45, 47, 48

Category 2: Respecting Confidences: 2, 3, 7, 

Category 3: Challenging Other Discourses: 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 29, 31, 32, 33, 34, 44, 50, 54

Category 4: Being Between a Rock and a Hard Place: 4, 5, 6, 20, 27 (some), 35, 36, 39, 47

Category 5: Malfeasance/Doing Harm: 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 25, 38, 46, 53

Category 6: Dilemmas of Social Justice: 41, 42

Category 7: Labelling: 20, 29, 43

Category 8: Conflicting Principles/ Conflicting Roles: 21, 30, 34, 51



















7.	 ‘None’ identified but pragmatic strategies listed
8.	Human rights charter cited
9.	professional code of practice cited
10.	Chartered status cited
11.	Principle of non-malfeasance cited




16.	Personal principles/own worldview (unsourced)
17.	Utilitarian mentioned specifically
18.	christian (inferred but unspecified)
19.	Aspiration to virtue




24.	Belief in equal opportunities
25.	Duty to maximize individual happiness
26.	Feminism or feminist psychology
27.	Every Child Matters Agenda
28.	Emancipatory view of psychology
29.	‘People have the resources to solve their problems’
30.	Notion of public service
31.	Concerns about fair play










Integration of Level 1 codes into Level 2 categories

Category 1: Being Child/Person-Centred:  1, 3, 14, 23, 25 

Category 2: Believing in a Religious Precept: 4, 5, 6, 21, 38, 39, 

Category 3: No particular worldview: 8

Category 4: Believing in a Political Goal/Social Justice: 7, 11, 20, 26, 27, 29, 30, 31, 35

Category 5: Adhering to Statutes: 12, 13

Category 6: Being Influenced by a Philosophical Paradigm: 20, 22,

Category 7: Being Influenced by a Psychological Paradigm: 17, 18, 32 

Category 8: Using Pragmatic Strategies: 10










1.	peer support (other EPs)
2.	senior colleague/line manager support
3.	peer support (team colleagues in general)
4.	peer support (other professionals)
5.	family and friends
6.	self through personal reflection
7.	involve the client in decisions





13.	adherence to professional code












Integration of Level 1 codes into Level 2

Category 1: Peers, whether EPs or from another discipline:  1, 3, 

Category 2: Line managers/Supervisors: 2, 8, 19 

Category 3: Family and Friends: 5, 

Category 4: A Role Model: 10, 

Category 5: The Client: 12, 13

Category 6: Reflecting on Personal Knowledge/Experience/Beliefs: 6, 11, 12, 14, 20, 22 

Category 7: Researching/ Professional development: 19, 24

Category 8: Referring to established guidelines: 13, 18


















N = 3115	Full members = 84.5% of the total membership.  































Procedural note: Many respondents defined ethical in phrases that generated more than one level one code, for example, Respondent 30: Following code of practice, service protocol and ‘do no harm’. – Doing my job to the best of my ability.   
In this example, four level one codes (2, 1, 25 and 7) were allocated to this response.  These were later subsumed under three level two categories, namely Category1, Rule –following, Category 3, Seeking Well-being/ Doing no harm and Category 4, Practising Virtues.

In the following categories, where examples have been provided for illustration purposes, * indicates that the instance provided contains codes which fitted into more than one category, for example,
Respondent 1: *Working within the BPS code of Ethics and in general honest and moral behaviour and practice.  
This respondent defined the term ‘ethical’ in working practice as having two dimensions: one being the specific observance of the principles enshrined in the professional code of practice and the other implying a wider application of the personal quality of honesty.  These responses were coded at level one as 2 and 7 and later subsumed under Category 1, Rule-following and Category 4, Practising Virtues










Doing The Right Thing 27.1%

Seeking Well Being/ Do No Harm 41.5%

Respecting Human Rights 32.2%

























Principle of cognitive consistency i.e. motivation to reduce discomfort and achieve consonance.


and/or



